- Series
- Dilemmas of power
- Air Date
- Duration
- 00:58:30
- Episode Description
- The sixth program in this series features Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith talking about the economies of developing countries.
- Series Description
- This series presents a variety of lectures on Soviet-American relations. The lectures are followed by informal question and answer sessions.
- Subject(s)
- Creator(s)
- WBJC (Radio station : Baltimore, Md.) (Producer)Johns Hopkins University (Producer)Schwartz, Donald (Composer)
- Contributors
- Galbraith, John Kenneth, 1908-2006 (Lecturer)
- Genre(s)
- Geographic Region(s)
- regions
- Time Period
- 1971-1980
[00:19 - 00:24]
Would you be in Baltimore in cooperation with the Maryland Center for
[00:24 - 00:29]
Public Broadcasting and Johns Hopkins University. Present the annual
[00:29 - 00:34]
undergraduate student project. The 1971 Eisenhower
[00:34 - 00:38]
symposium. An 11 part series of featured speakers presenting formal
[00:38 - 00:43]
addresses followed by an informal question and answer sessions.
[00:43 - 00:48]
This year's topic American relations dilemma is an hour
[00:48 - 00:53]
on this program Dr. John Kenneth Galbraith Harvard economist will discuss the
[00:53 - 00:58]
role of the Third World as it is affected by competition between the great
[00:58 - 00:58]
powers.
[00:58 - 01:13]
Doug Wright and our LADIES AND GENTLEMAN Good evening welcome once again to the
[01:13 - 01:18]
Milton Eisenhower symposium the United States and the Soviet Union. The
[01:18 - 01:22]
dilemmas of power. Dr. John Kenneth Galbraith
[01:22 - 01:27]
prefaces his book The affluent society with a quote from aphid Marshall.
[01:27 - 01:33]
The Economist. Like everyone else must concern himself with the ultimate aims of man.
[01:33 - 01:37]
This is aptly described the life of Dr. Galbraith economist
[01:37 - 01:42]
professor author ambassador Dr John Kenneth Galbraith has held public
[01:42 - 01:47]
offices and has participated in several presidential campaigns. A
[01:47 - 01:51]
Canadian by birth. Dr. Galbraith has resided in the United States since his
[01:51 - 01:56]
graduation from college in 1980. He received his Ph.D. in
[01:56 - 02:01]
economics from the University of California. Where the Social Science Research
[02:01 - 02:05]
Council fellow at the University of Cambridge and has taught at the University of
[02:05 - 02:10]
California Princeton University and Harvard University. He holds numerous
[02:10 - 02:14]
honorary degrees from colleges and universities in the United States
[02:14 - 02:20]
India and England. A former editor of Fortune magazine
[02:20 - 02:26]
has written many books spanning a wide range of topics including economic social
[02:26 - 02:31]
criticism politics and Indian painting. In addition he has written a
[02:31 - 02:36]
collection of short stories and novels and it's well-known in literary circles as an
[02:36 - 02:41]
essayist and book critic a teacher of agricultural economics and
[02:41 - 02:45]
economic development. Dr. Gahl served as an advisor to the governments of India
[02:45 - 02:50]
Pakistan and a line. From 1961 until
[02:50 - 02:54]
1963. He was ambassador of the United States to India. A
[02:54 - 03:00]
period recorded in his book ambassador's journal. A personal account of the Kennedy years.
[03:00 - 03:05]
A diary in which he deals with a variety of issues including Berlin Vietnam
[03:05 - 03:10]
the Congo the European Common Market tackles in the United States and agricultural
[03:10 - 03:15]
policy. Described as an enormously unorthodox ambassador. He was
[03:15 - 03:20]
responsible for American policy during the Chinese Indian border conflict in
[03:20 - 03:22]
1982. This term is in
[03:22 - 03:30]
common with President
[03:30 - 03:34]
ambassador. Prime Minister
[03:34 - 03:41]
for the help. Of my coach
[03:41 - 03:49]
and my.
[03:49 - 03:50]
Doctor.
[03:50 - 04:13]
Madam Chairman let's examine. My friends. May I say for
[04:13 - 04:17]
my part that I'm very happy to be here this evening at
[04:17 - 04:22]
Johns Hopkins. Very happy to be here at the Melton
[04:22 - 04:29]
Eisenhower symposium.
[04:29 - 04:35]
Renew old acquaintances among others with my old friend.
[04:35 - 04:39]
Dr. Eisenhower. One of the things
[04:39 - 04:44]
I may face on one of the very few things that was omitted from that very graceful and pleasant
[04:44 - 04:49]
introduction. Was that in the 1930s
[04:49 - 04:55]
I served for a time in the United States Department of Agriculture as did
[04:55 - 05:01]
Dr. Eisenhower. We started at rather different levels. He was a
[05:01 - 05:06]
rather senior figure you in your in years but
[05:06 - 05:07]
senior in the hierarchy.
[05:07 - 05:12]
I was doing your and yours an appropriately junior in the hierarchy but he was
[05:12 - 05:15]
the name to be contact with.
[05:15 - 05:20]
I was telling him at dinner how how sternly we younger people were
[05:20 - 05:25]
warned to avoid association with.
[05:25 - 05:30]
The and reign with Milton Eisenhower and Martha K. I see
[05:30 - 05:35]
Theo and Louis bean and the other group of radicals who are
[05:35 - 05:39]
around Henry a lot of.
[05:39 - 05:43]
Well in the ensuing years I've stuck to the middle of the route.
[05:43 - 05:55]
Dr Eisenhower of course has continued to go after.
[05:55 - 06:00]
Keeping keeping abreast of the students in this respect and I suppose that
[06:00 - 06:06]
is explains why he has survived as the world's most durable
[06:06 - 06:07]
university president.
[06:07 - 06:21]
You know in addressing myself this evening to the problem of
[06:21 - 06:26]
the symposium I have taken as is the right of the speaker. Some very
[06:26 - 06:31]
generous. Liberties with my
[06:31 - 06:36]
with the topic assigned as I have been working on this
[06:36 - 06:41]
subject. I've been impressed with the
[06:41 - 06:46]
fact that in foreign policy in these last years the United States
[06:46 - 06:51]
has had a dynamic United States policy has had a
[06:51 - 06:55]
character and a dynamic of its own that has
[06:55 - 07:01]
been separate from anything that could be immediately of a
[07:01 - 07:07]
lated to our application to the Soviet Union even though.
[07:07 - 07:11]
It varies very greatly on it. And since I can
[07:11 - 07:16]
profess to some familiarity with what
[07:16 - 07:21]
this aspect of our foreign policy. And since I cannot profess to any
[07:21 - 07:26]
great familiarity with the more detailed problems
[07:26 - 07:31]
of our relations with the Soviet Union it is on the purity of the marker of the
[07:31 - 07:36]
American aspect that I'm going to go out by the
[07:36 - 07:39]
end of my.
