- Series
- Nuremberg and Vietnam: Who Is Guilty?
- Air Date
- 1971-06-04
- Duration
- 00:31:02
- Episode Description
- Series Description
- My Lai was a war crime and violated established international laws which the United States has long accepted. It was a specific crime, and in the last few days we've heard allegations of other crimes with the charges against Gen. Donaldson. Tonight we're going to examine whether in a far broader sense the United States has violated international law by its conduct in Vietnam.
- Subject(s)
- Creator(s)
- British Broadcasting Corporation (Producer)
- Contributors
- MacNeill, Robert (Host)
- Genre(s)
- Geographic Region(s)
- regions
- Time Period
- 1971-1980
[00:05 - 00:09]
What experience in government was appointed the civilian head of the top level
[00:09 - 00:13]
investigation ordered by the Pentagon into the MI LA incident.
[00:13 - 00:19]
Mr. Craig your report on the lie led to charges against 14 officers as high as
[00:19 - 00:23]
General close to the divisional commander. Why did you feel that responsibility went no
[00:23 - 00:26]
higher.
[00:26 - 00:30]
Essentially it was a question of how high the information had
[00:30 - 00:35]
reached our inquiry was limited to
[00:35 - 00:39]
determining the adequacy of the immediate reports and
[00:39 - 00:45]
investigation that had. Been undertaken following the incident.
[00:45 - 00:50]
You'll recall that the facts of me lie lay buried for.
[00:50 - 00:54]
Over a year and it was only when a former
[00:54 - 00:59]
serviceman. Brought the matter to the attention of
[00:59 - 01:03]
the Defense Department in Washington
[01:03 - 01:08]
and the. Various congressional leaders
[01:08 - 01:13]
that there was the investigation of which I was a
[01:13 - 01:17]
part some 20 months after the event.
[01:17 - 01:22]
Do you think as Mr. Taylor suggests that there should be a full inquiry
[01:22 - 01:25]
into higher responsibility.
[01:25 - 01:30]
If we look at a situation such as an me lie. I
[01:30 - 01:34]
don't believe that a further investigation
[01:34 - 01:40]
would be very productive. We conducted an exhaustive
[01:40 - 01:45]
investigation. It will in due course be made a matter of public record
[01:45 - 01:49]
present time. There are court martial proceedings
[01:49 - 01:54]
pending. And I'm not in a position where I can speak about
[01:54 - 01:57]
the findings of our
[01:57 - 02:03]
investigation but this will I think when
[02:03 - 02:06]
it is a matter of public record.
[02:06 - 02:13]
Show what at least in this situation went on.
[02:13 - 02:18]
It's not just not quite clear do you think responsibility should go higher than the
[02:18 - 02:23]
officers you want to charged or should stay at those officers charged or who may be
[02:23 - 02:23]
charged.
[02:23 - 02:28]
So far as the. Passing up of responsibility I think
[02:28 - 02:33]
that. It must be a conscious guilt it
[02:33 - 02:37]
must be a culpable guilt that is involved and that where
[02:37 - 02:42]
information does not proceed where there is not an intent to
[02:42 - 02:46]
violate a legal principle that there there is no criminal
[02:46 - 02:49]
liability and it would be inappropriate.
[02:49 - 02:54]
Thank you sir. Now we are Strunk real generally mashes defense counsel whether here
[02:54 - 02:59]
agrees with Mr Taylor the principles established by the master case are of great importance in
[02:59 - 03:05]
defining the criminal responsibility for war crimes in Vietnam.
[03:05 - 03:09]
I'm afraid that it's very clear under the rule as laid down by the United States Supreme
[03:09 - 03:14]
Court in the case. That in view of the finding of guilt of
[03:14 - 03:17]
Lieutenant Calley because of events which occurred it's on me.
[03:17 - 03:26]
Every important general officer in the chain of command.
