- Series
- U.S. foreign policy: Demands of the next decade
- Air Date
- 1968-09-09
- Duration
- 00:27:46
- Episode Description
- ABC News commentator Joseph C. Harsch discusses NATO and other western alliances.
- Series Description
- On the occasion of its 50th anniversary, the Foreign Policy Association of the United States organized a traveling conference based on the theme "demands of the next decade." This is a series of recorded speeches from a 1968 Portland, Oregon, conference sponsored by the FPA, the World Affairs Council of Oregon, and Time Magazine.
- Subject(s)
- Creator(s)
- KOAC (Radio station : Corvallis, Or.) (Producer)Oregon State University (Producer)
- Contributors
- Genre(s)
- Geographic Region(s)
- regions
- Time Period
- 1961-1970
[00:05 - 00:10]
Mr harsh in view of what you've just said what justification have
[00:10 - 00:15]
way for maintaining the six American army divisions in Europe.
[00:15 - 00:20]
I don't know that it has to be six divisions mainly it could be
[00:20 - 00:24]
less. I think that what whatever is necessary must be
[00:24 - 00:29]
left there in our own self interest. Those divisions
[00:29 - 00:34]
are not there. For the benefit of Germany
[00:34 - 00:39]
or France or Britain or anyone else. They are there because it is a forward position for the
[00:39 - 00:44]
United States and as long as they are there we have some control of the
[00:44 - 00:49]
direction of German foreign policy. I think if we withdrew those divisions
[00:49 - 00:55]
you have to think about what where German policy would revolve
[00:55 - 01:00]
if they are abandoned left to their fate by us we pull out. I think that
[01:00 - 01:05]
they will immediately see some sort of a of a conciliation with
[01:05 - 01:10]
Moscow. You must remember after all that what this is
[01:10 - 01:14]
all about. Basically we fought two world wars and we keep troops in
[01:14 - 01:18]
Germany because the one of the first requirement.
[01:18 - 01:24]
Of the security of the United States is that no run potentially hostile
[01:24 - 01:29]
power controls the whole of Eurasia and the
[01:29 - 01:34]
power center of the world is still from the English Channel to
[01:34 - 01:39]
the Ural Mountains. If any one man ever
[01:39 - 01:44]
gets control of that whole area of the earth he hones the power center of the
[01:44 - 01:48]
earth in his hands. If it happens to be a pair of hands friendly to us well all
[01:48 - 01:53]
right we don't need to panic about it but a whole series of world
[01:53 - 01:58]
wars have been fought to prevent that massive
[01:58 - 02:03]
population scale industry in power from falling into unfriendly
[02:03 - 02:08]
hands. We didn't want the Germans to have it in World Wars 1 or 2.
[02:08 - 02:13]
We don't want the Russians to have it now. After all the Cold War was a
[02:13 - 02:17]
power struggle waged to prevent Moscow
[02:17 - 02:22]
from controlling everything that lay not only from the English channel of the Ural
[02:22 - 02:27]
Mountains but actually for a moment seen from the English channel of the China Sea.
[02:27 - 02:33]
Maintaining military forces in Europe maintaining an
[02:33 - 02:38]
alliance with the countries of Western Europe whatever their attitude towards us is
[02:38 - 02:43]
merely in the last remaining. A piece of machinery by
[02:43 - 02:48]
which we protect ourselves against any possibility of the
[02:48 - 02:51]
whole of Western Europe flowing into some sort of
[02:51 - 02:58]
a harmony with Russia and we cannot we cannot.
[02:58 - 03:03]
Count upon the good will of Russia if they
[03:03 - 03:08]
ever held within their control the power to do us harm. I do not
[03:08 - 03:13]
think I do not fear Russia as long as there is a balance of power in the world. But I
[03:13 - 03:18]
would greatly fear what she would do with total power if you ever got a hold of it. And I
[03:18 - 03:23]
think one of the things we have to do to protect ourselves against that danger is
[03:23 - 03:28]
go on maintaining as respectable a military force as we can in Europe.
