Episode 9: Japan and the A-Bomb

From WFC are five College Radio in Amherst Massachusetts. We present

Japan 1868 through 1968.

This year has been officially designated as the centennial of the beginning of the

modernization of Japan and this is the ninth of a series of broadcasts

with John M. Markey professor of government and vice dean of the College of Arts and

Sciences at the University of Massachusetts. The title of today's

broadcast is Japan and the atomic bomb.

Professor Markey the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on

December 7th 1941 was a tactical achievement

of great brilliance. On the other hand it was

a strategic blunder of the first magnitude.

There was no doubt as to the tactical success tactical in the broadest possible

sense of the term of the attack on Pearl Harbor. It temporarily

crippled the United States Pacific Fleet. It inflicted

grave casualties on the American Navy and

it in a very real sense opened the door for Japan's

real objective which was not of course to occupy the Hawaiian islands although

some strategists have even raised the question as to whether or not Japan should not

have attacked that key American outpost in the Pacific. What the

Japanese wanted to do was to drive into Southeastern Asia

and simultaneously with the attack on Pearl Harbor there was let loose

against the Philippines against Indochina Indonesia and

Malaya. A very broad attack which in the space of actually

a few weeks brought all of that area under Japanese control.

Now the reason why the Japanese were eager in indeed driven

to take this step was twofold.

The Japanese wanted to drive from Asia any remnant

of allied military power to get the weak American

forces out of the Philippines the British out of Hong Kong and South China

out of Malaya and to bring the French forces into Indochina completely

under there the Japanese domination and of course the Dutch had weak forces in

Indonesia. But also and even more importantly from the

Japanese point of view control over all of this vast area meant

control over vitally important sources of strategic war

materials. Tin for one thing. Iron ore for another supplies of

coal for still another natural rubber in Malaya and above all

petroleum to provide the fuel both for the Army and

Navy and also for the Air Force. The Japanese felt

that once they occupied this vast area they would one

have control over the strategic materials and to be able to

funnel them back into Japan into Japan's industrial

structure. It didn't turn out the weapons that would be necessary to

defend this vast area.

Now as I mentioned earlier the Japanese in a sense were

driven to this act one to the attack on Pearl Harbor and to

the involvement of the country in a war with the United States. No the

reason was very simple. At the time of the attack on Pearl

Harbor Japan had been involved in a major war

against China for almost four and a half years.

And this it had obviously caused a very considerable drain on the Japanese

economy. In addition as I pointed out in an earlier broadcast they

lined up the military lined up the diplomatic lined up in world

affairs. That is roughly the two and a half years of the Second

World War was such that there was this direct confrontation between the axis

Alliance which Japan was a principal power and the United States

and the European nations that the United States had allied itself with

the negotiations in Washington from April into late November of

1941 had demonstrated as I emphasized earlier the fact that

it was impossible for the United States to accept the Japanese position in a ship

and it was equally impossible for Japan to accept the American position.

Not only in Asia but again on the whole broad stage of

world affairs. Now on the other hand as I mentioned

at the beginning this was a strategic blunder of the first

order and for a very simple and obvious reason

namely it created the United States as an enemy

a fighting enemy against Japan an enemy that had a

military potential that Japan simply could not hope to match.

Now also the very success of the attack on Pearl Harbor

achieved something else that the Japanese obviously had not intended.

And that is that almost instantaneously it created

a broad national unity inside the United States.

Now in spite of the fact that the United States government had adopted a policy

that was directed very much against the Axis alliance and despite the

fact that this policy had broad popular support in the

United States there was still a very great deal of feeling within the

country that the United States should not get involved in any way

in the second world war. The familiar current of isolationism

which would characterize American policy since the early

1920s. But this attack on Pearl Harbor its

treachery on the day that will live in infamy. To use FDR a

phrase was of such a nature that immediately almost all Americans

felt that they had to stand together not only against the Japanese anime

but against the Axis alliance itself. So consequently

this. Well both psychological and political

unification of the United States gave added weight to the

military potential of the United States. Now as I

emphasized earlier one reason why Japan had been so well in

mentally successful in its resort to military force as an instrument of

national policy was the simple fact that from

1895 onward Japan had not been confronted with a

strong military enemy. But this attack on Pearl Harbor

transformed the broad strategic position of Japan

immediately and as things turned out disastrously for Japan.