[03:26 - 03:31]
In the American army. Is responsible criminally for what occurred. This is
[03:31 - 03:37]
all the way from the. Commander in Chief who at that time was President Lyndon B Johnson.
[03:37 - 03:42]
Through General Westmoreland who held a position similar to that of General Yamashita in the
[03:42 - 03:47]
Philippines. Now what I mean by that is this. If I can explain for a moment.
[03:47 - 03:51]
In the case the United States Supreme Court. Over the
[03:51 - 03:56]
strenuous objections of defense counsel of which I was one establish the principle. But it
[03:56 - 04:01]
made no difference. The general you Masha didn't know what was going on and couldn't have known what was going
[04:01 - 04:06]
on didn't order didn't come down didn't have any direct connection with these atrocities
[04:06 - 04:11]
whatsoever. But because of atrocities which were identical in many
[04:11 - 04:14]
cases with the evidence in the catalogue case of
[04:14 - 04:22]
identical identical. So when the provocation because it was a war against guerillas.
[04:22 - 04:27]
Because everybody's atrocities the United States Supreme Court upheld the finding of a military
[04:27 - 04:31]
commission that General Yamashita was even though he had no connection with them whatsoever
[04:31 - 04:36]
simply because he was the commander in chief. Now as
[04:36 - 04:41]
I said before applying a precedent. Law is based on precedent. If we
[04:41 - 04:46]
apply. We have no choice not only to try. The former
[04:46 - 04:51]
President Johnson and General Westmoreland but in view of the finding that these things
[04:51 - 04:55]
did occur in the Cali case the only remaining fact is were these men in the chain of
[04:55 - 05:01]
command. There's no doubt about it. We would literally have to convict.
[05:01 - 05:09]
Former President Johnson General Westmoreland and every other general officer in the chain of command.
[05:09 - 05:13]
I think it's a terrible thing and I don't think we should do it. I think we're faced with a
[05:13 - 05:18]
serious dilemma. I think that the remedy should be simply
[05:18 - 05:23]
to admit forthrightly face the fact that the case was a
[05:23 - 05:29]
mistake. It was badly wrong. That we should not and must not.
[05:29 - 05:34]
Convict people for something they do or didn't do but because of the position they held.
[05:34 - 05:39]
But further than that I think that these were crimes trials and I don't restrict it to
[05:39 - 05:43]
the trial at all. I think they were all a mistake. I think there were
[05:43 - 05:48]
exercises basically in vengeance rather than in the law. And I think it's most.
[05:48 - 05:53]
Important that we recognize the fact. That essentially what Iraq crimes trial
[05:53 - 05:58]
based on a violation of the laws of war debts. Is simply.
[05:58 - 06:03]
Tried to distinguish between a good way of killing a person and a bad way.
[06:03 - 06:08]
A nice way to fight a war and not the way to fight a war. The implication
[06:08 - 06:13]
that it's somehow criminal to shoot a civilian. Point blank range
[06:13 - 06:19]
but not criminal to destroy him by bombs from the skies or artillery shells.
[06:19 - 06:23]
I come back to the clear implications of a. Round crimes trial.
[06:23 - 06:28]
Which I when you analyze it that it's perfectly acceptable
[06:28 - 06:33]
for example to kill babies providing
[06:33 - 06:38]
we are sufficiently revolted by the policies of the political leaders of those
[06:38 - 06:43]
babies. RAR is a system of carrying out a political enterprise
[06:43 - 06:48]
trying to achieve a political end by killing people. I think we've got to face up to the
[06:48 - 06:53]
fact that war itself. Is the evil that war itself is the crime and
[06:53 - 06:58]
that you cannot conduct this criminal enterprise by legal
[06:58 - 06:59]
means.
[06:59 - 07:04]
Sir when Jones in London as a another participant in the work to work crimes
[07:04 - 07:09]
trials do you agree with Mr. Riehl that this was a vengeance rather than a law and that
[07:09 - 07:11]
the whole exercise is pointless.