[07:39 - 07:46]
Lecture this evening when you will all be a great deal older.
[07:46 - 07:51]
I will come to communism in the Soviet Union. But I am somewhat more
[07:51 - 07:55]
marginally than the others who have gone before me on
[07:55 - 08:00]
this symposium. This leads me to hope they were all right.
[08:00 - 08:02]
They cuz.
[08:02 - 08:06]
It's evident that I will not be correcting them this evening
[08:06 - 08:11]
as I should like to have done if they had been in error.
[08:11 - 08:18]
The last 10 years in the last five in particular
[08:18 - 08:23]
and then ones of unparalleled under introspection as
[08:23 - 08:28]
regards American foreign policy and from nearly all of this law
[08:28 - 08:33]
has come the conclusion that the policy is wrong. The day is going to
[08:33 - 08:38]
come when we all have to decide what is right. One prominent
[08:38 - 08:43]
cause of our trouble in the twenty years following World War 2 was the
[08:43 - 08:48]
habit of accepting on critically what the Pentagon the State Department in the White House. Said was
[08:48 - 08:53]
needed and must be done. Let's lead to the propagation among numerous other
[08:53 - 08:57]
areas of the very large fantasy that was
[08:57 - 09:02]
essential for our national survival and the pregnant detail that our
[09:02 - 09:07]
right of innocent passage is being denied in the summer of 1964
[09:07 - 09:12]
in the Gulf of Tonkin. But it is dangerous to
[09:12 - 09:17]
suppose that the government is always right it will sooner or
[09:17 - 09:22]
later be awkward for the public administration. If most people
[09:22 - 09:26]
suppose that it is always wrong when the government or
[09:26 - 09:31]
government does better. We should be aware of it. We
[09:31 - 09:36]
shouldn't assume more or less automatically that annual design for a lot of
[09:36 - 09:39]
things is replacing the old one.
[09:39 - 09:46]
I'm going to argue presently that without ever quite identifying the nature of the disorder
[09:46 - 09:52]
we have come some distance in correcting one of them our grievous faults of our foreign
[09:52 - 09:57]
policy in the years following World War Two. It has come about partly as the
[09:57 - 10:01]
result of the Vietnam War our piety it is the sound political
[10:01 - 10:07]
reaction. The man and policies which were productive a great couple.
[10:07 - 10:12]
Some of the credit must also go to Richard Nixon. I am like many
[10:12 - 10:20]
others sensitive about giving the Nixon credit for anything.
[10:20 - 10:25]
On a wide range of matters from Supreme Court appointments to racial equality to the problems of the cities and the
[10:25 - 10:30]
poor is preferences instinct. Seems to me
[10:30 - 10:35]
for whatever is regressed over the visit I attend for whatever effect it may
[10:35 - 10:39]
have and it isn't very great to oppose him in the future as in the past
[10:39 - 10:44]
and I must say that I think very little of the tradition in American political comment
[10:44 - 10:49]
which is relentlessly impelled to prove that it is even handed
[10:49 - 10:56]
that tradition which I'm encountering some categorically regressive comic or obsolete figure
[10:56 - 11:00]
like Metro Fire oh Agnew or J Edgar Hoover feels obliged to
[11:00 - 11:05]
remind people. Of the redeeming tendencies of the particular person as a
[11:05 - 11:07]
husband athlete are.
[11:07 - 11:16]
Our one time nemesis of Baby Face Nelson.
[11:16 - 11:21]
But Mr. Nixon does respond to public opinion even when one suspects that
[11:21 - 11:25]
it is in conflict with his longtime preference. When this brings better results
[11:25 - 11:31]
one cannot deny him the credit.
[11:31 - 11:35]
In most capitals of the world the diplomatic representatives of the smaller countries are rather more
[11:35 - 11:40]
pleasant and popular than those who speak for the great nations including
[11:40 - 11:45]
the two superpowers the United States and the Soviet Union. This is not
[11:45 - 11:50]
because Swedes Danes Canadians Mexicans or tsunamis are intrinsically more amiable than
[11:50 - 11:55]
Americans or Russians. It is because their countries have little power.
[11:55 - 12:00]
And their officials in consequence do not have the unfortunate and
[12:00 - 12:05]
often repellent Association which is the style of the man who
[12:05 - 12:10]
are associated with power that is not their own. I doubt that Americans
[12:10 - 12:14]
exercising such power any more in unpleasant than have been Roman
[12:14 - 12:19]
Spaniards Englishman Germans or Japanese. Similarly circumstanced in the
[12:19 - 12:23]
past but we must notice that they also all had a bad reputation
[12:23 - 12:30]
and our bureaucracies have been much larger. So we have had more people in
[12:30 - 12:34]
these last years with this unfortunate style that is
[12:34 - 12:41]
involved when people to print pretend to power that is not their own.
[12:41 - 12:46]
Power execs exercised through a bureaucracy has other objectionable features
[12:46 - 12:52]
which mark this. It is the will of our going to station
[12:52 - 12:58]
not that of the individual that as you can see is expressed this is inevitable
[12:58 - 13:04]
for everyone associated with the State Department the Pentagon or I
[13:04 - 13:08]
think this is especially rewarding thought the CIA had to speak
[13:08 - 13:13]
his mind or whatever passes therefore. The
[13:13 - 13:18]
result would be chaotic. Organization is only
[13:18 - 13:22]
possible if the organisation man when the decision is taken
[13:22 - 13:26]
are less reliably to the organisation line.
[13:26 - 13:33]
Democratic Centralism isn't an imperative 40 miles away in
[13:33 - 13:38]
Washington as it is at a slightly greater distance in Moscow. It
[13:38 - 13:43]
follows that those who possess power must defend its use not with
[13:43 - 13:49]
their own arguments but with the arguments of the organization.
[13:49 - 13:53]
It follows that they will always seem in their style to be parroting an
[13:53 - 13:58]
official line. That is what they must do.
[13:58 - 14:03]
A skillful b r grad is not a man who speaks his own mind. Let's go
[14:03 - 14:08]
for bureaucrat is a man who gives the impression of doing so while in fact making the
[14:08 - 14:13]
organization case the bureaucratic style in other
[14:13 - 14:18]
words is intensely conformist. For that is the only way a bureaucracy
[14:18 - 14:23]
can function if it is doctrine that communism is the original sin.
[14:23 - 14:28]
Castro is a world menace. That conflict with the Soviet Union is
[14:28 - 14:31]
inevitable.
[14:31 - 14:36]
That if the North Vietnamese were not stopped at the de-militarized line they will
[14:36 - 14:41]
proceed. The whole why. One must have
[14:41 - 14:47]
one must have a man that will go along with the stuff.