Now initially that is to say in the period of roughly six months

after the attack on Pearl Harbor it seemed as if Japan

had long last reached the ultimate payoff in its

career of military aggression. By early June of

1942 Japan controlled an almost

unbelievable extent of land and sea. Some of

you may recall that the Japan Japanese forces in the spring of

1042 actually occupied what was by any

definition American territory. That is to say two of the islands in the

Aleutian chain stretching westward from Alaska.

Now from the far northern reaches of the Pacific Ocean

namely the Aleutian Islands Japanese control extended

Southwest word through the western half of the Pacific Ocean

through the Philippines Indonesia Southeastern Asia

large areas in China as I emphasized earlier. Clear to the borders

of India itself. Now even if the Japanese had

had to fight no battles at all in occupying this territory this

would still have been a very impressive achievement. Now the Japanese had

to liquidate allied strength in Southeastern Asia

particularly but again with the fall of the Philippines in the

spring of 1940 to this objective was achieved.

As a matter of fact to hear again was a manifestation of the

extremely favorable position that Japan had enjoyed strategically

namely again the overall weakness of the western of the

allied military presence in Asia in the beginning stages of the war.

Now on the other hand the tide of war begin to

shift gradually and almost imperceptibly against

Japan almost from the very moment of the Japanese achievement

of what seemed to be the ultimate in its career of military aggression.

Now also a nother military development of very great

significance although it was largely unheard of at that time because of the

blanket of secrecy that surrounded it was the beginning of a very

effective if American campaign of submarine warfare

against the Japanese shipping. Now this was meant to

achieve a very obvious goal namely to

deny Japan access to the raw materials that

Japan thought it had brought under its control in the initial stages of the

war. By the summer of. In

1944 it was perfectly clear that Japan had

lost whatever military initiative it had gained and that was very considerable in early

1042 and was already a force back

on the defensive. And it was perfectly clear that

Japan had no hope of winning the war and no hope of emerging from

the war in a favorable position. On the other hand it was

impossible to determine when that war would come to an end.

Now as far as Japan was concerned the decisive stage of the war

began early in 1945 when Japan was

for the first time brought under massive allied meaning American

really air attack by say June of

1945. Both Japan and the United States were confronted

with fundamental questions. The American problem was

simply how to end the war without an invasion of Japan.

The Japanese problem was also how to end the war but

on what the Japanese would regard as reasonable terms.

A very great deal has been said about the use of the atomic

bombs against Japan about the American decision to use those

bombs. And I am not going to go into a discussion of

this fascinating problem. It will be a problem bitterly

debated for many many years.

What I would like to do is simply to read what

two very wise men have had to say about this

decision. First I am going to read a

passage from the memoirs of Henry L.

Stimson entitled on active service in peace and war.

It was Mr. Stimpson who was a secretary of war during the

Second World War and was the man who perhaps had played

a key role who did play a key role in the decision to use the bomb against

Japan. And ironically this was the same Henry L. Stimson who was

responsible for the Stimson doctrine back in 1932 that as

I emphasized in an earlier broadcast was the policy

position that the United States adhered to in its relations for almost 10 years

with Japan.

Writing about a year after Earth the decision had been made and Mr.

Stimson said this. Two great nations were approaching

contact in a fight to a finish which would begin on November

one thousand nine hundred forty five. Our enemy Japan commanded

forces of somewhat over five million armed men. None of those

armies had already inflicted upon us in our break through the outer perimeter of their

defenses. Over three hundred thousand battle casualties.

And the Army still unbeaten had the strength to cost us a million more. A

million casualties that is killed or wounded and captured. As long as

the Japanese government refused to surrender we should be forced to take and

hold the ground and smale the Japanese ground armies by close

in fighting of the same desperate and costly kind that we had faced in the Pacific

Islands for nearly four years and then later on Mr. Stimson wrote

my chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the

least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had

helped to raise in the light of the alternatives which on a fair estimate were

open to us. I believe that no man in our position and

subject to our responsibilities ording in his hands a weapon of such

possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives could have

failed to use it and afterwards look his countrymen in the face.

