#11 (Reel 1)

Some of you will recall I'm sure that former Secretary of Defense McNamara made a speech in

Montreal a little over two years ago.

In which he talked to this point among other things and he came up with a total

during the period from 1959 to nineteen

sixty six to nine hundred fifty eight to nine hundred sixty six and

eight year period.

He came up with a total of what he called one hundred and sixty four.

Occasions of violence in the world that had international implications. In other words

he didn't include those that didn't have any international consequences but he came up with a total of some one

hundred sixty four. Occurrences of violence in the world.

And we did have these international implications.

That was Colonel Donald Bussey senior specialist in national defense at the Library of

Congress speaking at the twenty sixth annual Institute on world affairs

conducted as a special feature of the instructional program at San Diego State College the institute is

dedicated to the use of the free academic forum for the presentation and discussion of current and

continuing issues of international significance. The main theme of this year's

Institute is expressed in one word revolution

and how to introduce our speaker at the session. Here is Professor meet us generalise director of the

Institute on world affairs.

The discussion will center on the subject of. Geopolitics

revisited. I'm sure that

all of you know what your politics is if not the term is almost self-explanatory.

It has strong strategic implications. And it was

devised as a method of interpretating. The power

potential in a sense of countries. On the

basis. Of geography.

As well as politics. Although it is a

specialized area it is nevertheless an area of broad connotation.

And a serious import for a country's security.

And we're fortunate to have an expert in that area and Colonel Don Busey.

Who is. An old hand at the subject matter

plus an old hand at the institute we have been privileged to enjoy his excellent

presentations here for. A number of years.

Presently he holds a position of senior specialists in national defense in the latest

legislative reference service of the Library of Congress.

He was schooled in a number of institutions. And your

colleges the University of Chicago.

Infantry School the Commanding General Staff College Strategic continued intelligence school.

Georgetown University I'm a rock college and surfer.

His career is accordingly. Centered on the area of.

The room of the army. And security system of the United States.

Between 1959 and 1967 he was in the faculty of the U.S. Army War

College at Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania.

He has served also as a staff member of the Draper Committee in Washington.

He's been involved in policy planning and all types of activities related to.

We're fortunate in having you with us. We also recognize him amongst other

things as a fellow of this institute. And in

exceedingly happy to be able to present him to you today to discuss this topic

geopolitics of the revisit.

With him.

Thank you very much Professor generalities as always it's a great pleasure to come to San Diego

and I must say this is one of the nicest days I've ever had the pleasure of enjoying here.

Some years ago as I recall it was in the late 20s or early 30s.

There appeared in The New Yorker magazine a map which was

called. The New Yorker's map of the United States.

Now as you might guess. This map was distorted.

The state of New York and of all the city of New York.

Was the central focus of the map. I had assumed a rather substantial

portion of the entire surface area of the page upon which it was printed.

Florida. Was. Also rather large on this map.

There was a very short distance and very small state in between New York City

and the state of Florida. And again as you might expect the city of Miami was rather an

outsize Also California.

Occupied a good half of the western portion of this map

which was intended to portray the United States and the states in between

were very slowly. Presented as slivers of

one shape or another. And on the portion devoted to California.

Again as you might expect Hollywood. Was about half of the state of California.

Now I say this. New Yorkers map of the United

States. To suggest that the

world in which we live. Is very much. Influenced

by our particular perspectives. The image we have of the

world is heavily influenced by a wide range of. Factors not the

least of which is where we happen to be located and how that world

presents itself to us in that particular perspective.

I think all of us for example really tend to think of a world as being flat

even though we know that it's round because we've been brought up by. Typically

Mercator projections of the world. And a Mercator projection clearly is an

attempt to portray on a flat surface terrible.

SURFACE.

Many times in the Mercator projections that we deal with the Western Hemisphere is on the

western portion of the page and the Eastern hemisphere or the whole

world is on the eastern side of the page.

Sometimes in order to avoid this distortion.

You may have the Western Hemisphere in the center and then a portion of

Eurasia to your left. If you look at the map and of course Europe to your

right. If you look at the map and I rather suspect that most of us when we think of the

world in which we live. Have that image of a Mercator projection

of the United States substantially in the center.

And looking out to the right to Europe and to the left to Asia. My

point basically is that I think we think about the world as it has been portrayed to

us by cartographers.