[07:11 - 07:16]
No certainly not. I think it is essential to have the Nuremberg trial and the
[07:16 - 07:21]
other trials first of all to expose the crimes that had been committed
[07:21 - 07:26]
so that the record would be available for all time. But secondly to set
[07:26 - 07:31]
standards for future behavior. War is of course the supreme
[07:31 - 07:36]
crime. But at least one can hope that criminal as aggressive war
[07:36 - 07:41]
is the number of dead babies may be diminished in the
[07:41 - 07:46]
furtherance of the laws of the Geneva Convention and the
[07:46 - 07:51]
laws of war are directed to introduce as much pity and mercy into
[07:51 - 07:55]
war making this possible.
[07:55 - 07:59]
So as a reverend just one would like to ask whether you are taking the question
[07:59 - 08:04]
of your master principle and applying it to Vietnam. Do you think
[08:04 - 08:08]
would you agree with those who think that the guilt should go.
[08:08 - 08:13]
I think that if the facts prove that there was knowledge
[08:13 - 08:19]
of the crimes of dua being committed all that those higher up or to have known of what
[08:19 - 08:24]
is taking place and took no steps to prevent them happening that is
[08:24 - 08:28]
responsibility. After all the military Kamandi in particularly as a part of
[08:28 - 08:33]
c'mon here's the part of example he has to protect those within
[08:33 - 08:38]
the area of his command is a duty to protect civilians that Field Marshal Fine
[08:38 - 08:43]
men Stan was convicted of Hamburg because it was found that he had failed to
[08:43 - 08:48]
exercise that duty. That is a clear duty in the military command and he is the part of
[08:48 - 08:53]
life and it is those below him of primarily the duty to a bay he has a
[08:53 - 08:57]
higher duty to see that war is conducted within the limits of the laws of
[08:57 - 09:02]
war as well of course as is of achieving victory.
[09:02 - 09:06]
That's quite a distinction isn't it between amount as having knowledge and being in a position where they
[09:06 - 09:08]
opt to have knowledge.
[09:08 - 09:12]
Yes I think that is a distinction. But if crimes are
[09:12 - 09:17]
sufficiently prevalent or if that
[09:17 - 09:22]
means of investigating whether crimes are going on in these I
[09:22 - 09:27]
understand exist to the full in Vietnam. It is a surprising
[09:27 - 09:32]
situation. If war crimes. Ah being perpetrated on a
[09:32 - 09:37]
scale which is alleged to be taking place which the military commanders
[09:37 - 09:38]
have no knowledge.
[09:38 - 09:43]
So Reverend Jones thank you very much Mr Robert Jordan. As a recent into
[09:43 - 09:47]
reason your lawyer for the Army what do you think of Mr. Taylor's legal argument that the responsibility
[09:47 - 09:52]
for war crimes in Vietnam must be taken higher by the standards that your predecessors
[09:52 - 09:55]
applied 25 years ago.
[09:55 - 09:59]
Well of course if you want to talk about the overall conduct of the war as a as a
[09:59 - 10:04]
political exercise that's one thing we did it that's very difficult but we were trying
[10:04 - 10:09]
to avoid that let's talk about the problem of the responsibility flowing up from the
[10:09 - 10:15]
various acts of war crimes that occur in the field. And I'd just like
[10:15 - 10:19]
to read about a dozen lines from the high command keys. You're a bird. Modern
[10:19 - 10:24]
war entails a large major of decentralisation high command you cannot keep
[10:24 - 10:29]
completely informed of the details of military operations of subordinates and most assuredly
[10:29 - 10:34]
not of administrative measures. He has a right to assume that details and
[10:34 - 10:38]
trusted to responsible subordinates will be legally executed. There must be
[10:38 - 10:43]
personal der election that can occur only where the act is directly traceable to
[10:43 - 10:48]
him or where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates constitutes
[10:48 - 10:53]
criminal negligence on his part. In the latter case it must
[10:53 - 10:57]
be a personal neglect amounting to wanton immoral
[10:57 - 11:02]
disregard of the action of his subordinates amounting to
[11:02 - 11:06]
acquiescence. I believe that is the standard of Nuremberg and I don't believe you
[11:06 - 11:12]
should do is really inconsistent with that. I think that's a standard we ought to be applying to day in and by
[11:12 - 11:16]
that standard. By and large superiors in Vietnam would not be held accountable.