[14:47 - 14:51]
One cannot have individuals who will go before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
[14:51 - 14:54]
admit the fault right that it is all a lot of nonsense.
[14:54 - 15:07]
I need to accept the official line in the style that goes with having to do
[15:07 - 15:09]
so.
[15:09 - 15:13]
There's not in principle exclude the expression of individual
[15:13 - 15:18]
opinion before the organization position is established
[15:18 - 15:23]
in practice. However it does a man who goes along in
[15:23 - 15:28]
public feeling develops the habit of going along in private. The
[15:28 - 15:33]
consequence of this is very far reaching. It means that
[15:33 - 15:38]
on the question of the conformist style. There are never any
[15:38 - 15:43]
very strong internal pressures to change the substance of
[15:43 - 15:45]
official policy.
[15:45 - 15:49]
Here is another place where we move quickly from style the substance. Once it is
[15:49 - 15:53]
established that something becomes policy it remains policy.
[15:53 - 16:01]
This would seem to suggest that a bureaucratic policy would be a cautious policy.
[16:01 - 16:06]
This cannot be assume the policy is what it is whatever is
[16:06 - 16:10]
being done already. And if that is reckless the policy will be
[16:10 - 16:15]
reckless. I'm here long last I come to the communists
[16:15 - 16:21]
in the 50s and 60s it was the accepted line that the communist countries in
[16:21 - 16:26]
general in the Soviet Union in particular were conspiratorial and
[16:26 - 16:30]
relentlessly expansionist any divisions within the Communist
[16:30 - 16:35]
world the secretary rescued regularly the war concerned on only the
[16:35 - 16:40]
best way of destroying the free world. This
[16:40 - 16:44]
was fully accepted gospel by organization by the State Department
[16:44 - 16:49]
as indeed it is still a military gospel. This was not in
[16:49 - 16:54]
those years a formula for caution but a sanction and Vietnam
[16:54 - 16:59]
Laos the Dominican Republic for a great deal of dangerous
[16:59 - 17:04]
adventures it fostered notably in the intelligence agencies in
[17:04 - 17:08]
American bond ism based on the thesis that communist
[17:08 - 17:13]
disregard for international law and accepted standards of
[17:13 - 17:18]
international behavior could only be matched by an
[17:18 - 17:23]
even more sanguinary immorality on the part of the United States. We have
[17:23 - 17:27]
the subs coming back. Then it will affect attitudes again.
[17:27 - 17:32]
But it was after the war and the occupation of Germany and Japan and the administration of
[17:32 - 17:37]
the Marshall Plan and the prosecution of the Cold War. That it became
[17:37 - 17:43]
evident what an association with the foreign policy of the United States would
[17:43 - 17:45]
do for a man almost any man.
[17:45 - 17:52]
The names that come from this period are part of the American legend Lucius
[17:52 - 17:56]
Clay. John Jay McCloy Paul Hoffman Robert Lovett Christian herder
[17:56 - 18:01]
John Foster Dulles Allen Dulles Arthur Dean Henry Cabot Lodge.
[18:01 - 18:05]
Oh man who I would their eminence but the eminence of American foreign
[18:05 - 18:10]
policy in these years and many younger man lawyers college
[18:10 - 18:15]
professors in the main acquired a less cosmic but in their own
[18:15 - 18:20]
more limited circles. I'm not less impressive reputation for their service in
[18:20 - 18:25]
Berlin Paris or Washington where in fact they did much of the hard work
[18:25 - 18:29]
there after they were revered figures on their campuses
[18:29 - 18:36]
or in their law firms and with their clients. It was a time and
[18:36 - 18:41]
notably in the case of the Marshall Plan when foreign policy seemed to work.
[18:41 - 18:45]
Association with success makes a man a success.
[18:45 - 18:52]
All of the great names that I have mentioned it would be invidious to say which not
[18:52 - 18:57]
only owed their distinction those which not only
[18:57 - 19:01]
owed their distinction to their association with foreign policy but owed it
[19:01 - 19:06]
entirely to the stars. I think the word may be said possibly if
[19:06 - 19:10]
the two of the most famous the two dollars brothers
[19:10 - 19:15]
both of these gentlemen were deemed the lawyers. John Foster Dulles in
[19:15 - 19:20]
particular both in especially John Foster Dulles had the confident
[19:20 - 19:26]
manner that is essential to the senior standing and the American establishment.
[19:26 - 19:30]
Both of these men had a simplistic conspiratorial view of
[19:30 - 19:35]
history in general and communism in particular. I think it is a fair
[19:35 - 19:40]
statement that neither of them had any knowledge of the social factor shaping nations
[19:40 - 19:45]
that went much beyond the revelation that communism was a wicked and free
[19:45 - 19:50]
enterprise not a good but righteous and consistent with the strongest positions
[19:50 - 19:55]
strongest tenets of the Presbyterian Church. Mark than anyone else.
[19:55 - 20:00]
Mr John Foster Dulles was responsible for making these beliefs the
[20:00 - 20:05]
basis for policy for the decision that we must every Very stand
[20:05 - 20:10]
guard against communism or anything so designated them for the doctrine that so
[20:10 - 20:14]
disciplined and comprehensive as the communist conspiracy that it could be contained only by the
[20:14 - 20:19]
threat of massive retaliation against Moscow with a corollary
[20:19 - 20:23]
that any disorder anywhere in the world. And he had a
[20:23 - 20:29]
conspiratorial view of history might invite this retaliation.
[20:29 - 20:34]
It was he who denounced neutrality in the cold war as immoral. It was he
[20:34 - 20:39]
who bound the poor countries of the world the United States in a complex of military alliances
[20:39 - 20:44]
which burdened them with costly and useless armies and burdened us with a
[20:44 - 20:49]
catastrophic commitment that in the next decade brought us
[20:49 - 20:53]
disaster in the jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam I'm not suggesting that that
[20:53 - 20:58]
commitment was so irrevocable that it couldn't with better sense have been broken. But that was where it all
[20:58 - 21:03]
began. Allen Dulles proceeding in accordance with
[21:03 - 21:08]
exactly the same doctrine authored in quick succession two of the
[21:08 - 21:12]
greatest foul ups. In our national history. The shooting
[21:12 - 21:17]
down of the U-2 in the Paris summit in the summer of 1960 and the
[21:17 - 21:21]
incredible comic tragedy of the Bay of Pigs. Just one year later
[21:21 - 21:27]
foreign policy could make statesman of material like this man who were
[21:27 - 21:34]
so error prone. And if it even could even get an airport named for one of them.