I would like to add here that Mr. Stimson was also aware of

what a costly invasion would mean to the Japanese.

And so in spite of the passage that I just read his concern was not simply with

the saving of American lives but with the saving of Japanese lives as

well. Now finally Mr. Stimson in looking

back at this decision had this to say.

As I read over what I have written I am aware that much of it in

this year of peace may have a harsh and unfeeling sound. It would

perhaps be possible to say the same things and to say them more gently

but I do not think it would be wise. As I look back over the five years of

my service as secretary of war I see too many stern and heart

rending decisions to be willing to pretend that war

is anything else than what it is. The face of war

is the face of death. Death isn't an inevitable part of every

order that a wartime leader gives the decision to use the atomic

bomb was a decision that brought death to over a hundred thousand

Japanese. No explanation can change that fact and I do not

wish to gloss it over but this deliberate premeditated

destruction was our least abhorrent

choice. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki put an

end to the Japanese war. It stopped the fire raids and the strangling

blockade. It ended the ghastly specter of a clash of great land

armies. In this last great action of the Second World

War we were given a final proof that war is death.

War in the 20th century has grown steadily more barbarous more destructive

more debased in all its aspects. Now with the release of atomic

energy man's ability to destroy himself is very nearly complete.

The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended a war. They also made

it wholly clear that we must never have another war. This is the

lesson men and leaders everywhere must learn. And I believe that

when they learn it they will find a way to lasting peace. There is

no other choice. And Lester old Mr Henry L.

Stimson regarding what the historical decision

to use the atomic bombs against Japan. In my opinion

the best study of the decision to use the bomb

is by Herbert Feis and the book in its

second version is entitled The atomic bomb and the end of

World War 2. A Mr. face was not

involved in the decision to drop the bomb. But

like many serious men thoughtful men he

became very much interested in this problem and he wrote

which in my opinion is the most detailed study to date

of the manner in which the decision was made. What I would

like to do is simply to read Mr Feist says. The concluding

remarks about the use of the atomic bombs because I

think it is about the most thoughtful analysis of many

aspects of the action that has so far been set down.

Mr. Feist writes as follows. In summary it can be concluded

that the decision to drop the bombs upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki

ought not to be censored. The reasons were. Under the

circumstances of the time weighty and valid enough.

But a cluster of worrisome queries remain which the passage of time

has coated with greater political ethical and historical

interest. One of these whether or not the desired quick surrender could have been

induced if the American government had been more explicit in its explanation of how the

Japanese people and the Emperor would fare after surrender was

considered in the preceding chapter. Another which has often been asked

is why ten days were allowed to pass between the receipt of

information regarding the results of the test of the bomb and the issuance of

our final warning. I think the delay was due to an intent to be sure

that if the warning was at first unheated it could be driven quickly and deeply

honed by the bombs. Thus we waited until we knew all was in

readiness to drop them. These tactics worked but.

I wonder whether it might not have been wiser to issue the warning sooner

and thus to have allowed the Japanese authorities more time to ponder its

meaning and acceptability. I think it not out of the question

that if allowed say another fortnight the Emperor might have imposed his final

decision before the bomb was set for use. However because of the

blinding fury and pride of the fighting men meaning the Japanese fighting men it is

unlikely he hardly would have dared to do so until the explosion of the

atomic bomb destroyed the argument that Japan could secure a better peace

if it continued to refuse to surrender unconditionally. And

Mr. Feist continues but what if the American government had fully revealed the

results of the New Mexico test to the Japanese and the whole world. Could

that have induced the desired quick surrender. The most promising

time for situ revelations would have been in connection with the issuance of the Potsdam

declaration for by then the American air assaults and naval bombardments were

spreading happens everywhere and most Japanese were aware they had

no way of countering them. No good idea of how to survive them.

Supposed to be more precise. The American government had published the reports on

the test which were sent by General Groves to Potsdam for Simpson and the president.