[03:28 - 03:33]
Mr harsh What would you consider to be a respectable military force.
[03:33 - 03:38]
Well I'm sure you can trim it down substantially. It is not necessary
[03:38 - 03:43]
I suppose to maintain women and children the dependents and all that. You can
[03:43 - 03:48]
bring back. You could bring back a lot of. That of the
[03:48 - 03:53]
frills of the army of occupation. As long as you lept left the
[03:53 - 03:58]
command structure and the and the equipment
[03:58 - 04:03]
there you can rotate the actual troops by these big
[04:03 - 04:07]
cargo planes that were building No. And you certainly can cut down.
[04:07 - 04:12]
Maybe I don't know you could cut from half a million to a quarter of a million I suppose without seriously
[04:12 - 04:17]
affecting our ability to influence events in Europe
[04:17 - 04:22]
which would very much help our balance of payments. It is it is the
[04:22 - 04:27]
large amount of family that camp followers that are that
[04:27 - 04:32]
are spending so much money over there. We can cut that down. The only thing is that
[04:32 - 04:37]
I'm a little afraid that if we start cutting You may set in
[04:37 - 04:41]
motion a withdrawal tendency which could go much too far.
[04:41 - 04:43]
Could be very dangerous.
[04:43 - 04:49]
Sir how is Charles de Gaulle parlayed what is a small base of power into what
[04:49 - 04:52]
seems to be a worldwide power base.
[04:52 - 04:57]
I think the only answer I can give you is force of personality. It is
[04:57 - 05:02]
amazing how little power can be translated
[05:02 - 05:07]
into large effect by one man with a face with a vision with a
[05:07 - 05:12]
dream with an assertive personality and how much great power
[05:12 - 05:17]
can be frittered away and left not inadequately used
[05:17 - 05:21]
by a man who doesn't have that quality of leadership. Now
[05:21 - 05:26]
what did all is done is done with mirrors the actual real power front doesn't
[05:26 - 05:31]
begin to justify the influence which this man wheel's and I
[05:31 - 05:35]
suppose it is a reasonable proposition that the minute he go.
[05:35 - 05:42]
All of this fabric of influence which France has today will simply disappear overnight.
[05:42 - 05:45]
The fact is he's got it now and he has it because
[05:45 - 05:53]
he has dignity. He has a commanding presence.
[05:53 - 05:57]
He has a certain grasp of reality and a and a
[05:57 - 06:03]
willingness an ability to to speak in real terms.
[06:03 - 06:08]
He makes pompousness he can explode pompousness with one deft
[06:08 - 06:13]
phrase or word. He is a very able public figure
[06:13 - 06:18]
and one of the tragedies of the moment is that there are so few other similar Well there is no
[06:18 - 06:22]
other figure of such stature. The tragedy of Britain.
[06:22 - 06:29]
Is that in the wake of a Churchill. They have perfectly
[06:29 - 06:34]
nice people. I like them all. Harold Wilson is is is a
[06:34 - 06:38]
good conversationalist. He's a very bright
[06:38 - 06:43]
fella but he's not a great man. He doesn't have he doesn't begin to have the
[06:43 - 06:49]
stature of a Churchill or a to go all Roosevelt or a Kennedy.
[06:49 - 06:54]
You can't help feeling when you talk to him that he's. Well he'd make a very
[06:54 - 06:59]
good professor of economics and one of your colleges out here he's very bright
[06:59 - 07:04]
at that sort of thing he knows his history pretty well. But you can't imagine him
[07:04 - 07:10]
really infusing Britain with a new sense of goal and purpose.
