The Yugoslav Way to Socialism, Part 1, reel 1

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The Theory and Practice of communism. A series of 13 lectures drawn from the
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1967 Wisconsin Alumni seminar held at the University of Wisconsin
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in Madison. Michael B Petrovich the speaker is a professor of history at
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the University of Wisconsin and a specialist in Russian and Balkan history. He's the
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author of several books and articles in today's lecture. Professor Petrovich
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offers the first of a two part discussion of the Yugoslav way to
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socialism.
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Now Professor Petrovitch in 1947 I was all
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prepared to write as a graduate student at Columbia and on the basis of ample
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evidence a book which was to show that Yugoslavia was the most loyal
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and most subservient of all of Russia's East European satellites.
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One year later in June 1940 Stalin ordered Yugoslavia's
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expulsion from the communist information bureau. The common
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form. As the first step towards the extermination of Tito and his supporters
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Tito's and seemed imminent and today nearly 20 years later
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not only is Tito alive but he is flourishing. He has outlived
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Stalin in May 1955 he had the delectable
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pleasure of serving crow to Stalin successors Khrushchev and Bill Gandhi
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and in Belgrade itself. Tito stands today as an example of a
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communist who has rebelled against Moscow and who has not only lived to tell
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about it but has prospered. What factors account
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for Tito success. Undoubtedly the nature of the international
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situation had much to do with Tito's ability to escape
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Soviet retribution. Given the tension between east and west.
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Stalin was probably not willing to risk violence in a region where any
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Russian could release that pent up hatred of the oppressed millions in the satellite
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states. Besides Stalin probably believed that Tito could not
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withstand a general boycott by the Soviet Union and its satellite governments
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especially if the West continue to be against Tito. But
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Tito did withstand one of the most vicious campaign short of war ever
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to be inflicted on a nation.
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Let's remember that Peter was not one of those satellite leaders who first heard about the
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liberation of his homeland on a Soviet radio and was then flown to worse our progress
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so the Soviet plane Tito came to power at the head of
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his own army while fighting against the German and Italian
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occupiers of Yugoslavia and behind him was in this breed a car
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forged in battle. Another in fact are of
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immense importance in Tito's success in withstanding Soviet pressure was
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aid from the United States. While giving aid to any
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kind of communist dictator. Even when he is at odds with Moscow
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disturbs many Americans. The fact is that few of our
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American investments abroad have paid off as well. To
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be sure we did not convert Tito from communism. As a matter of fact our
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government astutely tied no strings to our help. And Tito
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has expressed public gratitude for this. For example in his
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address before the seventh Congress of the Communist Party in May 1958
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Tito remarked I quote Our relation with the USSR are founded
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on mutual respect cooperation on an equal basis and non interference
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in internal affairs. We received economic and military
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aid from America at a time when we were in most urgent need of it. That is
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in a period of Stalin's political economic and propaganda pressure on our
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country. This helped us a great deal in overcoming the tremendous
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difficulties we were in then. Some people in the east wanted to take
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advantage of this for propaganda purposes expressing the doubt that the
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aid was given without any political or other concessions but facts are
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facts. We did not make any concessions of that kind nor did
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anyone with such conditions promise at the time and approach
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even if at some future time Tito should turn against us which I
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cannot imagine. Historians may still record that this aide was one
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of the best investments our foreign aid program ever made because Tito ism
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is one of the greatest shocks communism has had to suffer in its history. Its
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effects in some ways have been more destructive to the Soviet might in the
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world than anything the United States has accomplished to counter the Soviet
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threat. Certainly an other reason for Tito
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success was that his defiance of Moscow rallied about
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him. Millions of Yugoslavs who had no love for communism but who
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shared a national pride. This support within Yugoslavia
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grew steadily as Tito relaxed some of the severity of his
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regime and increased relations with the non communist world.
