- Series
- As we see it: Vietnam '68
- Air Date
- 1968-07-01
- Duration
- 00:30:15
- Episode Description
- Dr. Walter Judd, a former U.S. Congressman and delegate to the General Assembly of the United Nations; also a former medical missionary in mainland China, makes the case of the Vietnam War as a watershed in the U.S.' willingness to use force to respond to the spread of Communism.
- Series Description
- A series of appearances of noted spokesman presenting their various views on the war in Vietnam, conducted over a period of five weeks on the campus of Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, under the sponsorship of the Miami University Student Senate.
- Subject(s)
- Creator(s)
- WMUB (Producer)Miami University (Oxford, Ohio) (Producer)
- Contributors
- Judd, Walter H., 1898-1994 (Speaker)
- Genre(s)
- Geographic Region(s)
- regions
- Time Period
- 1961-1970
[00:05 - 00:10]
It just is difficult but as simple as that. President Truman
[00:10 - 00:15]
came to it President Eisenhower came to President Kennedy came to it President Johnson has got to come
[00:15 - 00:20]
to it keep Red China on first base keep Red China on first base until this ending
[00:20 - 00:25]
of World History in somebody makes a mistake somebody somebody dies like
[00:25 - 00:30]
most of them or the situation changes worldwide or the internal
[00:30 - 00:32]
situation in China changes.
[00:32 - 00:37]
It is changing it will change people in first grade
[00:37 - 00:43]
because if you give them a second base then they want a third base.
[00:43 - 00:48]
What's third base. The rest of Asia Africa and Latin America.
[00:48 - 00:53]
That's not a mean nasty charge by me it's been proclaimed in the Lin Biao doctrine the
[00:53 - 00:58]
equivalent of Hitler's mind comp people didn't pay attention to that either. And that
[00:58 - 01:03]
doctrine says that the way to conquer the United States is not by attacking it.
[01:03 - 01:08]
They're not strong enough with inserting in. Organizing people's
[01:08 - 01:12]
wars in the rural areas and the North Atlantic is the equivalent of the
[01:12 - 01:17]
city. You see Western Europe and the United States. So after
[01:17 - 01:22]
second base these 15 peninsulas in which you live one pearl of all the
[01:22 - 01:27]
people in the world the rest the next is the rest of Asia Africa and Latin America.
[01:27 - 01:32]
They held a conference a little over a year two years ago now in January
[01:32 - 01:37]
in Havana. What they called the first try Continental
[01:37 - 01:42]
tri continent Asia Africa Latin America the first tri Continental
[01:42 - 01:47]
solidarity conference and they plan their this subversion of the rest of Asia
[01:47 - 01:52]
Africa and Latin America. Mr Castro announced on television so everybody in
[01:52 - 01:57]
Florida and so on could hear that Cuba is to be to the Western
[01:57 - 02:02]
Hemisphere what North Vietnam is to South Vietnam. That's just as plain as they could say it.
[02:02 - 02:07]
Cuba is the place where the agents and the dissidents born in Panama are born in
[02:07 - 02:12]
Guatemala born in Colombia Brazil Ecuador Bolivia.
[02:12 - 02:17]
But one of the revolutionists not patriots of the country where they were born when Europe
[02:17 - 02:21]
become a communist you were not now a Russian patriot or a Chinese pages or an American
[02:21 - 02:26]
patriot. You're a cancer cell. You have abandoned
[02:26 - 02:31]
rejected the law abiding processes of growth of your own nation your a world revolution
[02:31 - 02:36]
is. And just as the leaders of the Viet Cong have been trained in
[02:36 - 02:41]
North Vietnam and supply and directed and then
[02:41 - 02:46]
transported down down into South Vietnam or from these
[02:46 - 02:50]
training schools they have in Cuba transported back into the western hemisphere
[02:50 - 02:55]
to to subvert from within. Suppose they get third base and they want a
[02:55 - 03:00]
home base don't think what's home to the North Atlantic Western
[03:00 - 03:05]
Europe has three hundred twenty five million people the largest body of skilled competent
[03:05 - 03:09]
trained manpower in the world. Our side of the Atlantic has almost two hundred twenty five
[03:09 - 03:14]
million United States and Canada. If these five hundred fifty million really were
[03:14 - 03:18]
united the president wouldn't have to be sending over emissaries
[03:18 - 03:23]
pleading with the North Vietnamese to come and negotiate ho demanded have to
[03:23 - 03:29]
come voluntarily to negotiate and on the free world's terms but we're not united.