[21:34 - 21:38]
It was surely obvious even to the most retarded citizen
[21:38 - 21:45]
that foreign policy could do something for almost anyone.
[21:45 - 21:48]
The realisation of the rewards of association with foreign policy
[21:48 - 21:54]
then became very strong and it came rather early
[21:54 - 22:00]
dose of Jones in his book on the Truman Doctrine a very good book. Now of the joy
[22:00 - 22:05]
in Washington when word came in one thousand forty seven that the British were giving up
[22:05 - 22:10]
responsibility for Greece and that the United States would soon have to take
[22:10 - 22:11]
over.
[22:11 - 22:16]
Now the United States would have to quote someone who is saying
[22:16 - 22:20]
world leadership with all of its burdens and all of its glory.
[22:20 - 22:27]
And he goes on to say that the people in the department felt called to a higher mission.
[22:27 - 22:31]
These are his words tenseness and controlled excitement filled the room when
[22:31 - 22:36]
Dean Acheson expound the emerging expounded the emerging policy at that
[22:36 - 22:37]
meeting.
[22:37 - 22:42]
All felt that a new chapter in world history had opened and that they
[22:42 - 22:45]
could be present where the most privileged the man.
[22:45 - 22:50]
This was as I say taking grease under our wing to
[22:50 - 22:55]
ensure that it would henceforth have a democratic government.
[22:55 - 23:00]
Much of Mr. Nixon's some of Mr. Nixon's foreign policy is at best a
[23:00 - 23:05]
puzzle even granted the enormous power of the bureaucratic
[23:05 - 23:10]
momentum related to the bureaucratic style that mention the
[23:10 - 23:12]
slow withdrawal from Vietnam.
[23:12 - 23:16]
Coupled with the Cambodian enlargement and the relation of episodes are
[23:16 - 23:21]
inexplicable and especially in the way in which they have allowed potential democratic and
[23:21 - 23:25]
tagging us to inherit right and just play the peace issue.
[23:25 - 23:34]
I'm a Democrat but forgive the Democrats their past
[23:34 - 23:40]
sins on this issue I think it's something that may well be premature.
[23:40 - 23:45]
I say a personal matter Mr. Nixon's adherence to the old Ellis line in
[23:45 - 23:50]
support of Pakistan and he spend all this unnecessary uncivilized cruel
[23:50 - 23:56]
and provocative of decent opinion Vice President Agnew this recent visit to the Greek
[23:56 - 24:05]
Vice President Agnew's recent visit to the Greek winter was equally
[24:05 - 24:11]
reprehensible to the extent that it cannot be interpreted as a review.
[24:11 - 24:15]
But.
[24:15 - 24:20]
But elsewhere Mr. Nixon and his people have shown it seems to me a commendable tendency
[24:20 - 24:25]
to avoid the crises and the tensions which
[24:25 - 24:29]
so rejoice the practitioners of the earlier style.
[24:29 - 24:36]
They have so far refused to become unduly aroused over the communists in Chile
[24:36 - 24:41]
or the left wing government to cancel a visit of a warship
[24:41 - 24:46]
was better than to send several in which would have sent certainly have been
[24:46 - 24:49]
suggested 10 years earlier.
[24:49 - 24:54]
You know any person who is seems to have lost his head on this issue as
[24:54 - 24:59]
John Connally and some Democrats at least have to take responsibility for
[24:59 - 25:01]
him.
[25:01 - 25:06]
Evidently the administration did some settlement with the Soviets in the matter of nuclear
[25:06 - 25:11]
submarines in Cuba. They have been
[25:11 - 25:15]
patient in the Middle East by not sending troops to help Hussein in
[25:15 - 25:21]
1970. I avoided doing something very wrong.
[25:21 - 25:26]
And getting a lot of blood on the sand. I remember
[25:26 - 25:31]
the administration when I complimented that it helped a lot but there were no helicopters available.
[25:31 - 25:35]
But still they didn't go. The administration has
[25:35 - 25:40]
ignored the call of the Democratic elders and by
[25:40 - 25:43]
goners this time with their has the
[25:43 - 25:50]
contact really described him their call for a crackdown.
[25:50 - 25:53]
On the urge to politic.
[25:53 - 25:58]
On the reconciliation policy in the east of Chancellor Brandt an
[25:58 - 26:02]
act an action which if the administration had gone through with it would have
[26:02 - 26:08]
kept transfer brand out of the clutches of the Nobel Peace crowd.
[26:08 - 26:12]
The administration appears to made some progress. Will that be
[26:12 - 26:18]
ratified in making life more tolerable in relations with the Soviets more tolerable.
[26:18 - 26:23]
On Berlin. And perhaps something will happen as the result of
[26:23 - 26:28]
the SALT talks. We should not be in doubt as to what the problem in the go
[26:28 - 26:33]
ahead. There is both sides. The
[26:33 - 26:37]
negotiations go on immediately under the eye of the military people
[26:37 - 26:43]
which is the equivalent of putting negotiations for the suppression of
[26:43 - 26:48]
negotiations with France for the suppression of the heroin
[26:48 - 26:52]
traffic under the command of a whole group of
[26:52 - 26:57]
narcotics addicts and the whole of
[26:57 - 27:02]
our. Oratory and communist wicked wickedness which was
[27:02 - 27:07]
already in the Klein and a Kennedy and particularly under Lyndon Johnson has disappeared.
[27:07 - 27:14]
The old China policy has been dramatically reversed a step which I
[27:14 - 27:19]
can think involved was taken
[27:19 - 27:24]
without some. Of the rather considerable political
[27:24 - 27:29]
risk that was that was present there.
[27:29 - 27:33]
Perhaps it was all an accident. That.
[27:33 - 27:39]
China now is the result of this ends up in the United Nations.
[27:39 - 27:44]
Which is where it has long been long as I say it was entirely an accident.
[27:44 - 27:49]
But at least one must give the administration credit for having accidents and some accidents that
[27:49 - 27:53]
turn out well. And now. The
[27:53 - 27:58]
president has got to announce a trip to Moscow which removes the
[27:58 - 28:03]
suspicions of some. I think beyond just suspicions that
[28:03 - 28:08]
this was the whole move toward China was some kind of an anti-Soviet
[28:08 - 28:13]
ploy. When anybody described anything as being a
[28:13 - 28:15]
rather complicated operation in Washington.
[28:15 - 28:20]
You should suspect because anything that complicated people would already be boasting about
[28:20 - 28:28]
when the China and China when the Democrats were in power.
[28:28 - 28:33]
We must say that they they had.
[28:33 - 28:37]
The mobility of a man who was up to his neck in concrete.
[28:37 - 28:44]
Communist bureaucracy was committed to the belief that the Communists were wicked
[28:44 - 28:49]
but they were interlopers who were intransigent they hostile
[28:49 - 28:56]
and alas they didn't wish to bully the Chinese to be otherwise.