[11:16 - 11:21]
If those standards applied they would be held accountable.
[11:21 - 11:26]
If those standards were met they would be held accountable though if they if they met these rather restrictive
[11:26 - 11:30]
terms about the wanton immoral disregard and so forth and yes they
[11:30 - 11:33]
would be accountable they ought to be held accountable.
[11:33 - 11:38]
That's what about this point about commanders who ought to have had knowledge
[11:38 - 11:39]
and may not have.
[11:39 - 11:44]
Well you know on to a difficult thing to find first of all it's one thing if you
[11:44 - 11:49]
have war crimes occurring and you learn about it and you do something about it. There's a lot of evidence that General cruel
[11:49 - 11:54]
act is mentioned. That's in fact what's happened in Vietnam you can't prevent everything but
[11:54 - 11:59]
that is mean you have to overlook it when it happens and it hasn't been overlooked. Everybody knows
[11:59 - 12:04]
a matter of common sense in a large area military operations some of these things are going to occur so
[12:04 - 12:09]
everybody's on that kind of notice. But I don't believe anyone's on the kind of notice it's
[12:09 - 12:14]
widespread. The place where it is so prevalent that one has to move
[12:14 - 12:19]
in and stamp it out I don't believe that the evidence in Vietnam any that I've seen.
[12:19 - 12:24]
Would substantiate that you lied to me is an aberration I've seen nothing that even the
[12:24 - 12:29]
approximate sir Mr. McCreery Do you accept the criteria that Mr.
[12:29 - 12:33]
Jordan puts forth the Nuremberg criteria on the culpability of commanders.
[12:33 - 12:38]
Yes in a general way I do. I think that my own
[12:38 - 12:43]
investigations. Would indicate no
[12:43 - 12:48]
conscious program of annihilation. In the first instance. And I
[12:48 - 12:51]
think that that would be a necessary part of
[12:51 - 12:57]
linking. An event to an overall
[12:57 - 13:02]
program of unlawful conduct. So far as
[13:02 - 13:06]
the gathering of information that is indeed one of the
[13:06 - 13:11]
greatest difficulties of this war of finding out what has in
[13:11 - 13:15]
fact gone on and in the case of
[13:15 - 13:19]
atrocities they can be so localized and
[13:19 - 13:24]
contain themselves and this is indeed what was founded
[13:24 - 13:29]
that it was something that was capable of being contained
[13:29 - 13:34]
simply because of the circumstances of this war.
[13:34 - 13:38]
Mr. Turner do you in your book your say.
[13:38 - 13:44]
Paraphrasing according directly I believe that the model in the case of the Army and the
[13:44 - 13:49]
model health as you put it of the Army can only be restored if.
[13:49 - 13:54]
The Guild of leaders is scrutinised by the same standards that as you say their revered
[13:54 - 13:59]
predecessors applied 25 years ago. Do you think the definition Mr. Jordan and Mr. Moore
[13:59 - 14:03]
create the criteria they are suggesting or what you mean.