[03:29 - 03:34]
Our alliances as they say in Washington buzz are in disarray which is
[03:34 - 03:39]
Washington's word for a mess. Now Lenin said this
[03:39 - 03:44]
except they didn't use baseball terms he said back in 22 or 23 the
[03:44 - 03:49]
way to Paris. That is the North Atlantic is through Peking and
[03:49 - 03:54]
Calcutta which was then the capital of India. There's no secret about it.
[03:54 - 03:59]
Heat modern first base don't give them second to let alone third and home base now how do you
[03:59 - 04:04]
do that. There are two ways one is and even one's positive the negative is don't do anything to
[04:04 - 04:08]
help. Nobody loses by being assisted to win. You know
[04:08 - 04:14]
that means you mustn't trade within their system with all their
[04:14 - 04:19]
great leap forward says not sound and they've got shortages compared mainland
[04:19 - 04:24]
China and preach China on Taiwan. This one a shambles this one
[04:24 - 04:29]
the most effective and really sensational illustration of what
[04:29 - 04:34]
three people will do given a chance to work for development without internal
[04:34 - 04:39]
disorder that there is on the planet today. Their
[04:39 - 04:43]
system is in trouble. Keep them in trouble don't help them out by
[04:43 - 04:48]
supplying debt surpluses or the products that our system provides
[04:48 - 04:53]
or encourages and enables people to produce and supply them with the
[04:53 - 04:58]
things that will enable him or give them a better hope of replacing our system which
[04:58 - 05:03]
works with their system which doesn't work. Second
[05:03 - 05:08]
don't give them the smashing victory which official diplomatic
[05:08 - 05:12]
representation would recognition would need.
[05:12 - 05:17]
We don't need to recognize them to deal with them. Britain recognize Red China
[05:17 - 05:22]
in one thousand forty nine and her ambassador has yet not yet
[05:22 - 05:27]
been honored with being received by miles of them personally the Asia watches
[05:27 - 05:31]
the white man being held outside the door waiting now almost
[05:31 - 05:36]
20 years whereas we have been dealing with the communist almost
[05:36 - 05:41]
every month since 54. We've had official dealings with them
[05:41 - 05:46]
in conferences at ppl in Warsaw and various other
[05:46 - 05:48]
places.
[05:48 - 05:53]
If the United States accepts embraces read Red China can
[05:53 - 05:58]
anybody else resister. That's the show.
[05:58 - 06:02]
And third this is why Red China must be brought into the United Nations until she
[06:02 - 06:07]
qualifies for membership until she qualifies. Frequently you've heard people
[06:07 - 06:12]
say we got our heads in the sand we're rigid stubborn blank pretending that Red
[06:12 - 06:18]
China isn't there denying her existence keeping your out of the United Nations.
[06:18 - 06:19]
Now let me be rough.
[06:19 - 06:25]
That is totally inexcusable misrepresentation of our position.
[06:25 - 06:29]
We are not stubbornly rigidly keeping Red China out of the United Nations. She is
[06:29 - 06:34]
stubbornly rigidly keeping herself out because she announces she will not
[06:34 - 06:37]
qualify for membership.
[06:37 - 06:42]
The door is wide open. We offered over 70 times to sponsor
[06:42 - 06:46]
their membership in the UN if they will qualify and what do they have to do to qualify.
[06:46 - 06:51]
Well read the United Nations charter. It hasn't even been re written by any of our American
[06:51 - 06:57]
courts as yet and you can read it and find out.
