- Series
- Special of the week
- Air Date
- Duration
- 00:30:00
- Episode Description
- Series Description
- Subject(s)
- Creator(s)
- Contributors
- Genre(s)
- Geographic Region(s)
- regions
- Time Period
- 1961-1970
[00:05 - 00:09]
And we are the national educational radio network presents
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special of the week from Yale University from its
[00:14 - 00:17]
series called Yale reports.
[00:17 - 00:22]
All of us expect the government to provide certain services to US public schools police
[00:22 - 00:27]
protection and rubbish removal are three of the many city state and national services we
[00:27 - 00:32]
count on and pay for our taxes support these services and the men and
[00:32 - 00:37]
women the public labor force who make them work. Through the years we have come to expect
[00:37 - 00:41]
Labor's right to strike private industry for better wages and better working conditions in
[00:41 - 00:46]
public service however strikes by employees hired by any level of government are expressly
[00:46 - 00:51]
forbidden by law. Other public and private sectors of our economy really so different.
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Are we coming to a time when we will recognize a teachers right to strike is the effect on the
[00:56 - 01:01]
economy different when steel workers strike then refuse collectors walk out.
[01:01 - 01:06]
This is the first of two programs on public employees and the strike weapon. Harry H
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Wellington Edward J Phelps professor of law and Ralph K. winter Jr.
[01:11 - 01:16]
professor of law. See the question of strikes against government as one that affects not only the rights
[01:16 - 01:20]
of a particular group but one where different economic pressures applied to the public and
[01:20 - 01:21]
private sectors.
[01:21 - 01:27]
Mr. Wellington It is a fact that public employment has increased
[01:27 - 01:32]
dramatically and particularly in state and local government. Over the past several
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years for example in 1947 there
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were some five and a half million people employed by federal
[01:41 - 01:46]
state and local government in 1067. The figure was close
[01:46 - 01:51]
to 12 million. And the really substantial increase was in
[01:51 - 01:54]
state and local employment rather than in federal employment
[01:54 - 02:00]
accompanying this increase and employment has been a even more
[02:00 - 02:05]
dramatic increase in municipal state and
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federal unionism in percentage figures. For
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example the total increase in the AFL CIO membership
[02:14 - 02:20]
between 1956 and 1967 was 7
[02:20 - 02:24]
percent whereas the American Federation of Government Employees
[02:24 - 02:29]
increased by two hundred fifty percent. The American Federation of State County and
[02:29 - 02:34]
Municipal Employees by a hundred and two percent and the American Federation of Teachers by
[02:34 - 02:36]
a hundred 60 percent.
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So it's fair to say that in fact the principal increase in unionism in the last
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decade has been in public employment rather than.
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While employment very definitely and one of the important questions is I
[02:48 - 02:53]
suppose a lie this is more I should think that the increase in the song
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lies in numbers and the government bureaucracies would be one of the reasons with the
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increase in the size of the chain of command in employment its links and the feeling
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of being governed by impersonal forces not really knowing the person that is
[03:07 - 03:12]
making the rules under which you have to work and setting the wages on that which you have to work.
[03:12 - 03:17]
That the creation of that kind of feeling it naturally creates a great incentive to unionize there's not
[03:17 - 03:21]
really the very fact of growth is as an important contributing factor to
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the increase in unionism.
[03:23 - 03:28]
Sure because there's a correlation between a feeling of powerlessness in employment
[03:28 - 03:33]
and the size of the enterprise in which one is working out all of the literature on unionism.
[03:33 - 03:39]
He said that the increasing size of corporate structure and the increase in the size of the economic
[03:39 - 03:44]
units as a result of the Industrial Revolution tended to create a lot of forces driving
[03:44 - 03:45]
towards unionism.
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All right. Another reason I would suppose is the fact that in 1962
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collective bargaining was legitimated in public employment by
[03:56 - 04:01]
President Kennedy and his famous executive order 10 9 8 8
[04:01 - 04:06]
which provided for collective negotiation in the federal government
[04:06 - 04:11]
between federal agencies and and unions. It didn't of course provide for the
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strike. We have to make that very clear. That's outlawed explicitly by
[04:15 - 04:16]
legislation.