[14:03 - 14:09]
Well I think there's no disagreement with a statement of principle. I would like to comment on
[14:09 - 14:14]
what Mr. Riehl said about this very point and I'm sorry he's not here because I would have to
[14:14 - 14:19]
challenge you very explicitly. His interpretation of the decision and you marched
[14:19 - 14:25]
in what she have self right in such a valuable service. He says the court held that
[14:25 - 14:30]
a commander could be held responsible even if he didn't know about things. But in his
[14:30 - 14:34]
own book he quotes the Chief Justice Stone as majority opinion in that case and what the
[14:34 - 14:39]
court ruled was that an army commander has a duty to take such appropriate measures
[14:39 - 14:44]
as are within his power to control the troops under his command which I take it you
[14:44 - 14:49]
couldn't do unless he knew about them. Now that seems to me a perfectly sound principle
[14:49 - 14:54]
whether you in fact had the power or was a question of fact on which the Supreme Court said the military
[14:54 - 14:58]
commissions judgment was conclusive but I think the decision in principle is perfectly
[14:58 - 15:03]
sound. Could I make one comment on what Mr Roache said before I was going to go back to
[15:03 - 15:08]
Mr. Rhodes Why don't you make your comment and then we'll go back to him when I was about to be a little more impolite and gentle cool act and
[15:08 - 15:13]
say that I don't think Mr. Obama's invocation of the historical approaches has clarified the situation
[15:13 - 15:18]
here. I don't think that we've been talking about a teller without a Jago.
[15:18 - 15:23]
It seems to me that we have all along had in mind that the North
[15:23 - 15:27]
Vietnamese conduct of operations to get conk conduct of operations the use of
[15:27 - 15:31]
civilians and so forth is a large part of the precipitating factor here.
[15:31 - 15:37]
Mr Roach says that the North Vietnamese invaded South Vietnam assuming that to be
[15:37 - 15:42]
true if he means it that in any way relaxes our own obligations under the laws of
[15:42 - 15:46]
war. I think the answer is plainly no. Nor do I think the issue here is
[15:46 - 15:51]
whether we should be compared to the Nazis. The question is whether we are or
[15:51 - 15:56]
are not complying with the laws of war that we ourselves agreed to be bound by. And
[15:56 - 16:01]
finally the analogy between the president's responsibility and Governor Reagan seems to me quite out of
[16:01 - 16:05]
place. The president is commander in chief and is in the chain of command
[16:05 - 16:10]
over the generals and others under him. Governor Reagan is not in the chain of command over
[16:10 - 16:13]
whoever it was that killed those people in California.
[16:13 - 16:17]
Mr Roach I was simply trying to make the point on responsibility. That
[16:17 - 16:23]
the president of the United States is responsible for everything that happens just as the governor of California is
[16:23 - 16:27]
responsible for everything that happens under his jurisdiction. I do not believe that one
[16:27 - 16:31]
can pin objective guilt on a president
[16:31 - 16:40]
on the basis of actions which they in no way had any knowledge of
[16:40 - 16:44]
nor did they blind themselves deliberately to and in fact they were
[16:44 - 16:50]
subjectively innocent. And I think that the attempt to launch this thing to a ploy a domino
[16:50 - 16:52]
theory of guilt into this in a situation.
[16:52 - 16:57]
Is a mistake. Does anybody else want to come back quickly. Yes Mr.
[16:57 - 16:59]
Kerik I.
[16:59 - 17:04]
Think it's unfortunate that Mr. Rove made that historical interpretation he has because it
[17:04 - 17:09]
gets us into the question which we don't have time for a big just an unjust war and I think it
[17:09 - 17:13]
very strange that he begins his historical analysis in 1957 ignoring
[17:13 - 17:18]
the United States is involved with the French and for that
[17:18 - 17:25]
I'm afraid Mr. Kerry that we don't have that is the time we have available to make your observation.
[17:25 - 17:31]
Yes we know I've heard all the arguments. The moment has come to turn to our three
[17:31 - 17:36]
eminent jurists for a summing up and judgment. Three questions for them to
[17:36 - 17:40]
consider are on the basis of what you've heard tonight.