[06:57 - 07:02]
It says membership shall yet membership is open to other peace loving nations that will
[07:02 - 07:07]
accept the obligations of the charter. What's the first obligation to read Crean
[07:07 - 07:12]
from the threat or use some force in international dispute. That's all they have to
[07:12 - 07:17]
do. But most of them score with my scout is over the use of force he said you've got to use
[07:17 - 07:21]
force political power comes only out of the barrel of a gun.
[07:21 - 07:27]
All he has to do is abandon We've never asked him to abandon his claim to Taiwan
[07:27 - 07:34]
to agree not to use force the issue was about how our international disputes to be settled.
[07:34 - 07:38]
He announces the UN's got to come to him. The mountains got to come to mama
[07:38 - 07:44]
not Moll adjust himself to the monkey. Please don't wreck the UN.
[07:44 - 07:48]
Some of us to work for world organization. That would be effective long before the
[07:48 - 07:50]
UN came into being.
[07:50 - 07:55]
It's because I want a better United Nations more effective even more united that I don't
[07:55 - 08:00]
that I advocate not bringing in until it qualifies outfits that you know will
[08:00 - 08:03]
make it weaker and more disunited.
[08:03 - 08:08]
This is the negative don't help winning. Now what's the positive the positive the
[08:08 - 08:13]
do all you reasonably can that is within the reasonable limits of
[08:13 - 08:18]
limits so our resources and with due regard to our other obligations including those at home
[08:18 - 08:23]
do all we reasonably can to strengthen the countries around China. And here you
[08:23 - 08:28]
come to Vietnam again. Because it's the key to those that are
[08:28 - 08:33]
being there you must strengthen because that's where they're coming. They're trying to come down through this weak spot.
[08:33 - 08:38]
Now how are we doing in Vietnam militarily we've been doing much better
[08:38 - 08:44]
including the events that have happened in the last few days. For example the
[08:44 - 08:49]
Vietnamese army is very much better than it was. Two years
[08:49 - 08:53]
ago as late as one year some people thought that you couldn't make a good army out of
[08:53 - 08:58]
Vietnam. There are many reasons for that. In the more Orient particularly where you have a
[08:58 - 09:03]
Confucian background the lowest order of society is the military and the
[09:03 - 09:08]
highest is the scholar. And they sent out into the military
[09:08 - 09:12]
government and the people who would become pugs and gangsters and gunman and
[09:12 - 09:17]
racketeers and the students were they were the intelligencia they were
[09:17 - 09:22]
exempt. They would never resort to force to get their hands.
[09:22 - 09:27]
Now it takes a while believe me to change it so that it becomes praiseworthy NPP
[09:27 - 09:32]
Riady and honorable to go into the military. But when I was out
[09:32 - 09:36]
there last fall it was clear that the Vietcong military
[09:36 - 09:40]
establishment had improved enormously much better.
[09:40 - 09:46]
And as been proved in recent weeks they have not won. There has been not
[09:46 - 09:52]
been one outfit in South Vietnam that darn it down its arms and ran away.
[09:52 - 09:57]
Up until a year ago the Vietnamese South Vietnam my IIS army was losing
[09:57 - 10:01]
about one weapon to the Viet Cong to every weapon it was getting back and
[10:01 - 10:06]
all of last year when they were a bit calm. It would be a Congress
[10:06 - 10:11]
losing about 2 weapon to 1 they were getting back and the defections
[10:11 - 10:16]
from the Viet Cong to the free Vietnamese were more in the first six months of
[10:16 - 10:21]
67 than in all of nineteen sixty six.
[10:21 - 10:26]
The tide was turning and it I say not one outfit in
[10:26 - 10:31]
this recent striking from within hasn't thrown down its arms and run.
[10:31 - 10:36]
Now they were caught asleep. Why I suppose they read the New York Times and some of the
[10:36 - 10:41]
American papers which said that Hu Jia man is just a Vietnamese Patriot this is
[10:41 - 10:46]
a civil war. Well if he's a Vietnamese then he
[10:46 - 10:51]
will respect the lunar calendar. After all North Vietnam
[10:51 - 10:55]
proposed and announced the six day truce. And
[10:55 - 11:00]
Vietnamese don't go out and go to war during the lunar
[11:00 - 11:00]
holiday.