[07:10 - 07:15]
The trouble is that there's nobody in the Tory party either who has as
[07:15 - 07:20]
yet demonstrated the capacity to do that. I know Ted Heath I
[07:20 - 07:24]
know Reggie modeling I know in Macau they're all
[07:24 - 07:29]
very able politicians. McLeod is the ablest political operator of the
[07:29 - 07:34]
lot. And I think he has had a bit as a bit of vision he can
[07:34 - 07:39]
articulate a concept but it's not the kind of concept
[07:39 - 07:44]
it's going to set the prairie is ablaze or set the
[07:44 - 07:49]
British off on some new great crusade. There is no great leadership. The French
[07:49 - 07:53]
haven't. The amount of the French know that many of the things that the
[07:53 - 07:58]
Gold says and proposes are outrageous. This attempt of his to
[07:58 - 08:03]
break up the Canadian federation is an outrageous
[08:03 - 08:08]
thing and isn't sensible you know perfectly well equipped back it's not going to
[08:08 - 08:13]
be re-united with France which is what he wants when he's really trying to do
[08:13 - 08:17]
is simply express.
[08:17 - 08:21]
His own resentment at the victories which British arms won over French
[08:21 - 08:26]
arms in two world wars. But more
[08:26 - 08:28]
isn't the Duke of Marlborough in the wars of
[08:28 - 08:36]
Wellington and no saint in the Polian taken the Louis the Fourteenth
[08:36 - 08:37]
wars.
[08:37 - 08:40]
This is he still resents the fact.
[08:40 - 08:47]
That the British won the battles of plenum and on the Plains of Abraham
[08:47 - 08:52]
and Trafalgar and Waterloo but because he
[08:52 - 08:57]
feels this because he wishes to do these things many of which he can't do he never he
[08:57 - 08:59]
is a great world figure.
[08:59 - 09:04]
I just wish we had some others to match in my. Any other questions.
[09:04 - 09:08]
Mr harsh is military force our dominant means of
[09:08 - 09:12]
influence as opposed to diplomatic means.
[09:12 - 09:17]
You are overstating it of course you're overstating it but
[09:17 - 09:22]
I would certainly go along with what you implied to this extent that it
[09:22 - 09:27]
is my opinion that we had. Do tend frequently in our
[09:27 - 09:32]
history and right now as an example to rely more on military
[09:32 - 09:36]
power than is necessary and less on diplomacy than we cut. I
[09:36 - 09:41]
don't think that we're unbalanced. I think that Europe is a case
[09:41 - 09:46]
where I think our relations with Europe are victims
[09:46 - 09:51]
of the fact that we have sought in by military
[09:51 - 09:56]
means a solution of a problem in the Far East which I think could
[09:56 - 10:00]
have been solved. I personally think it need not have been made a
[10:00 - 10:05]
military issue a tall. And I do think that we could resort to other
[10:05 - 10:10]
means for finding a solution to that problem if we could ever disentangle ourselves from the
[10:10 - 10:15]
present problem there. But I must warn you that I am
[10:15 - 10:20]
not supposed to be talking here about Vietnam. It would be very easy for me to let
[10:20 - 10:25]
myself be drawn into that subject because there I feel quite strongly on it and write
[10:25 - 10:30]
about it but I'm supposed here to be talking only about Europe. Now I don't know how I
[10:30 - 10:35]
can be more responsive to your question without getting outside the area of my proper
[10:35 - 10:39]
field of discussion in this room.
[10:39 - 10:44]
I can only say that I do think that we are over relying on military power right now.
[10:44 - 10:50]
Mr harsh. Why does the United States give money that is foreign aid
[10:50 - 10:53]
to countries that are not friendly to us.
[10:53 - 10:58]
I don't know of any case where we're giving money to anyone for the
[10:58 - 11:03]
purpose of buying friendship. I know of a lot of places where we
[11:03 - 11:07]
are investing money. Usually on loan
[11:07 - 11:14]
for the purpose of improving economic conditions with
[11:14 - 11:18]
the idea that the country in which we so invest will become a
[11:18 - 11:24]
less subject to what the communists call wars of national liberation.
[11:24 - 11:29]
I think it's a pity that it's called aid it isn't foreign to most lay.