[28:56 - 29:01]
Until his last days in office Secretary Rusk. But the stubbornness that had a
[29:01 - 29:06]
certain amount of worldly charm about it declined even to concede that the
[29:06 - 29:10]
Communists had possession of the national capital. He continued to the end
[29:10 - 29:16]
to refer to Peking as a thing.
[29:16 - 29:21]
So I must say without Seems to me beyond question that the
[29:21 - 29:26]
Nixon initiatives of course a kind of reconsideration of our
[29:26 - 29:31]
foreign policy for which we should be grateful. Think me also
[29:31 - 29:36]
beyond question that they forced a major position a major problem for
[29:36 - 29:41]
the opposition to which I belong. The Democrats that they
[29:41 - 29:46]
come up to the election next year and then as will be the end think that many that
[29:46 - 29:51]
nothing much has happened. The president's ability to inspire like
[29:51 - 29:56]
this like seems to me to be undiminished. And notably among the black and they are on the
[29:56 - 30:00]
porch and had a three day with the war in Vietnam the bomber still
[30:00 - 30:05]
fly that edify themselves but that what is happening there and in Cambodia
[30:05 - 30:10]
and a lot that will be hoped will be enough to cause people to forget the
[30:10 - 30:15]
earlier Democratic complicity in disaster and perhaps even the role of
[30:15 - 30:21]
the some of those who are still around and had a part in it.
[30:21 - 30:25]
Alternatively it seems to me that the opposition can recognize
[30:25 - 30:31]
that they have been rather badly play by the president as
[30:31 - 30:36]
has all but been true on economic policy and.
[30:36 - 30:39]
Recognizing that they can make clear their intention to reform ranks
[30:39 - 30:48]
on the sensible side of the Nixon policy and this means.
[30:48 - 30:53]
A even stronger position of
[30:53 - 30:57]
the sun on the several problems which you're dealing with on this
[30:57 - 30:58]
symposium.
[30:58 - 31:05]
This means an even more positive commitment and even more affirmative commitment
[31:05 - 31:10]
to the principle of coexistence with the communist countries. It means a much
[31:10 - 31:14]
more determined effort than anything we have seen in the past to get the military
[31:14 - 31:19]
competition with the Soviets under control. And this means a
[31:19 - 31:24]
much. A much firmer very much firmer
[31:24 - 31:29]
grasp. On our own military establishment and its spending than we
[31:29 - 31:34]
have had achieved or had achieved in the past under the Democrats.
[31:34 - 31:37]
It means.
[31:37 - 31:42]
Abandoning Africa. It's too late. Castro
[31:42 - 31:47]
Senator Kennedy said the other day that it was not a commercial and then the
[31:47 - 31:54]
president can go 1000 miles to Peking. It should be possible
[31:54 - 31:56]
for.
[31:56 - 31:59]
Either.
[31:59 - 32:06]
President Nixon or his successor to make a 90 mile trip to Havana.
[32:06 - 32:11]
It means abandoning the sub imperial ambitions in the Third World.
[32:11 - 32:16]
And recognizing as I said on life tonight that there's little we can do to
[32:16 - 32:21]
influence political development in this part of the world. And let. That we need
[32:21 - 32:26]
to do so. And it means this is the most important of
[32:26 - 32:30]
all by far the most important of all eliminating the
[32:30 - 32:34]
intelligence and the military and much of the diplomatic bureaucracy
[32:34 - 32:39]
both in Washington and in the field. That these changes in
[32:39 - 32:44]
policy make we've done because it is the
[32:44 - 32:48]
bureaucracy and the making of policy by great organizations by the great
[32:48 - 32:53]
organization of the Pentagon and the State Department the intelligence agencies that is the
[32:53 - 32:58]
source of the style and the source of the contact content the substance.
[32:58 - 33:03]
That I argue tonight. We have now learned it's dangerous
[33:03 - 33:08]
foreign policy made by an organization I could put the whole thing in one sentence is
[33:08 - 33:13]
a contradiction in terms we must have it on the scale which again it can be made by
[33:13 - 33:16]
individuals and subject to the judgment of individuals.
[33:16 - 33:23]
And finally again a recurring for the cosmetic detail it
[33:23 - 33:27]
means making Washington a center of straightforward administration making the White
[33:27 - 33:32]
House not a symbol of the nation and not a symbol of anything
[33:32 - 33:37]
but a place for a sensible sensible man who lives and does business with the least
[33:37 - 33:42]
possible ostentatious and the greatest possible accessibility.
[33:42 - 33:47]
I think it's still uncertain how. The opposition how the Democrats
[33:47 - 33:49]
will react.
[33:49 - 33:54]
Democrats have a strong sense of tradition here in Baltimore and
[33:54 - 33:59]
know this extends to the man and the policies that have been it's
[33:59 - 34:04]
doing. There's a certain conditional affection for Democrats
[34:04 - 34:07]
even those who have been architects of disaster.
[34:07 - 34:14]
While I have very little. Doubt as to how the decision
[34:14 - 34:19]
should go. As to whether it will be hope to coast on the past
[34:19 - 34:22]
or do the Mr Nixon one better
[34:22 - 34:32]
I think will not be in any doubt as to what I feel should be the course.
[34:32 - 34:37]
Mr Nixon has made life very much more difficult for the Democrats in these last
[34:37 - 34:42]
months and I think we should all be very grateful to him for
[34:42 - 34:46]
doing so.
[34:46 - 34:50]
May I say that your you will now
[34:50 - 34:55]
realize that I didn't come all the way down here from Cambridge to
[34:55 - 35:00]
give you a fairly perfunctory speech.
[35:00 - 35:06]
You are you have aged since I began.
[35:06 - 35:10]
But may I say that as compared to a Harvard undergraduate Schork comportment and
[35:10 - 35:16]
particularly the way you wish strain from shuffling your feet is absolutely commendable.
[35:16 - 35:59]
Thank you very much. Each.
[35:59 - 36:04]
Professor Galbraith will entertain questions to facilitate our procedure
[36:04 - 36:09]
we have microphone set up in the aisles. He'll take questions alternately.
[36:09 - 36:14]
Please limit yourself to one question and don't touch the microphone.
[36:14 - 36:19]
I'd also like to remind you of our next speaker in the symposium Lieutenant
[36:19 - 36:21]
General James Gavin Professor Galbraith.
[36:21 - 36:31]
For many years the United States succeeded in keeping China out of the UN.
[36:31 - 36:36]
Not even a vote was taken and then all of a sudden the United States lost very badly
[36:36 - 36:42]
on the vote to even keep Taiwan in retch in the UN and I
[36:42 - 36:47]
have no understand exactly how the United States loss of badly could you offer any idea.