[11:00 - 11:05]
They announced and proposed and announce the six day truce on the first day when all
[11:05 - 11:10]
the Vietnamese or did what they've always done had a holiday and took
[11:10 - 11:15]
leave. And the attack came right then if you have any doubts as to whether they're trying in this or
[11:15 - 11:20]
Vietnamese. They demonstrated it in only three weeks ago.
[11:20 - 11:24]
Second Vietnamese is better politically if we force them to have
[11:24 - 11:28]
five elections in 14 months that's not too bad.
[11:28 - 11:33]
They didn't want to do it. This isn't their way of choosing their leaders but they had to do it in order to
[11:33 - 11:38]
satisfy us. We wanted a legitimate by our methods so they did it.
[11:38 - 11:44]
So their government is stronger politically and the Kabit Khan
[11:44 - 11:49]
only captured papers makes perfectly clear they thought. I guess again they'd been reading
[11:49 - 11:54]
the speeches of senators that the government of Vietnam is so one popular and it's so rotten
[11:54 - 11:59]
and the people are so against it. And not one city not
[11:59 - 12:03]
one grows up and were turned over to the Viet Cong.
[12:03 - 12:06]
Not a one welcomed him.
[12:06 - 12:11]
The government is stronger with all of its weaknesses than we have been given it credit. It's better
[12:11 - 12:16]
off economically. There's a bad black market there no question about it but
[12:16 - 12:21]
not nearly as bad as it was in Korea believe me. Now the US position is stronger
[12:21 - 12:26]
out there in the beginning we couldn't do much because we didn't have the base.
[12:26 - 12:30]
There was only one deepwater port and it took 50 to 65
[12:30 - 12:35]
days for a ship to come in get up to the border unload and get out. And
[12:35 - 12:40]
now in these first two years of our effort out there beginning in February
[12:40 - 12:45]
30 65 we've got six deepwater ports and the longest any ship
[12:45 - 12:50]
had been in harbor in any of these in this first nine months of this year was seven
[12:50 - 12:55]
days mostly three to five. Three years ago there was only there
[12:55 - 13:00]
were only three ports that would take airports that would take Jets one good one into
[13:00 - 13:04]
winter which you could squeak. Now we have eight good
[13:04 - 13:08]
airports some with the runways at long last. It's
[13:08 - 13:13]
possible to put pressure on the adversary and then
[13:13 - 13:18]
the screening begins in our country then we should be doing that which we've spent
[13:18 - 13:24]
two years getting ready to do You can't build a building until you get the foundations in.
[13:24 - 13:29]
There's been real progress. You may say
[13:29 - 13:34]
is there any hope in this kind of a policy. Yes there is.
[13:34 - 13:39]
Take for example three two years ago just now Mr.
[13:39 - 13:43]
Senator Fulbright held hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on what our
[13:43 - 13:48]
policy should be with respect to this part of the world and a whole series of so-called
[13:48 - 13:53]
experts testified 30 to 11 days. Most of them hadn't
[13:53 - 13:58]
had much experience with the communist but it was obvious they had at least read each other's books.
[13:58 - 14:02]
And this one. Is there a line number one the communists are
[14:02 - 14:05]
there too.
[14:05 - 14:10]
They have united the people of China. They said the people of China have
[14:10 - 14:15]
accepted communism they said they're better off under it. They said the regime in
[14:15 - 14:20]
Peking is stable. It's in secure and permanent and complete control
[14:20 - 14:24]
of the China mainland. Ergo we must be practical and accept
[14:24 - 14:28]
communist China and North Vietnam as a permanent fact.
[14:28 - 14:33]
That sounded pretty plausible but events proved as some people thought
[14:33 - 14:39]
would be the case that the premises of those conclusions were not sound.
[14:39 - 14:44]
And within three months after the experts testified events in China
[14:44 - 14:49]
proved one that the people of China had not accepted communism too.