[11:29 - 11:32]
It is bookkeeping that covers the
[11:32 - 11:39]
deploying of surplus military equipment. We are
[11:39 - 11:43]
arming armies with World War to cast off guns and
[11:43 - 11:48]
airplanes and things like that in order to make it possible for countries
[11:48 - 11:53]
to to be a little more self defensible than they
[11:53 - 11:58]
otherwise would be the case. If you look at the books on the so-called aid
[11:58 - 12:03]
program you'll find that a great deal of it is merely writing off World War 2
[12:03 - 12:07]
equipment which no longer has any market value. The Pentagon loves it
[12:07 - 12:12]
because they get a book credit. For stuff that they couldn't possibly
[12:12 - 12:17]
sell on a normal market so that they
[12:17 - 12:22]
they get a book credit which they can use them for buying new weapons and some other
[12:22 - 12:27]
country way off which may or may not need it gets a lot of cast off
[12:27 - 12:28]
weaponry from us.
[12:28 - 12:33]
But when it comes to economic aid.
[12:33 - 12:38]
Well I I believe I'm correct in saying that the first
[12:38 - 12:43]
beneficiary of American economic aid is India. We give more to India than anyone else.
[12:43 - 12:48]
When India is a vital piece in the world power pattern
[12:48 - 12:54]
we don't want India controlled by China. And if you believe that
[12:54 - 12:59]
it is necessary China or Russia. If you believe that it is
[12:59 - 13:04]
necessary to contain the imperial power of both China and
[13:04 - 13:08]
Russia then I think you must believe that it is desirable
[13:08 - 13:13]
that we do all we possibly can to make it in via
[13:13 - 13:18]
AIM. A viable modern state able to
[13:18 - 13:23]
live her own life and independence of both Moscow and Peking. I happen
[13:23 - 13:28]
to believe that I do not believe that it is desirable to
[13:28 - 13:32]
allow either Moscow or Peking to control India.
[13:32 - 13:38]
It seems to me that well ma'am put it this way when the present foreign minister of
[13:38 - 13:44]
France coup de morphia was in baster in Washington.
[13:44 - 13:50]
The time came when he received notice that he was being appointed to.
[13:50 - 13:55]
The Foreign Office in Paris. A group of us came around for a sort of farewell session and
[13:55 - 14:00]
somebody said Come on Koos tell us now. What more do you see on the
[14:00 - 14:05]
horizon of the future. And he sat back for a moment he said Well I think I
[14:05 - 14:10]
can only see one possible war. And we said what
[14:10 - 14:16]
he said a war between China and Russia over a possession of India.
[14:16 - 14:21]
Well I think that was a profoundly perceptive thought
[14:21 - 14:26]
which has in large measure been borne out by the fact that since then when
[14:26 - 14:31]
he really foresaw has happened the realisation in both Moscow and
[14:31 - 14:35]
Peking that there is a conflict of interest between them
[14:35 - 14:41]
which is far more important in both capitals than the common
[14:41 - 14:46]
religion of communism. They have been put
[14:46 - 14:50]
apart by. A vast common frontier I've
[14:50 - 14:56]
forgotten what it is an empty space is there all sorts of reasons which have driven them apart.
[14:56 - 15:01]
Producing a power pattern in the world today of great interest I mean what are
[15:01 - 15:05]
the power factors in the world that two great ones the United States and the Soviet Union.
[15:05 - 15:10]
There's there's a third coming up fast. China. And there's a potential
[15:10 - 15:15]
fourth in in India. I don't think that potential is likely to be
[15:15 - 15:19]
realized in a long time. And then of course there is the first world power
[15:19 - 15:24]
in potential which is Western Europe. If Western Europe ever did become
[15:24 - 15:29]
one. It would exceed in all respects except geography. Both
[15:29 - 15:34]
the either the United States and the Soviet Union. So what we're talking about is the interplay of
[15:34 - 15:37]
these power elements.