[36:47 - 36:51]
Oh I don't know but I'd
[36:51 - 36:56]
say this could be one of the best manufactory and recent
[36:56 - 37:01]
history. As long as the facts come out that well I'm
[37:01 - 37:06]
prepared to give some minor applause to whoever it was that
[37:06 - 37:10]
mismanaged this operation. I.
[37:10 - 37:15]
Thank you. Sir I would like to challenge you.
[37:15 - 37:23]
As an artist story and I very much appreciate the skill with which you
[37:23 - 37:28]
do style as significant. I mean that's what we do very much we can't
[37:28 - 37:33]
discuss content very well so we discussed. Formal appearances of things and presented
[37:33 - 37:37]
as a very serious discussion and I also appreciate your entertaining quality.
[37:37 - 37:45]
Maybe you should stop right there.
[37:45 - 37:50]
Right On the plus side. Let's turn to the other side. As a member of the National Congress of labor
[37:50 - 37:56]
committees I also have an obligation reality and that's what I'd like to challenge about. Since that's what.
[37:56 - 38:02]
Does not appear in the course of your long discussion. The point is this.
[38:02 - 38:07]
You tell us. And sort of love this audience with a sense of what is
[38:07 - 38:12]
happening on the basis of style some kind of appearance of reality.
[38:12 - 38:17]
And at the same time what is actually happening is very different. It is actually happening of the north through
[38:17 - 38:22]
substantial changes in the most significant kind in the recent period. One
[38:22 - 38:26]
is the floating of the dollar and the second is the imposition of wage price and wage controls
[38:26 - 38:31]
primarily as we've not seen or exclusively as we've seen so much of in the recent
[38:31 - 38:36]
continued rise in the cost of living index. And you. This urban gentleman
[38:36 - 38:42]
is one of the most. Strongest advocate of the disciplining of the
[38:42 - 38:46]
society through increasingly rigorous wage controls. He was one of the earliest
[38:46 - 38:51]
advocates of it and certainly Nixon's final agreement with
[38:51 - 38:56]
that is one of the things most embarrass the Democratic Party although there are still concerns as to
[38:56 - 39:01]
whether he will apply Phase 2 in such a way so that we will get to Phase 3 a real
[39:01 - 39:05]
disciplining of the wage force in this country. So on the one hand we have this
[39:05 - 39:10]
seemingly serene atmosphere of accommodation. But on the other hand we have an
[39:10 - 39:15]
increasingly disciplined society which is going to have to grow to offer tremendous internal struggle in the
[39:15 - 39:20]
country. So. The trial of that I would like to put is is it not the
[39:20 - 39:25]
case that with the disruption of the world economy in the
[39:25 - 39:30]
shrinkage of world trade that what is really behind the reality of this period is not a question
[39:30 - 39:35]
of style at all but a question of whether we will succeed in imposing the most rigorous
[39:35 - 39:40]
kind of discipline on our workforce in this country and work forces in other countries such as in
[39:40 - 39:45]
Japan. Which is already in decline. Such
[39:45 - 39:47]
factors as the.
[39:47 - 39:52]
I get the gist of my mous I would like to know whether that is really the question of reality that
[39:52 - 39:56]
faces us in this lying I think that there are more questions than one can talk
[39:56 - 40:01]
about one night plotting a dollar I regard as relatively unimportant thing the what's the matter the
[40:01 - 40:06]
steps taken on wage and price control are really of major importance. Also
[40:06 - 40:11]
the subject of a rather of another discussion at least as long
[40:11 - 40:15]
as the one I've just had and I doubt that the patience of the audience
[40:15 - 40:21]
survive that. Let me let me say that I don't think that the problem
[40:21 - 40:24]
is in the action itself but the problem grows out of the
[40:24 - 40:30]
appearance in our economy over the last 50 years. Very powerful corporations which
[40:30 - 40:35]
have the power to sap and move their prices juxtaposed
[40:35 - 40:41]
to less strong but still very effective unions and the tendency to
[40:41 - 40:46]
reach to reconcile and the 10 increasing tendency of the one to reconcile
[40:46 - 40:51]
the two to reconcile their disputes by passing the cost on the public. This is the
[40:51 - 40:56]
underlying reality. A further step
[40:56 - 41:01]
to control wages and prices is in a substantial degree in
[41:01 - 41:05]
my view an accommodation to that past development. It was the past development
[41:05 - 41:10]
which made it more or less inevitable. So I think you're I think you're quite
[41:10 - 41:15]
right in assuming that there's a that this is a step
[41:15 - 41:20]
of major importance really very great importance. But the step also of
[41:20 - 41:25]
accommodation the underlying change rather than a step change is much
[41:25 - 41:26]
itself.
[41:26 - 41:31]
I submit the underlying change is the decline of real productivities in this country and in
[41:31 - 41:36]
the western world as a whole and that's what underlies this crisis that we're entering into and
[41:36 - 41:41]
this this I think takes us onto another topic that perhaps is a bit longer than that and we should
[41:41 - 41:42]
spend tonight.
[41:42 - 41:48]
Earlier in the symposium Professor William Appleman Williams articulated what can be called
[41:48 - 41:52]
the revisionist viewpoint of foreign policy which basically state it says
[41:52 - 41:57]
that no matter how universal our universe was that
[41:57 - 42:01]
premise is that our foreign policy is based primarily on the desire to maintain
[42:01 - 42:06]
a congenial atmosphere for American capitalism. He did submit to the audience the
[42:06 - 42:11]
premise that in order for us to scale down our involvement in the world and in and
[42:11 - 42:16]
therefore scale down our military involvement we would have to make a fundamental change in
[42:16 - 42:21]
American capitalism at home and you know I don't agree with that. There will be evident.
[42:21 - 42:25]
And what I was talking about style tonight that I relate the style for the
[42:25 - 42:29]
substance.
[42:29 - 42:33]
Of policy that is associated with organization with
[42:33 - 42:38]
bureaucracy. I don't no one should. Entirely
[42:38 - 42:43]
diminish diety deprecate the role of economic
[42:43 - 42:48]
determinism economic imperialism as a factor in our foreign policy and it's a much more
[42:48 - 42:53]
important however. These are the European views of the Japan that it is these are
[42:53 - 42:58]
the Vietnam of Asia Africa. The
[42:58 - 43:03]
actual truth of the matter is that it's a capitalist
[43:03 - 43:08]
state one can use that term in Indochina as the
[43:08 - 43:13]
minimum as it swept under Japanese control
[43:13 - 43:18]
in World War Two. I was gone for five years. We never missed it
[43:18 - 43:24]
for a moment. We never miss China. It's impossible for
[43:24 - 43:29]
me to think that the American economy has the
[43:29 - 43:35]
depth of the stake in the third world that this fuel holds.