[14:49 - 14:54]
They were not better off under it. Most of them talk to you the swimmin they were
[14:54 - 14:59]
swimming three four five six hundred every month them Akala that many
[14:59 - 15:03]
got there nobody knows how many died in the room. I haven't heard anybody risking their life to swim into
[15:03 - 15:06]
mainland China at you.
[15:06 - 15:11]
And third the regime in Peking stable by it was torn from top to bottom
[15:11 - 15:14]
United.
[15:14 - 15:18]
War going on between the washouts he and his faction and most of them
[15:18 - 15:23]
over what it is that's incredible in Communism
[15:23 - 15:27]
don't don't don't give up on human beans.
[15:27 - 15:34]
I will never accept as permanent that which enslaves the human mind
[15:34 - 15:38]
or the body it can do it temporarily.
[15:38 - 15:43]
Don't sell man short. Or if you aren't sure about man please don't sell God
[15:43 - 15:48]
sure the universe is not on this side of this. History is not on the side
[15:48 - 15:53]
of this and the pessimists who
[15:53 - 15:58]
get overwhelmed by those little setbacks. I think we
[15:58 - 16:03]
ought to take a longer look at history. In short the Tyee
[16:03 - 16:07]
had turned militarily and politically out there.
[16:07 - 16:12]
Thanks first to the tenacity of the South Vietnamese and the other reason
[16:12 - 16:17]
for the changing is the plea of the of the direction is the clear headedness the
[16:17 - 16:22]
courage and the skill and devotion and heroism
[16:22 - 16:28]
of the Americans and the Koreans and the Australians and so on.
[16:28 - 16:33]
I found great confused by angry confusion in the United States but I found less
[16:33 - 16:38]
confusion in Vietnam now as a result of these changes.
[16:38 - 16:43]
The Communists can't win militarily.
[16:43 - 16:47]
Then why don't they come and negotiate. Because every time there's a so-called peace
[16:47 - 16:52]
demonstration in the United States it leads holds human to think that we will lose.
[16:52 - 16:58]
Why should he give up. Take a first down as long as there's a chance
[16:58 - 17:05]
to get a home run or to get a touch I should say.
[17:05 - 17:10]
And if we just didn't talk about bot negotiations all the time. And
[17:10 - 17:14]
appears so anxious we'd better have better chances of getting them. I
[17:14 - 17:19]
once heard one of my daughters say to her younger sister if you want that boy don't you see
[17:19 - 17:24]
and she had more sense than our government. Don't
[17:24 - 17:30]
Cherry seems whole let him come. Keep the door open.
[17:30 - 17:34]
But every time we do so we go. They hold out for us that makes more and more
[17:34 - 17:38]
concessions. Our eagerness for negotiations
[17:38 - 17:41]
reduces our chance of getting them.
[17:41 - 17:50]
Hold human has for hopes one disorders and self Vietnam and he's
[17:50 - 17:56]
trying his level best to create them. I don't think he can do it now.
[17:56 - 17:59]
They are sure we will stand firm.
[17:59 - 18:04]
The problem always is a vicious circle of how to get development
[18:04 - 18:09]
and security. How do you get about what might housing help highways a
[18:09 - 18:14]
better living standard agricultural reform. As long as there's insecurity all the time. And
[18:14 - 18:19]
how do you get security unless the people are sure that by turning in those pumps
[18:19 - 18:24]
their own government will make possible better living conditions and education and health and so on
[18:24 - 18:27]
for the families and their children.
[18:27 - 18:32]
You have to get group security and development but the only place you can break that vicious circle
[18:32 - 18:36]
is that security not report person security.
[18:36 - 18:41]
Then as has been proved in Korea and every other country the coarsest for repealing
[18:41 - 18:45]
it within are irresistible.
[18:45 - 18:50]
Given security you will not find the Vietnamese giving up
[18:50 - 18:56]
the second hold because disunity is especially among the European allies.