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So I would say that there are a number of other factors also. There's the increasing
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respectability and conservatism of unions. Unions are not thought of as being
[04:25 - 04:30]
institutions designed solely for very poor people. Many a
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relatively well-to-do middle class people belong to unions. One of the great
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attractions of government employment in earlier days was job security and fringe benefits
[04:41 - 04:45]
such as pensions. This created a contrast between public employment and private
[04:45 - 04:50]
employment that made public employment seem quite attractive. There has however partly as a
[04:50 - 04:55]
result of collective bargaining partly as a result of other forces but a tremendous increase in
[04:55 - 05:00]
jobs and job protection and in things like pensions in the private sector.
[05:00 - 05:03]
Yes it's also probably drove around.
[05:03 - 05:08]
Let the union movement in the private area has become more respectable.
[05:08 - 05:12]
It's a conservative force rather than a radical force. Since
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1935 it has had the stamp of federal legitimacy the
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Wagner Act was enacted then putting the government behind collective bargaining as a
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method of ordering labor management relations so that there are a number
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of forces but one of the interesting things is the lack of success
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of the unions in the private area
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in organizing white collar workers and so many of so many employees in the public
[05:43 - 05:48]
area would be designated as white collar workers. Now I wonder why that might
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be.
[05:48 - 05:53]
Well I would think that. A greater number of those who
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go into white collar public employment such as social work school teaching are
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ideologically inclined persons than those who go into private employment I would think a
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person who chooses to go into advertising would be less of an idealogue than that a
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person who decides to become a social worker. And I think the kind of ideology they
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bring to their job is an ideology quite favorable to unionism they have. They have long regarded
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unionism as a very good thing as a something that has
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done a lot for the country. This of course will have a tremendous impact on the attitude
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and behavior of some public employee use them he may be far more militant in form or
[06:33 - 06:34]
ideological as a result.
[06:34 - 06:40]
All of these factors and certainly must combine. Exactly how
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much weight would be attributed to each it's hard to know and there are other factors and one of them that of course
[06:44 - 06:50]
comes to mind. Both of us being lawyers is the role of law.
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It's awfully hard to know whether the law is a cause or effect of
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social change and unquestionably it's both. In the whole area of
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public employment and collective bargaining in the states and
[07:05 - 07:10]
municipalities the experience has been that the
[07:10 - 07:15]
problems have come to courts first and that really is the experience of most.
[07:15 - 07:20]
Public change most
[07:20 - 07:26]
developments reached the courts before they reach the legislature. Well
[07:26 - 07:30]
social change and we had a body of
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law and still have it in a lot of places of common law for
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banning collective bargaining by public employee.
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That's right not only forbidding the strike. The issue which is of such importance that I
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look for a betting organization by the employees for bidding recognition by the government
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employer forbidding the execution of a collective agreement preventing any form
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of unionization and toward a huge tour of the Dr ins that were
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mounted by the chords and their attack and beating back collective
[08:03 - 08:07]
bargaining of public employees where the doctrine of sovereignty.
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That is the sovereign doesn't negotiate with its employees
[08:12 - 08:18]
as it applied here and the doctrine of delegation what employees should work for
[08:18 - 08:23]
what their conditions of employment ought to be these were decisions that were to be made by the legislature
[08:23 - 08:28]
and not by employees. And these doctrines were widely
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held. But there has been a change in the common law. Quite apart from
[08:33 - 08:38]
statutory change and interestingly enough the state of Connecticut
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took a leadership role in that and its supreme court of errors in
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151 and Norwalk teacher's case held
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by it was permissible for a school board to
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bargain collectively with a Union of Teachers not
[08:57 - 09:01]
required. As I recall. That's right and not that the
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teachers had a right to strike but that the school board could without violating any principle
[09:06 - 09:11]
of delegation of its powers and or into a collective bargaining agreement
[09:11 - 09:14]
with a teacher's union.
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It did not have to recognize the teachers you know. I got the decision but
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it was permitted to write. And when you say that I was just as a matter of prediction that
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there is a greater likelihood that a court would today follow the
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doctrine of the Norwalk teacher's case than the doctrine of sovereignty or delegation
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of power which is an earlier time. What was thought to prevent collective bargaining.