[15:37 - 15:41]
We do not want Russia controlling China or China controlling
[15:41 - 15:46]
Russia. I say that it is a first national interest of the
[15:46 - 15:51]
United States to see that both Russia and China are contained
[15:51 - 15:54]
within roughly their own present frontiers.
[15:54 - 16:02]
But I think in thinking in those power terms which I do you have to also
[16:02 - 16:07]
bear in mind that containment involves all of these powers
[16:07 - 16:12]
just as we wish to see Russia and China contained. Russia and China wish to see
[16:12 - 16:17]
us contained. They are concerned about the containment of American power.
[16:17 - 16:21]
And I think what is what you must realize is to get this thing in perspective
[16:21 - 16:27]
is that the containment of any one is a constant process involving
[16:27 - 16:32]
all others. In fact we in the Chinese collaborate
[16:32 - 16:37]
in the containment of Russia and we and the Russians collaborate in the containment
[16:37 - 16:41]
of China. And they are both collaborating in the containment of the
[16:41 - 16:46]
United States that is there are points where we and the Russians have a common
[16:46 - 16:51]
interest against China. Are we in China have a common interest against Russia and so on.
[16:51 - 16:56]
This is a game that is going on all the time and must be played. And to us the
[16:56 - 17:00]
vital thing is that we are not outclassed by a
[17:00 - 17:04]
decisive combination of two unfriendly powers.
[17:04 - 17:10]
Mr. harsh one is the influence of the United Nations in this matter.
[17:10 - 17:15]
To me the United Nations is a forum of the nations. It is
[17:15 - 17:20]
merely a neutral meeting place where they come together. The United
[17:20 - 17:24]
Nations is a place where. Decisive opinion can be
[17:24 - 17:30]
organized and made effective. But first you have to have the majority.
[17:30 - 17:34]
The United Nations is a place where the United States and the Soviet Union can meet
[17:34 - 17:39]
and talk and work out possibly a solution to some one
[17:39 - 17:44]
particular problem. But the United Nations is not a thing in itself with power
[17:44 - 17:49]
of its own. It is merely a forum it is a meeting place it is a marketplace
[17:49 - 17:54]
where diplomats can come together. The ability of the United Nations to act
[17:54 - 17:58]
can never rise above the degree of cooperation
[17:58 - 18:04]
which is possible at any given time. Among the great powers
[18:04 - 18:09]
and I go back at the present moment there are only two great powers the United States and the
[18:09 - 18:13]
Soviet Union. So at the present time the limit of the
[18:13 - 18:18]
effective action of the United Nations is the limit of the degree of
[18:18 - 18:22]
cooperation possible on any given subject between the United States and the Soviet Union.
[18:22 - 18:28]
Mr harsh What are some of the factors involved in the deterioration of the North
[18:28 - 18:30]
Atlantic Treaty alliances.
[18:30 - 18:35]
There are many factors involved in the growing estrangement of the United States
[18:35 - 18:40]
and Western Europe and certainly one very important factor is that there were so many of us there
[18:40 - 18:45]
for so long there. One of the most human of reactions is the
[18:45 - 18:50]
feeling in the household when the guests who stayed perhaps a day longer than you originally intended
[18:50 - 18:56]
have gone and the family looks around says gee isn't it wonderful to have a house to ourselves again.
[18:56 - 19:01]
This is true in all households. It is German national households as well as in
[19:01 - 19:05]
individual households we were there a long time. We were
[19:05 - 19:10]
on the present and sometimes a little oppressive. I think it was
[19:10 - 19:15]
inevitable. Obviously the native Alliance was put together under
[19:15 - 19:20]
threat of a great danger. And as the danger recedes so does the
[19:20 - 19:25]
vitality of the institution we put together. It is certainly not entirely
[19:25 - 19:29]
our fault. I do myself feel and this I cannot prove that I am
[19:29 - 19:34]
correct about this but it is my feeling that the decay need not have
[19:34 - 19:38]
gone as far as it did. And above all it was not
[19:38 - 19:43]
necessary that. That the Grand Design
[19:43 - 19:48]
be lost entirely. I think this is the tragedy that the that the
[19:48 - 19:53]
March 24 times. No matter how slow towards a closer
[19:53 - 19:57]
unity of the great European tribes the Anglo-Saxons the
[19:57 - 20:02]
Germans the French the attentions has been halted.