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When Stalin died in one thousand fifty three it must have become obvious to his
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successors it was fruitless for them to perpetuate one of their Master's greatest
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errors. And yet though Khrushchev and Bill Gagnon
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publicly humiliated themselves by their famous trip to Belgrade
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we find today that the breach between Tito and Moscow is still far from
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mended. Why has there not been a complete reconciliation.
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What is the obstacle. The answer lies in the phrase Tito ism.
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What is tourism.
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Yugoslavia is of tremendous importance as a pacemaker in the
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communist world today on three different occasions during the
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last 20 years. Yugoslavia has charted for itself a course
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which has affected the outlook and practice of communism throughout Europe.
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The first of these occasions was Yugoslavia split with Moscow and its east
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European satellites in 1948. Whatever the other point to the issue were
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the central point was the contention of the Yugoslav Communist Party that
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all the nations in the socialist camp were the equals of one another in the right to
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conduct their own affairs. This claim of course struck
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directly against the heliocentric theory that Moscow
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was the capital and director of the world communist movement.
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And for this heresy quote unquote Yugoslavia was
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excommunicated by the common farm on June 28
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1948.
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This act was generally regarded as the first step toward the extermination of Tito and
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his supporters. Indeed according to whose jobs very long speech that we spoke
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about the other day Stalin boasted that all he had to do was to wiggle his little finger to
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accomplish this. Yet Tito and his supporters not only
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survived but Yugoslavia has been the most flourishing of the Communist nations of
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Eastern Europe. It is not my purpose here today to retell
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the story of Yugoslavia cism. Let us simply record that since
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Yugoslavia split with the Kremlin for one reason or another the
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theory of Moscow as the center of the Communist solar system has been
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shattered. And that not even Moscow clings to this theory any
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longer.
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The new order of the Communist universe is poly
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centric.
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If one indeed can refer to any order amid the disarray of the
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communist parties of the world the impact of the Polish
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and uprisings and especially the rift between Peking
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and Moscow has left its marks.
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Yugoslavia's daring claim in 1948 of the quality
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of the socialist nations and their right to mutual noninterference has
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since become common place. The Soviet Union itself
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indicated its acceptance when two years after Stalin's death Khrushchev
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and Bill Gandhian visit to Belgrade. Today
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all of these once exciting events seem almost old hat. And
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if Yugoslavia's claim on our attention rested solely on its split
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with Moscow in one thousand forty eight there would be little purpose to giving
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Yugoslavia special treatment in this lecture series.
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You can be as important today lies not so much in the cism which led
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to Polly centrism as it does to the changes which took place in
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Yugoslavia as a result of this ism. These
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changes did not come all at once. Indeed for about a year
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after the 1940 8 ex-communication. The Yugoslav
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leaders who seem to be in a state of shock of voided doing anything
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upsetting in the hope of healing the rift. It was only when they
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came to realize the impossibility of this that they embarked upon a course
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of their own.
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There was no full blown program to put into operation and no ready
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idiology on which to base it. The changes came piecemeal.
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As responses to outer pressures and internal predicaments of all
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kinds. Yet out of it all came a new system which
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altered Yugoslavia's life profoundly between 1950 and
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1964. Many of the important changes came out
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of the devastating critique which the Yugoslav leaders leveled against
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Soviet Stalin ism. Some changes came from Yugoslavia as
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need to adjust itself to the noncommunist world on which it had to
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rely after its ouster from the communist camp.
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However the most significant changes came from the sheer necessity of
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establishing a viable society and economy without giving up
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one's national independence culminating in the constitution of
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1963. The new system was a conscious departure
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from the rigid centralism of Stalin ism especially in the area of
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economics turning its back on the Soviet model of the
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total planned economy. The new system vaunted the principle of
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free competition in a market economy with autonomy for
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Yugoslavia's enterprises and self management for its workers.