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I think that's right although there have been some notable exceptions and traditional things but
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but most of the cases that have come up in court without statutes raising this issue.
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Have tended to use as their model the Norwalk teacher's case for example there was a case in Iowa
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just last year where Norwalk teachers was followed. Now there has also been a
[09:59 - 10:03]
rapid growth of statutory law the statutory
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development really began in 1959.
[10:08 - 10:12]
Interesting we end up with a comprehensive statute and acted by
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the state of Wisconsin.
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There are a number of statutes Connecticut has one which was an act in
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1066 there's a Taylor Law in New York which is very no
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solution as principal in a highly industrialized highly unionized states.
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That's right.
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And it varies and it's and it ought to be said that some states through
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since Alabama still have standards prohibiting unionization by employees
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entirely.
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Now these statutes do take many different forms but but what they
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provide in the broadest of terms is a peaceful method for recognition that is
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if a majority of employees want to organize.
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They're entitled to do so. It deals really with the with the establishment of
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collective bargaining in the model. Pretty generally is the model employed under
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federal legislation in the private area the National Labor Relations Act.
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Not all starships provide that the governmental employer has to
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recognize the union. Some places recognition is not obligatory but is
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permitted under the statute where it is obligatory however. It really isn't
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possible now to have a strike for recognition. There will be a procedure for determining the percentage
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of employees that are want to have the union and if the percentage is
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sufficiently high the statute commands the government along for it to recognize and bargain with the union
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if the union does not attain the required percentage usually 50 percent. Then I
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presume it would be illegal for that the minority Union to strike to attempt to compel recognition by
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the employer.
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The other important feature of the state legislation that has been
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enacted since 59 that mainly in the last couple of years is that it. It
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attempts to provide procedures for resolving collective
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bargaining disputes that the parties can't resolve themselves that is collective bargaining as a
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stablished. That the parties sit down and negotiate a
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union is chosen by the employees in that union and then negotiate with the relevant
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agency of government. Frequently I take a contract law
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governing wages hours and terms and conditions of employment when it doesn't when an
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impasse is reached. What usually happens in the private
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area is that the parties use self help. The strike
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or the lockout as I said all states bar the use of economic
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force in the public area and attempt to provide
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alternatives to it for resolving these impasses.
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For example mediation is readily available if you have a public
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board a public agency. It will provide mediation
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services. Fact finding procedures are frequently available
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with recommendations so that the tendency is to try
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to find substitutes for the strike. And in all of these cases the strike itself is
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legally barred.
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It would seem fairly clear though.
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Given the direction in which these dancers are moving let the next step will be to provide
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for arbitration of disputes wouldn't you think oh well I mean there is
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some movement along that line and that has its advocates and in my recollection is the
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George Meany himself has endorsed compulsory
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arbitration as a method of solving the impasse
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problem in the public area.
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On the other hand Rob one of the things that one finds in the literature
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and on the part of commentators is an increasing acceptance
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of of the strike as the method of solving impasse that
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is what one sees in this whole area is
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an accelerated acceptance of the private model
[14:17 - 14:22]
in the public area. One can trace the position of various
[14:22 - 14:27]
students of this shifting over time. Governor Schaefer of Pennsylvania established a committee
[14:27 - 14:32]
last year to make recommendations about a public employment
[14:32 - 14:37]
law in Pennsylvania and that committee
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which was manned by distinguished people in the area recommended that
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the strike be permitted after certain procedures had been exhausted and in
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limited areas I don't think anyone has suggested that the police ought to be able to strike or
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the firemen ought to be able to strike except some police and some firemen.
[14:57 - 15:02]
Well. I don't know I think what you're saying is right that on the first
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creature of these laws the recognitions procedure we are we already have what is essentially the same
[15:07 - 15:12]
system as now exists in the private sector. As far as impasse procedure is concerned we are
[15:12 - 15:17]
now in a transitional period we are relying on devices such as mediation and fact
[15:17 - 15:21]
finding which actually don't provide a final resolution of a dispute.