[20:02 - 20:07]
And I would say that today they are moving away from unity
[20:07 - 20:11]
rather than towards you. This I think is the tragedy and I have a feeling that
[20:11 - 20:16]
somehow if we played our cat cards a little more wisely we might have
[20:16 - 20:21]
preserved at least some slight movement towards
[20:21 - 20:22]
unity even.
[20:22 - 20:27]
Even though the goal might be a hundred years away Mr harsh the United
[20:27 - 20:32]
States has strong economic ties with Western Europe. Do you think this can lead to a
[20:32 - 20:35]
compulsion toward political ties of some sort.
[20:35 - 20:40]
Being a journalist I always exaggerate journalism the essence of journalism is both
[20:40 - 20:45]
oversimplification and exaggeration. You wouldn't have newspapers if if you
[20:45 - 20:49]
didn't do that to the news because there's relatively little news on any given day
[20:49 - 20:56]
what you appointed know. Is that there is a deep
[20:56 - 21:01]
underlying community of interest between the United States and Western Europe we are each other's
[21:01 - 21:05]
greatest trading partners and no matter what the estrangement may be
[21:05 - 21:11]
there is an ultimate stop to the and strange estrangement arising out of this
[21:11 - 21:15]
community of economic interest which we do have. And therefore I am being
[21:15 - 21:19]
slightly over pessimistic when I talk the way I do.
[21:19 - 21:24]
Because surely surely this community of interest will at that time
[21:24 - 21:29]
assert itself and a readjustment of the new relationship must must
[21:29 - 21:33]
emerge. It just has to. We can't we can't allow Europe to be
[21:33 - 21:38]
totally alienated from us because that would be a that would be a true defeat
[21:38 - 21:40]
for our purposes and for a national interest.
[21:40 - 21:46]
Sir what our French president de Gaulle's real reasons for keeping Great Britain
[21:46 - 21:49]
out of the European Common Market.
[21:49 - 21:53]
It's the merest fact that as long as the British are out he really does control the
[21:53 - 21:58]
Common Market right the minute the British get in there's an opportunity for the interplay
[21:58 - 22:03]
of political forces within the market. And his own influence will be very much
[22:03 - 22:08]
reduced and so a lot of friends he bestrides Europe by buying keeping the
[22:08 - 22:11]
British out of the common market of course.
[22:11 - 22:15]
Mr. harsh What is the current Russian threat to West Berlin.
[22:15 - 22:20]
At the present moment I'm not aware of any Russian threat towards West Berlin
[22:20 - 22:25]
at the present moment. The tide is going the other way and the Russians are
[22:25 - 22:30]
primarily concerned about how they can retain the loyalty of what we used
[22:30 - 22:34]
to call their satellites. The only truly loyal satellite they have
[22:34 - 22:39]
left is East Germany and one of the ways of holding East Germany is
[22:39 - 22:44]
by continuing to pretend that someday Russia is going to get West
[22:44 - 22:49]
Berlin for East Germany. This is something that the West that the East
[22:49 - 22:54]
German regime very much wants. It is a constant threat
[22:54 - 22:59]
to the survival of the regime that there is in this island of
[22:59 - 23:04]
freedom in the middle of their prison.