[43:35 - 43:39]
So I come back to attributing
[43:39 - 43:44]
much of the dynamic much of the movement there in the
[43:44 - 43:49]
last 25 years to show
[43:49 - 43:54]
the ideology that they had to an
[43:54 - 43:59]
ideology which misinterpreted. The American possibilities
[43:59 - 44:04]
in need and which got deeply into the bureaucratic
[44:04 - 44:09]
structure and I would put much more emphasis on the Pentagon
[44:09 - 44:15]
and this whole seems to me that a lot of the revisionist view
[44:15 - 44:19]
indeed has the effect of exempting the
[44:19 - 44:25]
State Department from the Pentagon and the CIA from responsibilities which should damn
[44:25 - 44:33]
well be put right.
[44:33 - 44:38]
Well I guess if I would rather say something and actually ask the question directly and ask you to respond
[44:38 - 44:43]
to it. If in fact I had a question if I had a question to ask I
[44:43 - 44:48]
suppose it would be sir. What did you say. I'm not quite
[44:48 - 44:53]
sure what you said. Now if I were you. I would not have said anything
[44:53 - 44:58]
tonight either that is anything in the area of my competence economics that's
[44:58 - 45:02]
supposed to be your area of competence. You are after all the same John Kenneth Galbraith who wrote the
[45:02 - 45:08]
affluent society which in 1971 seems to be a rather silly book.
[45:08 - 45:12]
I would not pronounce I would talk about style if I were you as well so.
[45:12 - 45:22]
Because so that just to address the question the gentleman earlier why you did not address what you have
[45:22 - 45:27]
been applied is the two major topics today. Your. Your
[45:27 - 45:32]
support for wage gouging in this period on the brink of World
[45:32 - 45:36]
oppression and the other related important economic issues if I were you I would only speak
[45:36 - 45:41]
publicly on such seemingly unrelated issues as foreign policy and so forth I would try to avoid
[45:41 - 45:50]
any answer to my question.
[45:50 - 45:55]
That's a good point and I think out I'll take it under advisement but.
[45:55 - 45:59]
Stop talking in my profession is harder than it seems.
[45:59 - 46:04]
The question about India and Pakistan has visited Moscow and peeking in
[46:04 - 46:09]
troops are massed on the Pakistan borders and were making nice noises to China
[46:09 - 46:13]
and Russia now can you see the three superpowers acting together to prevent conflict in India and
[46:13 - 46:14]
Pakistan.
[46:14 - 46:21]
You know I don't think it's entirely impossible. Hello. I've just been back out
[46:21 - 46:27]
there. This is this is a tragedy in the world almost beyond imagination.
[46:27 - 46:32]
It's I don't think there's any way of conveying that ghastly business that
[46:32 - 46:37]
is when 90 million people pick up or leave their homes and move over
[46:37 - 46:42]
into camps in another country. I don't
[46:42 - 46:47]
in some ways I don't think that they. Are. The problem of
[46:47 - 46:52]
war are terrible as it is. Should is the central on the central one
[46:52 - 46:57]
there is. That as far as we're concerned is first of all.
[46:57 - 47:02]
To support. The effort to provide a little
[47:02 - 47:07]
more food shelter and medical care subsistence for these people who
[47:07 - 47:12]
are just on the fringe of starvation. And the second most important
[47:12 - 47:17]
thing is to cut off our military aid and our economic aid.
[47:17 - 47:22]
Brinker pressure to bear on the Pakistan government to give the U.S.
[47:22 - 47:26]
and all the South government the autonomy
[47:26 - 47:32]
possibly even the independence when they come to that without which those people will not
[47:32 - 47:36]
have the sense of security that allows them to go home. That's a much more urgent
[47:36 - 47:37]
issue.
[47:37 - 47:44]
In all your years of the State Department and Washington who is absolutely the greatest
[47:44 - 47:49]
quote unquote backroom politician you've ever seen.
[47:49 - 47:51]
Backroom politics. Yeah.
[47:51 - 47:56]
Wheeler Dealer that type of politician.
[47:56 - 48:00]
I'm sure we do have them there. Well as
[48:00 - 48:08]
you know as the come as a complete politician.
[48:08 - 48:12]
Exclude the whole question of foreign policy and confine him to
[48:12 - 48:16]
matters of domestic policy and off. The.
[48:16 - 48:18]
Bat.
[48:18 - 48:23]
And considering the crowd and considering only the craftsmanship of politics which is to get things get the
[48:23 - 48:27]
possible accomplished let's define that then I would then I would suppose that
[48:27 - 48:32]
and I think I can't think I've ever seen anybody that was the equal of Johnson
[48:32 - 48:39]
and the tragedy of Johnson was that.
[48:39 - 48:44]
When this was his area of personal knowledge with terribly good
[48:44 - 48:48]
when he left his area of personal knowledge and had to rely on advisors
[48:48 - 48:55]
which was true of. Foreign policy in general. And Southeast
[48:55 - 48:58]
Asia in particular then
[48:58 - 49:05]
under the area of personal disaster. But you
[49:05 - 49:11]
know we must keep a balance on these matters.
[49:11 - 49:16]
Evers lost the race for Mississippi but he ran and if it
[49:16 - 49:20]
hadn't been for Johnson he wouldn't even have been running. That was where the great
[49:20 - 49:24]
thrust on it was from Johnson that the great thrust on civil rights
[49:24 - 49:30]
began was that on voting rights in particular
[49:30 - 49:36]
is about six months ago I was watching educational television and I saw a debate at
[49:36 - 49:41]
Oxford University between us and we met Buckley Jr. which I believe he
[49:41 - 49:42]
won.
[49:42 - 49:47]
I'd. Like to hear a much
[49:47 - 49:57]
more serious and that it was that I wouldn't mind it losing at Oxford.
[49:57 - 50:00]
I couldn't recall which it was but I'd like to hear your opinion of well enough.
[50:00 - 50:12]
Thought he was better prepared than I was that night.
[50:12 - 50:17]
I would suppose that broccoli is the I think there are
[50:17 - 50:22]
no views of Buckley's with which I agree with which I agree
[50:22 - 50:28]
I think it's fair to say however that Buckley is the only reactionary in our history
[50:28 - 50:32]
with a sense of humor.