[15:21 - 15:26]
I think we'll move to compulsory arbitration as a means of solving I think we are very likely
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to move if the present trend keeps up to the
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full private model that is we will permit strikes by public employees in non-emergency
[15:35 - 15:37]
situations.
[15:37 - 15:42]
So the question that is. I would think of most interest. An
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analysis of whether this embracing of the private model
[15:47 - 15:49]
really is a sensible thing to do.
[15:49 - 15:53]
One of the things that strikes one reading the literature is the
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lack of theoretical examination of this of this movement to the private model the Knology
[15:59 - 16:04]
with the private model is accepted almost automatically without any
[16:04 - 16:08]
really thoughtful discussion as to what the similarities and
[16:08 - 16:13]
differences between collective bargaining in the private sector and the public health sector really
[16:13 - 16:13]
exist.
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Maybe something to the would be sort of to ask
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about the justification of collective bargaining in the private area and
[16:23 - 16:28]
then see to what extent the rationality developed their fit of
[16:28 - 16:30]
collective bargaining by public employees.
[16:30 - 16:37]
Certainly one reason that the nation turned to collective bargaining as a means of ordering
[16:37 - 16:42]
labor markets was the dot desire to achieve industrial peace.
[16:42 - 16:46]
And I mean industrial peace really in two senses one is in a way
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an overview of a sense of class wars that is that a collective
[16:51 - 16:56]
collective bargaining was thought of as an institution which might mediate between what was
[16:56 - 17:01]
thought to be a rigid economic classes and would not leave
[17:01 - 17:07]
any particular class feeling completely left out that is that that it would feel that
[17:07 - 17:12]
everyone was participating but in a second sense industrial peace means the lack of
[17:12 - 17:14]
long and bitter labor disputes.
[17:14 - 17:19]
And the argument was made that if in fact the union was recognized and the
[17:19 - 17:24]
parties were to sit down and bargain they would then have a
[17:24 - 17:27]
wider understanding of each problem
[17:27 - 17:33]
and would be able to peacefully resolve the dispute rather than to
[17:33 - 17:38]
resolve it through industrial warfare and of course this is in the preamble to a major
[17:38 - 17:42]
label is that at the Wagner Act as amended might have partly you know graphic.
[17:42 - 17:48]
It was also the feeling rather anxious not only that we would have a less noisy
[17:48 - 17:53]
society through collective bargaining but we would also have a more
[17:53 - 17:58]
able or more independent kind of person out in the society if if we were to
[17:58 - 18:02]
take the employment relationship and give the employee a
[18:02 - 18:07]
greater sense of participation the fact that collective bargaining
[18:07 - 18:13]
was a means of providing the employee with
[18:13 - 18:16]
a say in the establishment of his terms and conditions of employment
[18:16 - 18:22]
that as industry became expanded
[18:22 - 18:27]
he tended to be a cob in the machine he was emasculated
[18:27 - 18:32]
he worked on a production line. He didn't see the end result of what he was working
[18:32 - 18:37]
on. He thought as if he were a machine. This was the moralising and
[18:37 - 18:42]
it made for less good citizens and he had less of a stake in the
[18:42 - 18:47]
political society than he and his government was
[18:47 - 18:52]
more susceptible to revolutionary movements as a result of this. So
[18:52 - 18:55]
that this was a very important feature. And again the
[18:55 - 19:01]
statutes respond to this and speak in these terms
[19:01 - 19:06]
provide for government by the
[19:06 - 19:11]
employees through their union the union serving as a representative and the employee that has a say
[19:11 - 19:14]
in the establishment of his wages hours terms and conditions of employment.
[19:14 - 19:19]
Now I suppose to say that both of these arguments which were used to justify collective
[19:19 - 19:23]
bargaining in the private sector the industrial peace argument and then the
[19:23 - 19:28]
industrial democracy where argument would seem to me to have a lottery
[19:28 - 19:30]
in the public sector.
[19:30 - 19:34]
Right and I think in the beginning when we were talking about the factors that led to
[19:34 - 19:39]
the enormous increase in unionization in these areas we mention these
[19:39 - 19:40]
factors.
[19:40 - 19:45]
The feeling of powerlessness the desire to have some say over one the
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creation and execution of one of the terms and conditions of employment.