[18:56 - 19:00]
The third hope is the capacity of the world communist movement with its
[19:00 - 19:05]
cells everywhere trained to create disruptions
[19:05 - 19:09]
disruptions in the Middle East I think you will find that step up there are not
[19:09 - 19:12]
disruptions in Korea.
[19:12 - 19:18]
Believe me the Pueblo was more of a defeat for us than anything that's
[19:18 - 19:23]
happened in Vietnam because it showed the world that the great United
[19:23 - 19:28]
States either can't or won't. I don't know which.
[19:28 - 19:30]
But the results are the same.
[19:30 - 19:35]
You either can't or won't defend its own armed forces on the high
[19:35 - 19:36]
seas.
[19:36 - 19:42]
I repeat what I said at the beginning. Who wants to be an ally of a paper tiger.
[19:42 - 19:47]
Paul being that perhaps forcing the Koreans to bring home
[19:47 - 19:52]
their 40000 50000 men some of the best troops in
[19:52 - 19:57]
South Vietnam forcing us to divert the enterprise and other things to the north. If they can
[19:57 - 20:01]
force us to be by under what the communist have always talked about
[20:01 - 20:05]
simultaneous struggles in half a dozen places or even
[20:05 - 20:10]
two then whole G-men hanging on may be able to pull through.
[20:10 - 20:17]
But their best hope is not disorders in South Vietnam or divisions
[20:17 - 20:21]
in Europe or disruptions in other countries it's it's divisions
[20:21 - 20:26]
and doubts and demonstrations even
[20:26 - 20:29]
disorders in the United States.
[20:29 - 20:34]
My friends the critical front just now is not Vietnam. It's here in the
[20:34 - 20:35]
United States.
[20:35 - 20:40]
The urgent need now is not better military leadership from civilians in
[20:40 - 20:45]
Washington but better political leadership from civilians in Washington.
[20:45 - 20:50]
I don't think that can be pulled together unless the people at the top treat the American people the way
[20:50 - 20:55]
Churchill treated the British people who lay it on the line however badly we're
[20:55 - 21:00]
not weak. But if our leaders come to a conclusion but don't
[21:00 - 21:05]
present to us frankly the evidence which led them to that conclusion we are not going
[21:05 - 21:10]
to accept that when they say we must support them but we'll support our country and we'll
[21:10 - 21:15]
support our cause if they if the considerations the facts which led
[21:15 - 21:18]
them to this conclusion are presented to us.
[21:18 - 21:23]
In short I think we must give lesser weight in this immediate future to the possible
[21:23 - 21:28]
but less likely risks for example that Red China would intervene.
[21:28 - 21:33]
Our government under civilians adopted military policies government civilians should
[21:33 - 21:38]
decide whether we get in but once we're in then I think we
[21:38 - 21:42]
ought to pay some attention to the experts. I don't know what we've been spending hundreds of millions of
[21:42 - 21:47]
dollars every year to train experts in military operation and West Point Annapolis and
[21:47 - 21:49]
Colorado Springs.
[21:49 - 21:53]
And then when we get into an operation in this regard the specialist we've trained hundreds of millions
[21:53 - 21:54]
training.
[21:54 - 21:59]
We spend hundreds of millions training I repeat I don't think our new civilian leadership
[21:59 - 22:04]
should have got us into this but we're there. And why haven't we done some of these
[22:04 - 22:08]
things that the military charged with the carrying on of the operation
[22:08 - 22:12]
wanted and their professional judgment told him we should do.
[22:12 - 22:17]
Well it said Red China will intervene but he she liked it too for
[22:17 - 22:22]
several reasons. If she were to intervene down here with her masses she would be inviting
[22:22 - 22:26]
and justifying our destruction of her nuclear facility.
[22:26 - 22:31]
Second how would he supply his masses down here. Third his best
[22:31 - 22:36]
troops are tied up on the mainland almost a million of them watching Taiwan.
[22:36 - 22:39]
They're not free to leave that mainland and go down here.