We would be well advised I might say that when we think about the world or wish to study

the relevance of location and space to international

affairs we would be well advised to use a globe rather than a Mercator

projection. Some years ago I used to enjoy the experience of carrying in

my pocket. One of these inflatable Globes that some of you may have seen

whenever I wish to discuss a strategic question I wouldn't do it with a flat

map on a wall I'd always take my inflatable globe out of the pocket and blow

it up and then we could discuss a little bit more intelligently what the problem is that we that

we were considering.

Now that's point number one point number two is that. In addition to the world

being a product of our own perspectives our own images our own

environment. The world also changes with technology.

I'm sure that some of you have seen in in recent weeks an

advertisement that has appeared rather widely in the newspapers and also in the periodicals

and advertisement for Trans World Airlines as it happens. And. It

shows the Atlantic Ocean. And it calls it the Atlantic river.

It shows Europe.

Nestled just off the eastern coast of the United States. And in a very real

sense this is now the truth the Atlantic Ocean isn't really an ocean

anymore. It is a river. There is no difficulty at all

as many of you I'm sure are aware. When. Taking off in the morning from

I don't weild in New York and finding yourself in London or Paris for

dinner. Even more confusing when you come the other way because you may find

yourself with two dinners on that occasion. It

is in fact an. Literally a river distances

is virtually meaningless from a strategic point of view. But when we

have the means for rapid transport such as the jet age has brought us.

I have often thought that like the New Yorker's map of America it would be very

interesting if some cartographer some day would come up with the jet

age map of the world. Again he would inescapably

take a certain perspective to begin with. He presumably would have the United States in the in the

center of such a map and he would try to portray what the real

distances are in terms of time and in terms of effort.

To move to Japan let us say or to Europe or to South America or or Southeast Asia or

where had to go.

I think you might find that in that sort of situation depending upon how you spelled out the scenario

that the United States rather than being ten thousand miles from Saigon let's

say is really just offshore.

In terms of strategic distance. We can move

material we can move people in copious quantities and in great numbers

from this country to any place in the world. Particularly if it is

a if maritime transport can be employed where large heavy

volumes are concerned where people are concerned of course with the jet aircraft. We can move

large numbers in in a great a great hurry with great speed.

I might say at this time that the the real problem in transport in the

modern world. Is not the problem of getting from here to there.

It's the problem of getting around there once you get there. All you

are familiar with the experience of taking two hours to get to the Los Angeles airport and

getting on a jet aircraft and finding your you're at your destination 25

minutes. And then spending two more hours getting from the airport to your hotel in town.

There's a fancy word for this in the transportation economy economics it's called and losses.

Well. The end losses are very severe. And from a strategic point of view there is

no gainsaying the fact that. It's very easy to go from here let's say to Europe.

But it may be very difficult and very tedious and very slow to move around in Europe.

Once you arrive. Now against these. Basic introductory

comments I want to try to do about four things in these remarks this morning.

First I want to talk a little bit about conflict in the 20th century. The theme of your.

Institute this year is you know is revolution in the 20th century.

And as our German has indicated we're going to be talking a little this morning about some of the international.

Aspects of the revolution. I want to talk

first then a little bit about conflict in this century and revolution is a part of the

conflict spectrum. Second I'd like to talk a little bit

more in a little bit more detail about geography.

And geopolitics.

And I'd like to talk a little bit about the policy implications of all

this for the United States. And then as time permits some closing

remarks. But the present and future seem to hold.

Now first with respect to the conflict in the 20th century.

How one defines conflict is pretty much an arbitrary matter.

There have been studies for example one one analyst took the New York Times. And

studied the New York Times very carefully for the period from one thousand forty six to nine thousand

fifty nine which is that some 13 year period. And just based upon

stories in The New York Times reporting international events he came up

with a total of some twelve hundred what he called internal

wars of one kind or another as if he defined a rather large

number. Another analyst using a somewhat different definition no different

criteria for.

Our conflict. Has indicated a total of some 200

something over two hundred fifty conflicts

since the end of World War 2 in 1946 during

the 1966 I was in a 20 year period something over two hundred and

fifty conflicts as he defined them. A somewhat lesser number obviously

the the other analyst I referred to basing his.

Analysis on the New York Times had a much broader definition of conflict and therefore

he came up with a much larger number.

Now there are two studies of conflict that I think are. Of

particular interest to us. Some of you will recall I'm sure that former Secretary of Defense

McNamara made a speech in Montreal a little over two years ago.

In which he talked to this point among other things and he came up with a total

during the period from 1959 to nine hundred

sixty six thousand nine hundred fifty eight to nine hundred sixty six and

eight year period.