[19:49 - 19:54]
So the analogy seems to hold up so far but there is another very important point
[19:54 - 19:58]
and this is where you know what you may begin to break down. One of the
[19:58 - 20:04]
arguments that one finds in the rhetoric of the union movement in
[20:04 - 20:08]
this country and they are dealing mainly with the private area is the argument that.
[20:08 - 20:15]
The individual is at an enormous disadvantage when he
[20:15 - 20:19]
deals with the corporate giant. That's an economic disadvantage or an economic
[20:19 - 20:24]
disadvantage that he he can't really have a say in the
[20:24 - 20:29]
setting of his terms and conditions of employment or his wages that it's
[20:29 - 20:34]
dictated by the the corporate giant and the corporate giant is likely
[20:34 - 20:39]
to take advantage of him and have and give him an unfair contract of employment.
[20:39 - 20:44]
And we can't tolerate this kind of
[20:44 - 20:49]
unfairness. Wages are depressed unduly profits increase
[20:49 - 20:54]
unduly and so forth and this is kind of an unsophisticated economic argument.
[20:54 - 20:59]
It certainly is true that in the long run and on the
[20:59 - 21:04]
average over time the market disciplines the
[21:04 - 21:09]
employer when he deals with the individual employee. He doesn't
[21:09 - 21:14]
have freedom to exploit but in some situations he may.
[21:14 - 21:19]
Oh yes I think it ought to be pointed out that many of the great
[21:19 - 21:24]
examples of the sweatshop for instance did not involve any kind of a corporate giant that involved an
[21:24 - 21:28]
employer who was constantly on the verge of bankruptcy very often worked along with the
[21:28 - 21:33]
employees suffered the same kinds of. Disadvantages the
[21:33 - 21:38]
same kinds of bad working conditions and that. In fact
[21:38 - 21:43]
the real cause of the sweatshop which was more the free market the competitive
[21:43 - 21:46]
economy than it was any kind of employer advantage in the labor market.
[21:46 - 21:52]
But there was this sense of unfairness and how often justified or not it's
[21:52 - 21:55]
very difficult to know that in some situations justified in others.
[21:55 - 22:02]
But collective bargaining is an attractive alternative to that if the individual employee doesn't have enough
[22:02 - 22:06]
information doesn't have enough economic muscle. Maybe if he gets
[22:06 - 22:11]
together and bargain collectively the union will have information necessary to make the
[22:11 - 22:15]
market work anough muscle. And
[22:15 - 22:21]
so as a response to the notion of unfair
[22:21 - 22:27]
individual contracts one has collective bargaining Now the important thing to point out is.
[22:27 - 22:28]
That the market.
[22:28 - 22:32]
Plainly disciplines or restraints the collective entities.
[22:32 - 22:37]
Well what you're saying now is that even if the argument that the employee is at a
[22:37 - 22:42]
disadvantage in the marketplace is wrong even if that argument is old enough that they're
[22:42 - 22:47]
overstated. Nevertheless there may be restraints on collective bargaining which
[22:47 - 22:50]
make the cost of that institution not very great.
[22:50 - 22:51]
I do not clearly so that way.
[22:51 - 22:56]
That's right so that one does not risk as much as one might think he is by turning to collective
[22:56 - 22:57]
bargaining.
[22:57 - 23:01]
Now I suppose the question is What are these market restraints.
[23:01 - 23:06]
How do they operate in the in the private area and
[23:06 - 23:12]
it's fairly plain isn't it in the private area. There is a
[23:12 - 23:16]
product that is being produced and consumers who buy the product
[23:16 - 23:22]
at a certain price and don't buy the product at another price but buy something else
[23:22 - 23:27]
if the price of the product that they wanted initially is to are that
[23:27 - 23:32]
is they respond to the price of the product through the railroad workers for us this may be able
[23:32 - 23:37]
to force the railroad to pay an extremely high wage but they can't force people to
[23:37 - 23:39]
ride on the wrong side of the era.