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Especially as far as the rest of the communist world was concerned the most challenging
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development to emerge from Yugoslavia as new system was the
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institution of the workers councils in the factories and
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communes as the basis of political self-government. Don't
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the Workers Councils and the communes were based on the contention
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the true social democracy meant that the producers
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themselves had the right to manage their own political and economic
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affairs directly. In an analysis of these
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developments published in 1962 the Swiss journalist
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and how Korean minimized the effects of the Yugoslav experience on the
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other communist countries of Eastern Europe even in Poland and Hungary among
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other things Haldeman remarked quote in Poland and Hungary almost the
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only people to give evidence of a real understanding of Yugoslav teaching
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were the theoretical economists at the universities. A group which is
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assigned only slight political importance in the communist system.
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I say this was published in 1962. Yet one need only
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turn to say the works of print Professor Gregory Grossman in our own country
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to see how important the role of the East European economists has been
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in introducing changes in their countries which echoed the Yugoslav
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experience in the Soviet Union itself. Similar
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changes have become synonymous with the name of an economics
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professor at the University of Hanukkah. You have say leap to mind.
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It is hardly possible to assess how much influence the Yugoslav way has
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had on various changes in East European countries in the past decade. After all there is
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always the possibility of parallel development.
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And yet it would be difficult to overlook the fact that you could be a initiated many of
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these changes and that its experience stands both as a challenge
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and as an invitation to the other communist countries of Eastern Europe.
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Again the very fact that for one reason or other the other East European countries
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have adopted some of the features of the Yugoslav system would seem to do away with the
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need to deal with Yugoslavia separately. In any assessment of European
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communism However Yugoslavia has not stopped being a pace setter
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in July 1965 the Yugoslav federal assembly
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passed some 40 laws decrees and recommendations which brought
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further important and radical changes to the Yugoslav economic system.
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These laws of July 1965 are known collectively as the
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reform and these economic changes are even now leading
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to another basic overhauling of political and social relations as
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well though based in large measure on the already established
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principles. These changes taken in their entirety and into relation
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constitute a qualitative leap which weight may well result in a new
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challenge and invitation to other communists. It is our
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purpose to undertake three tasks here. First to
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identify the main tenets of the Yugoslav communist ideology as
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it has developed since 1948. Second to
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examine the economic reform of the last two years. And third
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to assess some of the political effects of that reform on the Yugoslav
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Communist Party. Our overall aim is to help answer a crucial
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question. To what degree is Yugoslavia offering an effective
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answer to an important question in the 20th century.
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Namely can a society be both collectivist and democratic.
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It is tempting to try even in a brief summary of the Yugoslav communist
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ideology to give a historical survey which would show how each Tenet came about
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as a response to a given situation. Nevertheless for the sake of
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brevity and convenience let me turn to the program of the League of
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Communists of Yugoslavia as codified by its 7th Congress in one
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thousand fifty eight. Despite certain changes of detail and
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emphasis this 1958 program has never been repudiated
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and still embodies the main premises of the Yugoslav idiology.
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I should be paraphrasing from now on from this 1958
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programme.
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The Yugoslav communists see their own country as part of an
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inevitable historical process in which the whole world is turning from
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capitalism to socialism. However the development of
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socialism is an even as the development of capitalism has been
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and each must get to the goal his own way and in his own good
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time. Meanwhile say the Yugoslav is no socialist
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country is a perfect model and all have something to learn
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from one another. No one has the right to interfere in the
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internal affairs of the other since all are sought for it. The
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equality is a prerequisite for true socialist internationalism.
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Further more socialism is in itself no guarantee of purity.
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Under Stalin socialism in the Soviet Union became de farm.
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Though since his death it has been returning to a pure Marxism
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Leninism. I hope everyone understands I'm still paraphrasing. However
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China is now the heir to deformity of socialism.
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As for the non communist world all countries consciously or
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otherwise are on the road to socialism including the western
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capitalist democracies which are adopting socialist forms
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more and more and which are certainly not in the last stage of decay.