He came up with a total of what he called one hundred and sixty four.

Occasions of violence in the world that had international implications. In other words

he didn't include those that didn't have any international consequences but he came up with a total of some one

hundred sixty four. Occurrences of violence in the world.

And which did have these international implications.

As I recall he indicated some 82 different governments were involved in this total of one

hundred sixty four acts of violence. Involved that is either directly or

indirectly. Fifteen of these were

military conflicts. So you can see a very large proportion of them were were

not overtly military conflicts they were other kinds of conflicts in

the world stage. Now all of these

164 obviously a very large proportion were what we

would roughly call internal war or domestic war or

internal acts of violence or one kind of one kind or another.

But Mr. McNamara did not include these of course unless they did have in one way or another international

implications. Now that was an eight year period.

Now the most recent study in some ways I think probably the most useful study of this is one that just came

out last week actually it was written by a man. Named David Wood. For the

Institute for Strategic Studies which is located in London.

Here's a little pamphlet is called conflict in the 20th century.

He comes up with a total. Of one hundred twenty eight

wars. Or. Occasions of conflict

during the period from the Spanish-American War 1898 down to the

present with the Nigerian war as you know now in progress one hundred twenty

eight such wars.

Now you analyze these very carefully it comes up with rather interesting statistical

correlations and so forth for our purposes I'd simply point out a couple of features of this

analysis. For one thing if your take is your center point in

that band of time from the Spanish-American war down to the present.

If you take your center point roughly nine hundred thirty nine just prior to World War Two you

find that in the what is it some 40 year

period. Forty one year period.

Prior to 39. There were 44.

Out of this one hundred twenty eight wars sense thirty nine down

to the present. Roughly what thirty years twenty nine years. There are have

been 84. Now.

This comparison can't be taken too literally because there may be some reporting problems with respect

to wars or conflicts that might have occurred in the earlier period. We may

now be including as conflicts acts of violence which in the previous

historical period would not have been so classified. So there are problems

and destroyed and be taken too literally. But I think the more interesting thing about this analysis is that out of the

44 conflicts in the period from the Spanish-American war down to

1939 some twenty four of us more than

half.

Or approximately half were what you would call international wars that is

wars involving the armed forces of one state against the armed forces of another

state whereas the other half. Were what might be called

internal wars or domestic wars or civil wars roughly a 50/50 breakup

as between these two broad categories of conflict.

In the period since 1939 however down today

these 84 conflicts that he has listed

about three fourths of these were what would be called internal wars and

not international law and which armed forces of two sides were opposing each other

on the field of battle so to speak.

This is a very significant change obviously in the character of conflict in this

century. Now this study by. David Wood

is this finding is not a new finding this is then indicated

in other analyses as well. But I think it is of interest and is of

significance to get a feel for the changing character of conflict

in the world. I suppose you could generalize it this way that prior to

939 most wars were international.

There was a lower incidence of such wars and also when you did have internal

wars domestic wars guerrilla wars call them what you will. Internal riots civil

disturbances and so forth. They did not tend to have the profound international implications

that they have in the. Contemporary world in the more recent period

from thirty nine down to the present. These wars in greater and increasing numbers have

tended to be internal or domestic wars. There have been more of them and they have

had much more profound international implications.

Let me turn to the second topic I want to talk about and that is.

The broad field of geopolitics and the relevance of

geopolitics to this whole question of international conflict.

Now obviously this is a big subject and I can do no more than just get a

very few high spots. I suppose the name

most closely associated with with the idea of geopolitics is

that of Salford Mackinder the very famous British geographer

near 1984 he wrote a book it was called the geographic pivot of history

in that. Actually in 94 it was not a book it was an article but

later in 1900 wrote a book on the same subject.

Called democratic ideals and political reality in which he developed more fully his

ideas on the effect of geography on the political

affairs of states. And we we can

develop in these few minutes the evolution of Halfords thinking on this

subject but. We can sum it up I think in these in this way. In his

1900 book which I would remind you was written at the time of the first treaty in fact

in many ways this book of his was a treatise to serve as a warning. To the

peacemakers adverse side to take into account certain geographic

facts in Europe in writing the peace following World War

1. And you'll recall I'm sure many of you that he came up in that book with a very

famous jingle which went substantially as follows that He who

rules East Europe.

Controls the heart line and he who controls the heartland

controls the world aisle. And he who rules the world

Island controls the world.

This jingle had a profound influence on a whole generation of students and scholars.