[22:39 - 22:44]
He's got others up along the border with the Soviet Union and now with the internal difficulties he's got to
[22:44 - 22:49]
keep his most dependable troops at home to keep himself in power we've been given an
[22:49 - 22:54]
opportunity when we don't need to prevail. Dear China it's the least likely
[22:54 - 22:59]
of all the dangers. Well what is said if we were to go ahead and abandon this policy of
[22:59 - 23:04]
gradualism which means that that we escalate only after
[23:04 - 23:09]
the other side escalates when they get their Ana aircraft in and
[23:09 - 23:13]
their SAM missiles so they can shoot down our aviators then we allow our
[23:13 - 23:18]
aviators to attack those targets. There was a time when people say the way to
[23:18 - 23:23]
win a war is to get the most us there first US. This war is being fought on Beat
[23:23 - 23:28]
be played and be sure and don't get there first. But only after
[23:28 - 23:32]
the other side's got the weapons in to shoot down our boy.
[23:32 - 23:38]
I don't like to say this I've opposed it all the way along but that's what we've been doing.
[23:38 - 23:43]
What I'm saying is if you're going to do this get in then get the operational word and the
[23:43 - 23:48]
forgetting begins and the healing begins and there are things to look forward to.
[23:48 - 23:53]
You drag it on indefinitely and you'll have a dead patient. You can't operate
[23:53 - 23:58]
forever. You can't put five or six hundred thousand corners into that little
[23:58 - 24:03]
country strong aggressive hard driving corners with most of the
[24:03 - 24:08]
power and most of the money without destroying the fabric of that little country and you
[24:08 - 24:12]
have a successful operation perhaps and a dead patient that's a
[24:12 - 24:15]
right risk you better pay attention to it.
[24:15 - 24:20]
The greater risks in this gradualism are your giving time for
[24:20 - 24:25]
the communists in China to get missiles developed with which they can
[24:25 - 24:29]
use deliberate nuclear weapons on the United States.
[24:29 - 24:34]
You're encouraging the Soviet Union to commit itself seeing our
[24:34 - 24:38]
hesitation it may get its neck out too far and once it's crossed the
[24:38 - 24:43]
Rubicon. How does it back down and then you have the world Room country to
[24:43 - 24:48]
Greece in which we don't want it because I don't want a world country Greece and I want
[24:48 - 24:52]
us to follow the policy of firmness and strength not belligerence.
[24:52 - 24:56]
Chip on her shoulder. Which without exception has led to
[24:56 - 25:01]
de-escalation and improvement in the situation.
[25:01 - 25:06]
What we should do in the south is hold and help.
[25:06 - 25:11]
But you don't win just by holding and helping in the south. The remember
[25:11 - 25:16]
that the objective in a military struggle is political. Your objective is to
[25:16 - 25:20]
change the will of the adversary. Now what is likely to change the
[25:20 - 25:25]
will hold you meant killing people in the south while we constantly reassure
[25:25 - 25:28]
him that nothing serious is going to happen to his regime in the north.
[25:28 - 25:33]
Now he'll come and negotiate when the pressure on him in the
[25:33 - 25:39]
north is such that it's too dangerous for him not to come and negotiate.
[25:39 - 25:44]
What then is you to do in the north about three or four things one is maybe too
[25:44 - 25:49]
late for this one. Let the South Vietnamese what they do what they beg to
[25:49 - 25:54]
do under President GM and then under General key organize the Liberation
[25:54 - 25:59]
Front in the north. More than a million of them almost a million of
[25:59 - 26:03]
them came from the north. They know where the keys are they know where the Patmos are they know where
[26:03 - 26:08]
the hidden roads are. They know their own people and they want to go back as
[26:08 - 26:13]
guerrillas to interrupt things in the north the way the North is doing in the south but we wouldn't let them
[26:13 - 26:15]
because we mustn't offend the enemy.
[26:15 - 26:22]
A second thing we must do is have a what I would call a Kennedy blockade.
[26:22 - 26:26]
It was dangerous in Cuba and it would be
[26:26 - 26:32]
dangerous you might say in Haifa but I don't think I'll be blunt.