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They're for active peaceful coexistence between the socialist and
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capitalist systems is possible and on a lasting basis.
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As for the nature of socialism socialism and democracy are not
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only compatible says the Yugoslav programme but necessary
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prerequisites for one another. Building socialism is a long
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process which will require compromises and and
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adaptations.
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Thus Marxism is not a blueprint but a guide to be used
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creatively.
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The achievement of socialism is ultimately dependent on the attainment of a
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proper material basis for social democracy.
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Of the two dominant economic systems in the modern world one
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based on private capital and the other on state ownership.
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Neither is the true way. Both private and state
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ownership of the means of production deprives the worker of
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surplus value and his control over it.
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Besides controlled by state bureaucracy brings the
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economy to certain stagnation. The only true way to
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social democracy say the Yugoslavs is by the direct
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participation of the producers through Workers Councils and
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the direct participation of citizens through social organisations
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such as the Socialist Alliance the trade unions and others.
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A socialist economy is not immune to the operations of the market.
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While planning is necessary a centrally controlled economy does
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not work and should be rejected. Its alternative is and now I
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quote a free yet controlled market. Some of us are
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smiling. This is precisely what we have in our country. They freak control
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my kids. As for political power in a
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socialist state says the Yugoslav program it should be
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de-centralized and the state should wither away gradually
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as its functions are no longer needed are taken over by
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social organisations. Similarly the Communist Party should not
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dictate but influence by persuasion. And it
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too should gradually wither away. Social
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democracy envisages freedom of expression and development both
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for the individual and for social groups including various
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nationalities.
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Here then in a brief summary are the main tenets of the Yugoslav idiology.
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Some call it heresy.
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Others call it revisionism. Still others claim that it is true
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orthodoxy and there are those who are regarded as sheer opportunism.
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Much depends of course on what one regards as orthodoxy. From an
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institutional viewpoint orthodoxy is whatever the central authoritative
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body says it is. But the point is that there is no such central
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authoritative body as existed in the 1930s when the Communist
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International as Marxism Leninism Stalin is.
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Today Stalinism is no longer. And even Leninism is
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regarded in some quarters more as a guiding method than as a set of normative
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principles. The very seat of communist Orthodoxy must go is
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being denounced today by the Chinese communists. As for
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Marxism itself it is becoming notoriously true even for
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communists who regard themselves as models of orthodoxy. The
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scriptures may be read in many different ways. There are even the young
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Marx and the old Marx to consider. Indeed one may even recall to good
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advantage that Marx himself declared. We found Marxist and not a
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Marxist. From the viewpoint of the communists such a logical
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considerations are not a matter of indifference to him.
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They require a rationalization even if they may no longer evoke belief.
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In the present non-dogmatic face of communism as Miliband g last calls it
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when the communist ideology is being stretched and strained as never before to
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suit the practical needs of a variety of communist states and parties. The
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confrontation with the Yugoslav idiology is we submit of no small
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importance even if idiology were dead in communist Europe
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as it is increasingly fashionable to claim the Communists still feel the
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necessity to provide their actions with an acceptable logical
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justification. Whether they are right or not as long as the
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Yugoslav communists cling to the claim that they are still being true to the spirit of
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Marxism Leninism their idiology will be of interest to other communists
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who may need similar theoretical justifications for their actions.
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Humans have shown an almost infinite capacity for validating
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their actions on a theological and moral grounds. No matter what these actions
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have been.
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As long as the Yugoslav communists maintain the position of being true
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creative Marxists and not rebellious Protestants it does
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not matter too much as long as their way shows results.
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As the programme of the seventh Congress stresses the results are the only true
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verdict.
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There is scarcely a single tenet of the Yugoslav communist Creed which is
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original in itself.
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Each has been enunciated before by someone else and at some other time
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it is their combination when declared by Sovereign communist power
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and linked with a practical program of action which may be of enormous
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interest to others that makes these tenets important. The
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Yugoslav idiology stands not only as an indictment of both the Soviet and
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Chinese models but is the basis for a new kind of socialist system
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which commands attention.