[50:32 - 50:36]
Well that's slight praise it's not significant praise
[50:36 - 50:43]
as I would like to answer an earlier question and ask the professor
[50:43 - 50:48]
whether my answer would agree with his views namely the question what exactly he
[50:48 - 50:53]
said earlier this evening and I would say that that really it was quite simple. And the first
[50:53 - 50:58]
part of his address Professor Galbraith the created with
[50:58 - 51:03]
power and success become known as powerful and successful. And then
[51:03 - 51:08]
the second part of his address he said are associated with failure become known
[51:08 - 51:12]
as valid and therefore it was quite reasonable that during the
[51:12 - 51:17]
question period in describing in answering questions about the
[51:17 - 51:22]
factors that will affect American foreign policy such as. An incipient
[51:22 - 51:27]
depression which the leaders of many major countries are now talking about
[51:27 - 51:32]
especially the finance ministers would not have. Would not have the same effect.
[51:32 - 51:37]
On the politics of the 70s and the Great Depression of the 30s pattern the
[51:37 - 51:42]
politics of the third from the fourth century a correct
[51:42 - 51:46]
summary professor.
[51:46 - 51:51]
Yeah I think it would be if we have
[51:51 - 51:54]
a depression on the scale of the
[51:54 - 52:02]
30s in the 70s.
[52:02 - 52:06]
So I would suppose that we would have the Connelly art gallery right next to the
[52:06 - 52:14]
Mellon art gallery as part of an effort to retrieve.
[52:14 - 52:19]
Provided John can get the money. Whoever
[52:19 - 52:24]
is associated with with that sort of a disaster isn't going to come off any better than Andrew
[52:24 - 52:29]
Mellon or Herbert Hoover. I really think the prediction is there's
[52:29 - 52:32]
maybe a bit premature I.
[52:32 - 52:37]
Mean I think we have the technical capacity
[52:37 - 52:41]
here and in other countries to arrest that kind of
[52:41 - 52:47]
disaster and understand better how to do it than we did in the 30s and that this will be
[52:47 - 52:52]
done that the problems in the society the problems of inequality the
[52:52 - 52:56]
problems of the problems that are associated with the.
[52:56 - 53:01]
Enormous needs of urbanised existence
[53:01 - 53:07]
problems of how the individual relates himself to great public and
[53:07 - 53:12]
private organizations. Oh I think more serious.
[53:12 - 53:17]
And more puzzling than the problems of remedying or.
[53:17 - 53:22]
Depression in some ways I think the problem of inflation is still a more stubborn problem. So that
[53:22 - 53:28]
I could be wrong. There is a God somewhere that
[53:28 - 53:33]
slays people who makes predictions of this sort. I still am
[53:33 - 53:34]
unwilling to.
[53:34 - 53:39]
I would still be cautious about making a prediction of a return to the
[53:39 - 53:44]
thirties but could you comment or speculate on the
[53:44 - 53:49]
possibility the probability in the proper ability of their ever coming into being
[53:49 - 53:53]
a comprehensive world government that would supersede the power of existing
[53:53 - 53:57]
Nations and I hope that this is not the last stage in the development of man.
[53:57 - 54:04]
You know this is a this is a point that we must not
[54:04 - 54:09]
ever imagine the tendency to assume that the
[54:09 - 54:14]
present form of the national state like the present form of General Motors is the highest
[54:14 - 54:18]
achievement of mankind. The degree of conservatism which I'm not quite prepared to
[54:18 - 54:21]
accept and I'm glad you don't either.
[54:21 - 54:26]
Professor Gallagher to what extent are presidential politics and
[54:26 - 54:31]
decisions particularly based upon real election goals rather than the
[54:31 - 54:35]
dilemmas of the society in which we live. Well I'm not sure that they're entirely
[54:35 - 54:38]
inconsistent.
[54:38 - 54:41]
They.
[54:41 - 54:46]
Present the United States was able to fill very recent
[54:46 - 54:50]
times two and four at the deep and pious conviction of
[54:50 - 54:56]
economists that unemployment was a price that we could pay for
[54:56 - 55:00]
curing inflation and
[55:00 - 55:01]
is.
[55:01 - 55:09]
And it was only as the election got closer and closer and closer that
[55:09 - 55:14]
this curious combination of inflation and depression or
[55:14 - 55:19]
inflation and recession which they had managed to create nobody previously thought
[55:19 - 55:23]
impossible. As a result of pursuing old fashioned policies that
[55:23 - 55:28]
became intolerable pain became too great. I somehow think
[55:28 - 55:33]
that that. Politicians facing elections
[55:33 - 55:38]
may be better than politicians ignoring elections. I'm
[55:38 - 55:43]
not being but I could even make a bipartisan point on this. I have the feeling that Lyndon
[55:43 - 55:48]
Johnson prior to 1964 had a more civilized
[55:48 - 55:53]
view of the use of bombers than he did after 64.
[55:53 - 56:00]
Professor For those of us who don't have time to read your review and
[56:00 - 56:08]
Senator if you don't know now listen good mark you're not that busy are you.
[56:08 - 56:12]
For those of us who seem not to have the time then could you give us the gist of your if
[56:12 - 56:20]
it was a great deal to be said for Lyndon Johnson as a as a president on the
[56:20 - 56:24]
mastic policy. I think he could well have been the most effective of the
[56:24 - 56:31]
century even the overriding the disaster of his administration
[56:31 - 56:35]
was when he fell into the hands of the cold warriors and I gather that you
[56:35 - 56:40]
believe in the future of the capitalistic system I wonder if you could just explain how we're going to avoid
[56:40 - 56:46]
stepping on a larger larger percentage of the world consumer market. And you know what I would what
[56:46 - 56:51]
I I think we have already entered a stage of
[56:51 - 56:56]
post capitalism and the technocrats have extensively taken over in large
[56:56 - 57:01]
corporations and I would hope to see this evolve and into
[57:01 - 57:05]
increasing public form I don't believe in the future of the capitalist system but I am on the whole of evolution
[57:05 - 57:09]
this rather than a revolution. OK good night.
[57:09 - 57:25]
Next week Lieutenant General James M. Gavin former ambassador to
[57:25 - 57:36]
France will speak on the Atlantic community and relations with the Soviet Union.
[57:36 - 57:41]
WB Jacey FM in cooperation with Johns Hopkins University and the
[57:41 - 57:46]
Maryland Center for Public Broadcasting as presented the 1971 Milton
[57:46 - 57:51]
F. Eisenhower symposium. Soviet American relations the dilemmas of
[57:51 - 57:56]
power. On today's program Dr. John Kenneth Galbraith Harvard Economist
[57:56 - 58:01]
spoke on the role of the Third World as it is affected by competition between the great
[58:01 - 58:06]
powers. The executive producer and editor is Thomas Egil
[58:06 - 58:11]
that. Original theme music by Donald sure a printed
[58:11 - 58:16]
copy of this program send $1 to dilemmas of power.
[58:16 - 58:22]
Transcript. Number six Maryland Center for Public Broadcasting.
[58:22 - 58:25]
Owings Mills Maryland 2 1 1 1 7.
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