Such photographs of the explosion and of the mushroom cloud and the testimony of

scientists of the weapon that were available might not that broadcast

knowledge prefaced by an explanation that one of our purposes was to spare the

Japanese have had enough shock effect to cause the Emperor to

overrule the resistant Japanese military leaders. But Mr

Feis wonders he says but in order to make the disclosure

as impressive as possible it might have been necessary to postpone the

issuance of the final warning perhaps until the end of the Potsdam conference.

The test was July 16th. It would have taken time to assemble convincing

accounts and photographs and explanation. This

postponement might have prolonged slightly the period of combat.

However in retrospect I believe that the risk should have been

taken and the cost endured for by so doing this

we might have been spared the need to introduce atomic weapons into war

in the likely event that the Japanese would not have been swayed by this explicit warning of

what would happen to them if they rejected our ultimatum. We as a

people would be freer of any regret. I will not say remorse

at the necessity of enrolling Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the annals of

history. And then he concludes. But the mind circling

upon itself returns to the point of wondering whether if the

exterminating power of the bomb had not been actually displayed the

nations would have been impelled to make even as faltering an effort as they have

to agree on measures to save themselves from mutual extinction by this

ultimate weapon. In a novel published in 1914

H.G. Wells prophesied that nations would not recognize the

impossibility of war until the atomic bomb

burst in their fumbling hands.

No two great wars later it remains entirely uncertain

whether they will bow before its imperative and thus for old Mr.

Herbert Feis on the decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan.

Now the Japanese were confronted with a very difficult problem

namely how to bring to an end a war that was obviously

already lost. I would like to point out here only that it took the

two atomic bombs Plus the Soviet declaration of war on

Japan almost simultaneously with the second of the bombs to

force the Japanese to make the decision to surrender.

And even so almost a week had to elapse before that

decision was finally made. To conclude what I would like

to do is to read the so-called imperial rescript on the end of the

war they rescript that the Emperor Emperor Hirohito

broadcast to his people at noon on August 14 1945

to our good and loyal subjects. After pondering deeply the

general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in our empire today

we have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to

an extraordinary measure. We have ordered our government to communicate to the governments of

the United States Great Britain China and the Soviet Union that our

empire accepts the provisions of their joint declaration. To

strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the

security and well-being of our subjects is the solemn obligation

which has been handed down by our imperial ancestors and which we lay

close to heart. Indeed we declared war on America and Britain out

of our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self preservation and the

stabilization of East Asia. It being far from our thought either

to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon

territorial aggrandizement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four

years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone the gallant

fighting of military and naval forces the diligence and it of our

servants of the state and the devoted service of our 100 million people the war

situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's

advantage. While the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.

Moreover the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb

the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable taking the

toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight. It

would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese

nation but also it would lead to the total extinction of human

civilization. Such being the case how are we to save

the millions of our subjects. Or to atone ourselves before the hallowed spirits of

our imperial ancestors. This is the reason why we have ordered

the acceptance of the provisions of the joint declaration of the powers.

And then finally the Emperor's rescript on the acceptance of the

surrender terms concludes having been able to safeguard and

maintain the structure of the imperial state. We are always with you our good and

loyal subjects relying upon your sincerity and integrity. Be

aware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may engender needless

complications or any fraternal contention and strife which may create

confusion astray and cause you to lose the confidence of the world.

Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation

ever firm in its face of the imperishable ness of its divine land and

mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities and the long road before it.

Unite your total strength to be devoted to the construction for the future.

Cultivate the ways of rectitude Foster nobility of spirit and work with

resolution. So is she may and hence the innate glory of the imperial state

and keep pace with the progress of the world. Thus spoke the Emperor to his

nation by radio at noon on August 14th the Japanese time of

1945. And what he was doing in effect was announcing

the end of one chapter and all too familiar and a ghastly

chapter of modern Japanese history and introducing a new and

unknown one.

You have just heard a broadcast on the topic. Japan and the atomic bomb on

the ninth of a series titled Japan 1868 through 968

with Johnny Markey professor of government and vice dean of the College of Arts and

Sciences at the University of Massachusetts. The title of the next

broadcast in this series is the occupation of Japan

Japan 1868 through 968 comes to you from WFC

are five College Radio in Amherst Massachusetts.

This program was distributed by the national educational radio network.