[23:39 - 23:43]
And if they can't force people to ride on the railroad. The tradeoff that
[23:43 - 23:48]
they face in obtaining the higher wages may be a substantial degree of unemployment
[23:48 - 23:53]
unemployment which we can confidently expect the union will not permit to be to become
[23:53 - 23:58]
too high so that the union in the demands that it makes and the positions that it
[23:58 - 24:02]
takes in collective bargaining is faced with the problem of.
[24:02 - 24:08]
Pushing as hard as it can but recognizing if it goes too far prices will
[24:08 - 24:13]
have to go up if prices go up. There is likely to be a cutback in
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the demand for the product. If there's a cutback in the man for the product it's likely to be
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unemployment. And they don't want unemployment if they can avoid unemployment
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because. It means that their power is
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reduced and their power is reduced because they have less members and less dues
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money. That's right and there is also of course the political pressure within the union to avoid
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unemployment so that this is a very real and substantial restraint on the union's use
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of their collective power.
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So that in fact and in the private sector the employer is a strong
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countervailing force to unionism not just because he's trying to protect his
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profits which he surely is but that in trying to protect those profits the employer in fact
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represents the consumer is the one that gauges the effect against the
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higher prices will have on the sale of the product. But.
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And from his point of view what he's interested in is maximizing profit.
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That's right and he can do that only by satisfying certain desires of the consumers.
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So what we have very clearly in the private area is the restraint of the
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market imposed on the parties. We have an economic model and the economic model
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works economic laws restrain the parties. In some situations
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perhaps the employer is capable of some
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exploitation in some situations perhaps the unions are capable of some
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exploitation they have some monopoly power. I
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think most economists believe that there is at least some monopoly power the question really
[25:52 - 25:56]
becomes whether it's liquidated or an liquidated but still
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relatively minor. It's not terribly important. It's within
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tolerable limits. The society is quite able to accept collective bargaining because of these
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other virtues.
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The industrial democracy the industrial piece the stake in the community. These are very very
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important to the society and we can say that within within the
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limits of tolerance the collective bargaining contract is fair
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as between the parties and fair to the public. I think we also ought to point out.
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A union in going to an employer and making certain demands has
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to take into account the fact that unions often have great difficulty winning long
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strikes for one thing the employer may go out of business if they shut him down long enough.
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Secondly the pressure on the union to settle in the midst of a long long strike
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increases geometrically as the is the hardship on the individual union members increases a
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strike benefits get smaller as savings are used up the pressure on the
[26:58 - 27:03]
union increases very dramatically whereas As for the employer the pressure the
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subtle increases rather more steadily over time so that in fact in the private sector the
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threat of a long strike just by existing in place is a very
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severe constraint on union demands and union power.
[27:15 - 27:20]
Right and the going out of business is a point that really I suppose ought to be emphasized. What it means is
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in some cases I suppose the threat of bankruptcy which is a deterrent.
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Or are that he takes his capital and he goes elsewhere he puts it elsewhere.
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And that is an alternative that's available to him when in fact no one begins to think about the
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problem of the employer going out of business. A very critical difference between the public
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sector and the private sector becomes apparent. Certainly the New
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York school teachers are not afraid that New York City will go out of business. It may come to a
[27:52 - 27:57]
standstill. That's right. The public employer does not
[27:57 - 28:02]
face a competitive market the way the private employer does. One expects short of the collapse
[28:02 - 28:07]
of the society that the public employee will continue to exist and that the employment relationship
[28:07 - 28:10]
will continue to exist.
[28:10 - 28:14]
Next week professors Wellington and winter explore the complexity of the employer union relationship in the
[28:14 - 28:19]
public sector. The different interest groups operating there and the difficulty in applying the
[28:19 - 28:23]
conventions of collective bargaining to the public area. The scripts for these programs are
[28:23 - 28:28]
available without charge by writing your reports 1773 Yale station in New
[28:28 - 28:33]
Haven Connecticut 0 6 5 2 0. This is Charles Dillingham for you no
[28:33 - 28:37]
reports which originates in the audio visual center of Yale University.
[28:37 - 28:42]
Any RS special of the week. Thanks Yale University for this edition of Yale
[28:42 - 28:47]
reports. This is an easy R. of the National Education already own
[28:47 - 28:47]
network.
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