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As a practical alternative to both the private capitalism of the
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West and the state capitalism of the Communist East.
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Thus without dismissing the importance of the Yugoslav ideology it
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is certainly more profitable to examine the actual workings of the Yugoslav
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system.
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One might well ask why the communist rulers of Yugoslavia have
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embarked on a program whose avowed goal is the eventual disappearance
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of their own power. It is axiomatic in the world of political
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science that all power seeks to perpetuate itself and indeed to
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multiply.
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Without wishing to reject moral philosophical and psychological factors is
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irrelevant. Let me simply offer the contention that the chief and
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determining motivation behind the Yugoslav way to socialism has been and
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is economic pressure. Somewhere along the line the
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Yugoslav leaders came to the realization that their economic system if
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it could ever be called a system was not getting them anywhere.
[25:39 - 25:45]
It would be superficial and be Wrone as to claim that the Yugoslav leader
[25:45 - 25:50]
simply learned what lots of people would have been glad to tell them that the communist economic
[25:50 - 25:54]
system is no good and doesn't work. After all that system or some
[25:54 - 25:59]
version of it has raised the Soviet Union from an economically backward
[25:59 - 26:04]
peasant state to the second most important industrial country in the world in just two
[26:04 - 26:08]
generations. That same system had brought notable economic progress to
[26:08 - 26:13]
Yugoslavia despite great sacrifices. In the decade
[26:13 - 26:18]
1952 to 62 Yugoslavia was second only to Japan in the
[26:18 - 26:23]
world in its overall rate of economic growth. Its per
[26:23 - 26:27]
capita national income rose from one hundred forty dollars just
[26:27 - 26:32]
before the Second World War. This is based on present purchasing power to over
[26:32 - 26:37]
500 dollars in 1964. Yes it was
[26:37 - 26:42]
precisely Yugoslavia's economic progress that made it impossible
[26:42 - 26:47]
to keep the system which could achieve that progress. For reasons
[26:47 - 26:52]
known only to economists the figure of $500 per
[26:52 - 26:56]
capita national income just cited is the dividing line
[26:56 - 27:01]
between an economically underdeveloped country and a developing country.
[27:01 - 27:05]
If so this means that in 1964
[27:05 - 27:10]
Yugoslavia made the transition the leap if you like from being the
[27:10 - 27:15]
most developed of the under developed countries to being the most undeveloped of the
[27:15 - 27:17]
developed countries.
[27:17 - 27:22]
Now this was no mere step forward but a qualitative leap into a new kind of
[27:22 - 27:26]
economic world. From the bush leagues into the big league
[27:26 - 27:32]
if Yugoslavia had made progress so rapidly up to that point.
[27:32 - 27:36]
It was because all the authority of a powerful state
[27:36 - 27:42]
controlled by centralized Communist Party had been brought to bear
[27:42 - 27:46]
on industrializing an economically primitive country whose
[27:46 - 27:50]
economy such as it was had been ruined during the Second World War.
[27:50 - 27:57]
However whether we choose to take the $500 figure seriously or not
[27:57 - 28:02]
the fact is that by sixty one thousand sixty four it was fairly
[28:02 - 28:06]
clear to a more sophisticated segment of the Yugoslav communist
[28:06 - 28:11]
leadership that the Yugoslav economy was approaching a data end and
[28:11 - 28:15]
that the same methods which had brought progress before might now bring ruin.
[28:15 - 28:21]
As the late body vice president of the Federal Executive Council
[28:21 - 28:26]
reported to the Federal Assembly in 1965 quote We have
[28:26 - 28:30]
reached a level of development at which the further progress and
[28:30 - 28:35]
advancement of the economy necessitates the expansion of the market
[28:35 - 28:39]
as one of the fundamental regulators of economic trends.