[23:04 - 23:10]
And they keep saying to the Russians Well now you must get it for us so the Russians keep making
[23:10 - 23:15]
noises. But you may be sure that the Russians at the present moment are not going to do
[23:15 - 23:19]
anything serious about West Berlin because the instant they try to. Well that's the
[23:19 - 23:24]
quickest way of triggering a nuclear war. There's no question about our
[23:24 - 23:29]
commitment to West Berlin and to West Germany and the Russians
[23:29 - 23:33]
know that. But if the Russians were ever to renounce
[23:33 - 23:39]
the goal of capturing West Berlin for their East German stooges
[23:39 - 23:45]
at that moment the cement of the of the Warsaw Pact
[23:45 - 23:50]
disappears the Warsaw Pact is built on anti German ism. Which
[23:50 - 23:55]
is the theory of it the theory of the West German menace to all the countries of East of Eastern
[23:55 - 24:00]
Europe. If Russia at any moment abandons the doctrine
[24:00 - 24:05]
of the German menace at that moment the Warsaw Pact ceases to have any meaning.
[24:05 - 24:10]
And it is being eroded and undermined today by
[24:10 - 24:15]
the tendency of some of the Eastern communist countries Eastern European
[24:15 - 24:20]
countries countries to enter into a new and much more rational and reasonable
[24:20 - 24:24]
relations with the West Germany the Roumanians exchange diplomatic
[24:24 - 24:29]
representation to ambassadors with Bonn about a year ago when it
[24:29 - 24:34]
was almost a year to the day when the Romanian delegation walked out last
[24:34 - 24:39]
week. From that gathering of the Communist clan in Booker and
[24:39 - 24:41]
in Budapest.
[24:41 - 24:49]
Yugoslavia now has diplomatic relations again with the
[24:49 - 24:53]
Czechs have just had a an internal sort of palace
[24:53 - 24:57]
revolution which is thrown out the old hardline pro-Moscow
[24:57 - 25:02]
crowd and put in place of it and a new younger
[25:02 - 25:07]
nationalist crowd of Czechs and I should think that within another year you
[25:07 - 25:11]
probably will see the Czechs coming to terms with the bomb.
[25:11 - 25:16]
How much longer is Moscow going to pursue an anti German
[25:16 - 25:22]
policy just to please the East German regime remains to be seen.
[25:22 - 25:27]
There is a good deal of speculation in diplomatic quarters that you may see
[25:27 - 25:28]
a complete.
[25:28 - 25:35]
Transformation of the attitudes of Germans and Russians towards each
[25:35 - 25:40]
other developing over the next few years which brings us back to the question of how
[25:40 - 25:45]
long we remain maintained six American divisions in Germany.
[25:45 - 25:49]
I don't think it would be to our interest to have
[25:49 - 25:55]
Germany become much closer to Russia.
[25:55 - 26:00]
I don't I wouldn't look forward happiness to that prospect I do feel that
[26:00 - 26:05]
the safe balance of power for us is a balancing of a far less
[26:05 - 26:12]
organized Western Europe against the Soviet Union. The minute you get
[26:12 - 26:16]
European countries West European countries playing games with Moscow
[26:16 - 26:22]
it gets pretty risky and pretty tricky and I would not be happy to see that come
[26:22 - 26:25]
about. Well
[26:25 - 26:27]
as.
[26:27 - 26:48]
This has been the first in a series of seven programs about the United
[26:48 - 26:53]
States foreign policy intitled demands of the next
[26:53 - 26:57]
decade. Our guest today was Mr. Joseph C. Hutch
[26:57 - 27:02]
author columnist and news commentator. He spoke and
[27:02 - 27:07]
responded to questions on the general subject within the Western
[27:07 - 27:11]
alliance. This program series is based on presentations
[27:11 - 27:16]
from the foreign policy associations traveling foreign policy
[27:16 - 27:20]
conference. These programs are designed to stimulate the thinking of an
[27:20 - 27:25]
informed American public about some of the issues to be faced by
[27:25 - 27:30]
the nation during the coming decade. Today's program was presented in
[27:30 - 27:34]
cooperation with the World Affairs Council of Oregon the Oregon great
[27:34 - 27:39]
decisions Council the Foreign Policy Association and TIME
[27:39 - 27:44]
magazine. And this has been a public affairs presentation of Oregon
[27:44 - 27:46]
educational broadcasting.
[27:46 - 27:51]
This program was distributed by the national educational radio network.
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