[17:40 - 17:44]
Has it been established by Mr. Telford Taylor and others that first the
[17:44 - 17:49]
principles of international law as applied at Nuremberg are binding on the United States
[17:49 - 17:54]
and the other belligerence in Vietnam. Second that in
[17:54 - 17:58]
addition to acknowledged atrocities like American military conduct in
[17:58 - 18:03]
Vietnam has included methods of warfare that violate the laws of war.
[18:03 - 18:08]
And third that American military and political leaders are responsible for such
[18:08 - 18:13]
violations under international law and that the guilt for atrocities like me lie
[18:13 - 18:18]
goes higher than the men so far charged. Now first can
[18:18 - 18:21]
we hear from L.A. Law to protect in Britain.
[18:21 - 18:27]
While it's impossible in a summary judgment like this to do justice to the complex and
[18:27 - 18:32]
important issues at stake. But one thing's absolutely clear on all sides
[18:32 - 18:38]
that the principles of international as applied at Nuremberg binding on the US and
[18:38 - 18:42]
on the other belligerence in Vietnam but it's worthwhile remembering what those principles
[18:42 - 18:47]
are the main ones are that it is illegal to start and wage an aggressive
[18:47 - 18:52]
war. The other one is of course the obvious proposition of
[18:52 - 18:57]
liability for war crimes and the possibility that responsibility may
[18:57 - 19:01]
go up the line not turning to the second question
[19:01 - 19:09]
whether the American methods of war in Vietnam violate the rules of
[19:09 - 19:14]
war. Well again it's difficult to express a view about
[19:14 - 19:15]
this.
[19:15 - 19:20]
The measures we've heard described like free fire forced evacuations saturation bombing
[19:20 - 19:25]
and so on may well have elements of illegality in them. But it depends
[19:25 - 19:30]
in each particular case what the circumstances are. We've heard a little bit tonight
[19:30 - 19:35]
about the doctrines of military necessity and the possibility of reprisals.
[19:35 - 19:40]
And we have to apply those concepts in any given case. And we're not hearing more
[19:40 - 19:45]
about an individual accusation. One can't do that. There remains the
[19:45 - 19:50]
question of whether American military and political leaders are responsible for
[19:50 - 19:55]
these violations under international law or not. It's important to appreciate that
[19:55 - 20:00]
just because a soldier commits an offense that does not mean that his superior
[20:00 - 20:04]
officer necessarily also labile the superior is
[20:04 - 20:09]
only liable if he actually ordered the offense or if he
[20:09 - 20:16]
so had a reasonable basis for knowing of the offense and did nothing about it.
[20:16 - 20:21]
Now this will cover the ordinary chain of command in the field. There is also the
[20:21 - 20:25]
question of whether you can go beyond that to attribute responsibility to the
[20:25 - 20:30]
American superior military and political readers. I'm very doubtful
[20:30 - 20:35]
about this in respect of war crimes in the field. I'm rather persuaded by the
[20:35 - 20:39]
arguments I've heard tonight about the young Ashita case that the Supreme Court
[20:39 - 20:45]
faced the responsibility of the commanding officer in that case rather too high.
[20:45 - 20:49]
And there are decisions of war crimes tribunals in Europe that placed it somewhat
[20:49 - 20:54]
lower. But with students with a question which I think if I'm wrong at the present
[20:54 - 20:59]
time as to the responsibility of the American
[20:59 - 21:04]
political leaders for the war in Vietnam the question of whether the
[21:04 - 21:09]
war in Vietnam is an illegal war. If it is an illegal war
[21:09 - 21:13]
they are liable. But Reagan did tell him so. As explained how
[21:13 - 21:18]
difficult it is in the state of our present knowledge to assess the conditions
[21:18 - 21:23]
of mind of the people concerned and all effect and
[21:23 - 21:28]
one always has to bear in mind in this situation that it's no good to Woods
[21:28 - 21:33]
going back over the ground and looking at it with the benefit of hindsight and saying
[21:33 - 21:36]
they should have done otherwise.