[26:32 - 26:37]
Our government has a right to ask a one of you to go over there and give these lie.
[26:37 - 26:42]
If our government is not prepared to do all it can to reduce the capacity of the
[26:42 - 26:47]
North to get the weapons with which it takes your life. And the
[26:47 - 26:52]
third thing I think we have to do is have more important or more effective attacks
[26:52 - 26:57]
upon more important targets the in the year 1966 67
[26:57 - 27:01]
figures weren't available 99 percent plus of all the flights were
[27:01 - 27:06]
against targets that weren't sufficiently important for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have more on
[27:06 - 27:08]
their list.
[27:08 - 27:13]
Fly right over every day the airfield or the SAM missiles are being assembled and
[27:13 - 27:16]
we saw and took pictures of it for two years and three months.
[27:16 - 27:22]
And finally let our own men bomb that field last October after 68
[27:22 - 27:27]
planes had been shot down American planes and 80 and lost their lives by those
[27:27 - 27:32]
same missiles we were which we watched them assemble. If they found a buffalo down the road they
[27:32 - 27:37]
could should bomb the buffalo but not the base where the SAM missiles were putting in.
[27:37 - 27:41]
And one more and this is the humanitarian one I don't know why we haven't used it its
[27:41 - 27:46]
right use Ronnie's 85 percent of the rice is grown in an
[27:46 - 27:51]
isosceles triangle from home on Hanoi down to the Gulf of Tonkin King and about
[27:51 - 27:55]
100 miles along the Gulf and its grown in
[27:55 - 28:00]
irrigated paddy fields. The Red River comes down 20 to 25 feet
[28:00 - 28:05]
above the fields and their sluice gates to let the water out to irrigate. And
[28:05 - 28:09]
if you break those dikes they lose their rice crop.
[28:09 - 28:13]
Well we couldn't bomb and scars are women and
[28:13 - 28:16]
children. We have in every other war.
[28:16 - 28:23]
This would be mercyful better than kill them it seems to me and turn them to pieces. And furthermore
[28:23 - 28:28]
we can tell them to call off the aggression and we'll help you rebuild them and we'll keep you for
[28:28 - 28:33]
one crop. So you want Starr call off the operation. If that's
[28:33 - 28:37]
cruel and Abraham Lincoln was a barbarian because he burned the wheat
[28:37 - 28:42]
crops in the Shenandoah Valley and he sent Sherman down through the south to
[28:42 - 28:46]
destroy the food of this out of all the methods this is the least
[28:46 - 28:50]
any humanitarian.
[28:50 - 28:55]
I just hope that our government will out of this experience of the last few
[28:55 - 29:01]
weeks recognize that this is an enemy of ours.
[29:01 - 29:05]
I said at the beginning this is a watershed. If we can
[29:05 - 29:10]
humiliate us goes that way. On the other hand if we prevail as we
[29:10 - 29:16]
can and as we will if we understand the watershed goes the other way.
[29:16 - 29:19]
Ladies and gentlemen Vietnam is the test
[29:19 - 29:25]
not of our power but of our understanding and of our
[29:25 - 29:30]
insights. And perhaps I suppose you would say our
[29:30 - 29:34]
character as a people as a nation today. I
[29:34 - 29:39]
welcome the opportunity to talk to you about these jam and these things. Don't take
[29:39 - 29:44]
my word or anybody else's without examining. The hope that the world is in
[29:44 - 29:45]
you.
[29:45 - 29:58]
Arrive.
[29:58 - 30:03]
US you've been listening to an address by Dr. Walter Judd
[30:03 - 30:08]
former United States congressman from Minnesota. Doctor Judd spoke in the series
[30:08 - 30:12]
as we see it Vietnam 68. This form of opinion featuring noted
[30:12 - 30:17]
spokesmen on the war in Vietnam was sponsored by the Miami University student senate
[30:17 - 30:22]
and organized by Dave speller Berg recording an editing was done by Miami
[30:22 - 30:26]
University Radio. This is national educational radio.
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