But insert Helford mind the principal. Idea he was trying to get

across was the essential ality of not permitting a situation to develop in

the future in which Russia.

And Russian power was combined with the power of Germany

under the hegemony of a single state because in his view

this would represent control of the heartland. And that any single power controlling that entire

area.

Would inescapably ultimately to control the

entire Eurasian land mass along with Africa which he described as the world

Island. And once this kind of domination of the world island had been secured.

It would only be a matter of time. Until such a power could control the world.

This was or how for its basic idea in 1919 and it grew out of his essential analysis

from going out of 1004 article and on the geographic pivot of history now through

the years he has particular definition of this heartland change. In

1999 he had in mind very clearly for the peacemakers that. The

essential body of creating what came to be known as the court on sanitaire between Russia

in the east and Germany in the West. With a band of neutral states in between

Poland Czechoslovakia Hungary and so forth

the idea of a of a barrier. Of a zone between

the potentially great power of Russia and they just

demonstrated great power of Germany in World War One that it was essential not to permit these two

little power centers to combine. So as to threaten the peace of the

world. And so he conceived of the idea of this band of neutral states and of

course the peace makers a verse I did in fact establish such a cordon sanitaire.

In later years he offered further amended his essential ideas.

He never departed from the basic framework 1043 for

example in an earlier article in Foreign Affairs. He he talked also in

addition to the hard line he talked about what he called the Atlantic the middle of the ocean

in the middle of the ocean really was the Atlantic Ocean because he had he was witnessing

U.S. and world war to the great combined power of the United

States and Great Britain specifically in Europe.

Tied by maritime transport across the middle of the ocean. And he visualized this as

a new great center of power and that this middle of the ocean or we would call up today I

suppose the Atlantic community that this Great Midland ocean area with all the power that it

could generate could serve as a balance to the heartland power. So as I

say he modified his view. But the essential idea was always the

same. And that was that Eurasia must never come under the domination of any

single state. Now why did Sir Howard believe that the

heartland was the key and the heartland corresponds very roughly

to the Soviet Union and to the states of Eastern Europe. If you add western

Germany to that you literally have. The heartland as as Mackinder feared it might evolve

and might develop. This is why we all instinctively recognise that Germany is the

key to this whole picture.

The reasons are hard for to.

Visualize this kind of a power relationship in the world was because. In one thousand

four he was heavily influenced partly as a result of the Boer War experience but also he was

heavily influenced by the they're real and they do the developing network

of ground transportation of land transportation which he visualized for the

future of Eurasia. He expected that there would be a network of

massive rail communications all the way across racial. Some

180 degrees of the earth's surface from east to west.

Now actually sir Halfords projection of this did not come to pass as you know

the East Siberian the Trans-Siberian Railway as we know it.

Was double tracked only much later in history and even a dial on a double track

basis. It is a very meager and a very fragile land line of communication.

There are lots of evidences of this one of the most dramatic I think is the fact that the Russian that

historic Russia and of course in contemporary times the Soviet Union has always had to

maintain separate army separate military forces in the Far

East from those which were in European Russia.

The armies in the Maritime Provinces of the Far East were always considered separate because

the Russians historically and the Soviets could not anticipate being able to

reinforce the east with forces from the West or vice versa. They were not in other words

mutually supporting. Because of these very meager land lines of communication.

So therefore this basic premise underlying story Helford concept of the of the

heartland of the world Island did not in fact come to pass. And by

1943 he had recognised this and therefore reoriented the concept. But

it's the essential core remain. Nonetheless there. And that was that Eurasia

must not come under the head Germany of a single power. Now there were those who

challenged as to how often weekenders concept.

Probably the most notable was that. Of Nicholas speak the great

geographer do you a politician on the faculty of Yale University. We

can't deal extensively with what. Mr. what Professor speakin had to say

about the mic and the concept but essentially what he had in mind was does he recognise that

McAndrews theory fell on this business of land transport.

He pointed out that it was simply not in the cards that there would be this kind of massive

land communication across Eurasia and that rather than the heartland

represented the key to domination of Eurasia

it was the rim lands as he called it of Eurasia that ultimately represented.

Their seat of real power. These Rimland were mutually reinforcing

with copious maritime transport. All you have to do is conjure up in your

mind the kind of political map of the world which you saw.

In the before World War 2 and you'll recall that the British Empire was

always colored red on those maps. England then the British Empire

and the the whole sweep of that British Empire. Represented

control over a very large proportion. Of the rim lands of Eurasia

particularly in South Asia and East Asia.