[21:36 - 21:41]
Thank you very much for such a large effect. Can we go now to Berlin and professors I will hold
[21:41 - 21:41]
until then.
[21:41 - 21:48]
I am in Wallace complete agreement with what talked a lot about just so
[21:48 - 21:53]
that I too fully agree that the rules of Nuremberg
[21:53 - 21:58]
valid international law applicable to all or all the parties in the Vietnam
[21:58 - 22:03]
conflict. If they were applicable in other cases
[22:03 - 22:08]
as to the second question we have heard very many
[22:08 - 22:15]
corn contre and I think of all the things I am convinced that
[22:15 - 22:19]
evacuation measures of location seem to be
[22:19 - 22:24]
compatible with the Geneva Convention and hence could not in any case be
[22:24 - 22:29]
conjoined and leave him as a warrior. I am definitely not so sure
[22:29 - 22:33]
about the free fire zones where we were very good.
[22:33 - 22:39]
Controversial interpretations which seem to make it seem
[22:39 - 22:43]
quite all right this is a political measure and if you can and if people
[22:43 - 22:48]
understood the notion of saying that everything was alright well
[22:48 - 22:53]
they misunderstood these orders if that was the case well those were unfortunate things
[22:53 - 22:58]
but that would be about the putatively are strikes again
[22:58 - 23:03]
much for me to justify the measure that's here.
[23:03 - 23:08]
I would look at least as sponsibility.
[23:08 - 23:13]
Well but they're out of the question. Sleep the way up here.
[23:13 - 23:18]
I am quite in agreement with what was quoted. Your high command case
[23:18 - 23:23]
and under these circumstances I do not think that the one thing this
[23:23 - 23:28]
league of. Life and of war can
[23:28 - 23:32]
be against commanders and you
[23:32 - 23:37]
may perhaps be understood as imposing moral
[23:37 - 23:43]
standards for if you will
[23:43 - 23:48]
come out of the field and not become honest but I am
[23:48 - 23:52]
also more or less convince I'm quite convinced when one has been
[23:52 - 23:57]
saved by a president for Taylor
[23:57 - 24:02]
him so that perhaps she took when I was
[24:02 - 24:07]
over just like in trying to impose who have a duty
[24:07 - 24:14]
in the field to observe. I want to conclude
[24:14 - 24:20]
by saying that I fully agree with the
[24:20 - 24:25]
sentiment that war itself is an evil and but
[24:25 - 24:29]
just because it is an evil which unfortunately as it
[24:29 - 24:34]
is to be with us it is so very important to take
[24:34 - 24:39]
as strong as possible measures to ensure that the rules
[24:39 - 24:43]
of war human to lose a war so
[24:43 - 24:46]
heavily armed conflict.
[24:46 - 24:50]
Thank you for her says I to her. Thank you very much. And finally judge
[24:50 - 24:52]
in New York.
[24:52 - 24:58]
Thank you. I think it is quite clear to everyone
[24:58 - 25:04]
that this is not an actual trial. We are not here
[25:04 - 25:09]
trying the United States of America. We are not trying any particular
[25:09 - 25:13]
individual. We are not pronouncing on the guilt or innocence
[25:13 - 25:19]
of any particular individual whether enlisted in our officer.
[25:19 - 25:24]
We have had to present ation of certain bits of evidence. It has been impossible
[25:24 - 25:29]
obviously here for all of the available evidence to be presented.
[25:29 - 25:34]
We have been told for instance in one investigation that they are not
[25:34 - 25:38]
free to release that. The details are
[25:38 - 25:43]
secured in that investigation. Certain measures
[25:43 - 25:44]
are sub judice.
[25:44 - 25:50]
I think it must also be clear and I think it is clear from what
[25:50 - 25:54]
professor a lot of packed professors have said that
[25:54 - 25:59]
we in expressing an opinion. Cannot base
[25:59 - 26:04]
ourselves on want we have heard here tonight. It is
[26:04 - 26:09]
inevitable that we each one of us are some odd affected by
[26:09 - 26:14]
views which we have held as a result of our previous studies.
[26:14 - 26:19]
Questions of this kind because we have all three of us been professor
[26:19 - 26:23]
of international law and have had occasion to study these
[26:23 - 26:28]
matters. Now as to these specific questions
[26:28 - 26:32]
I think the three of us are fully agreed that the
[26:32 - 26:37]
principles of Nuremberg do applied to the United States
[26:37 - 26:42]
and to it as in Viet Nam. I would put
[26:42 - 26:47]
more emphasis than has been put tonight upon the resolution of the
[26:47 - 26:52]
General Assembly of the United Nations which was adopted unanimously and the
[26:52 - 26:57]
United States participation in that unanimous vote is a factor which must be
[26:57 - 27:02]
taken into account and Its Responsibility for observing those rules
[27:02 - 27:06]
as rules of international law characterized in that
[27:06 - 27:07]
resolution.
[27:07 - 27:13]
And the next place. I. Personally feel that
[27:13 - 27:18]
we cannot find here any conspiracy to wage aggressive war
[27:18 - 27:22]
in any terms comparable to those which were applicable to Hitler's
[27:22 - 27:28]
tried at Nuremberg and I think there is been pretty general
[27:28 - 27:33]
agreement that this question of trying the
[27:33 - 27:37]
responsibility for starting the war there was the
[27:37 - 27:42]
determination of the illegality of the war is a question which probably
[27:42 - 27:47]
defies examination by almost any
[27:47 - 27:52]
tribunal which could be made available at this time.
[27:52 - 27:57]
Moreover I think we must take into account and I think Professor Taylor has brought this to
[27:57 - 28:02]
a new book that the crime of aggression has defied definition in
[28:02 - 28:07]
spite of efforts over a series of years to decide what
[28:07 - 28:13]
the crime of aggression is. Now as to these specific acts
[28:13 - 28:18]
it seems to me that we are up against a question of
[28:18 - 28:23]
evidence which we are not in a position to weigh at this
[28:23 - 28:27]
time. We can only deal in certain principles. One
[28:27 - 28:31]
principle I think is clear that international law has not
[28:31 - 28:36]
characterized an aerial bombardment pursy as
[28:36 - 28:41]
illegal some killing from the air may be illegal but the mere
[28:41 - 28:46]
fact that there has been bombardment of towns does
[28:46 - 28:51]
not constitute a crime. Personally I cannot
[28:51 - 28:55]
escape that conclusion and I think that this is revealed in all of the
[28:55 - 29:00]
testimony tonight that there have been crimes even though some of them
[29:00 - 29:06]
may have been. Contrary to orders.
[29:06 - 29:08]
And finally since it is so limited I merely
[29:08 - 29:14]
wish to express my own opinion on this question of responsibility.
[29:14 - 29:18]
If there is an appropriate method an impartial method of determining the
[29:18 - 29:23]
validity of charges then I think responsibility
[29:23 - 29:27]
must be pinned up and to those who had authority to
[29:27 - 29:32]
forbid to prevent or to punish but who actually directed
[29:32 - 29:36]
sanctioned approved or acquiesced in or
[29:36 - 29:38]
tolerated the acts in question.
[29:38 - 29:42]
It was just him. Thank you very much. Well
[29:42 - 29:47]
that is as far as we can pursue these issues this evening for America. Obviously
[29:47 - 29:51]
the questions remain. How much further can the United States
[29:51 - 29:56]
dare to pursue these allegations of individual or national
[29:56 - 29:59]
guilt. Does the nation need to clear its
[29:59 - 30:03]
conscience for its own sake or for the sake of world opinion.
[30:03 - 30:06]
God not
[30:06 - 31:02]
God.
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