Episode 9: Japan and the A-Bomb

[00:05 - 00:10]
From WFC are five College Radio in Amherst Massachusetts. We present
[00:10 - 00:15]
Japan 1868 through 1968.
[00:15 - 00:19]
This year has been officially designated as the centennial of the beginning of the
[00:19 - 00:24]
modernization of Japan and this is the ninth of a series of broadcasts
[00:24 - 00:28]
with John M. Markey professor of government and vice dean of the College of Arts and
[00:28 - 00:33]
Sciences at the University of Massachusetts. The title of today's
[00:33 - 00:37]
broadcast is Japan and the atomic bomb.
[00:37 - 00:42]
Professor Markey the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on
[00:42 - 00:46]
December 7th 1941 was a tactical achievement
[00:46 - 00:51]
of great brilliance. On the other hand it was
[00:51 - 00:55]
a strategic blunder of the first magnitude.
[00:55 - 01:02]
There was no doubt as to the tactical success tactical in the broadest possible
[01:02 - 01:07]
sense of the term of the attack on Pearl Harbor. It temporarily
[01:07 - 01:11]
crippled the United States Pacific Fleet. It inflicted
[01:11 - 01:16]
grave casualties on the American Navy and
[01:16 - 01:21]
it in a very real sense opened the door for Japan's
[01:21 - 01:26]
real objective which was not of course to occupy the Hawaiian islands although
[01:26 - 01:31]
some strategists have even raised the question as to whether or not Japan should not
[01:31 - 01:35]
have attacked that key American outpost in the Pacific. What the
[01:35 - 01:40]
Japanese wanted to do was to drive into Southeastern Asia
[01:40 - 01:45]
and simultaneously with the attack on Pearl Harbor there was let loose
[01:45 - 01:50]
against the Philippines against Indochina Indonesia and
[01:50 - 01:55]
Malaya. A very broad attack which in the space of actually
[01:55 - 02:00]
a few weeks brought all of that area under Japanese control.
[02:00 - 02:06]
Now the reason why the Japanese were eager in indeed driven
[02:06 - 02:08]
to take this step was twofold.
[02:08 - 02:14]
The Japanese wanted to drive from Asia any remnant
[02:14 - 02:19]
of allied military power to get the weak American
[02:19 - 02:23]
forces out of the Philippines the British out of Hong Kong and South China
[02:23 - 02:29]
out of Malaya and to bring the French forces into Indochina completely
[02:29 - 02:34]
under there the Japanese domination and of course the Dutch had weak forces in
[02:34 - 02:39]
Indonesia. But also and even more importantly from the
[02:39 - 02:43]
Japanese point of view control over all of this vast area meant
[02:43 - 02:48]
control over vitally important sources of strategic war
[02:48 - 02:53]
materials. Tin for one thing. Iron ore for another supplies of
[02:53 - 02:58]
coal for still another natural rubber in Malaya and above all
[02:58 - 03:02]
petroleum to provide the fuel both for the Army and
[03:02 - 03:07]
Navy and also for the Air Force. The Japanese felt
[03:07 - 03:12]
that once they occupied this vast area they would one
[03:12 - 03:17]
have control over the strategic materials and to be able to
[03:17 - 03:22]
funnel them back into Japan into Japan's industrial
[03:22 - 03:26]
structure. It didn't turn out the weapons that would be necessary to
[03:26 - 03:28]
defend this vast area.
[03:28 - 03:35]
Now as I mentioned earlier the Japanese in a sense were
[03:35 - 03:40]
driven to this act one to the attack on Pearl Harbor and to
[03:40 - 03:45]
the involvement of the country in a war with the United States. No the
[03:45 - 03:49]
reason was very simple. At the time of the attack on Pearl
[03:49 - 03:53]
Harbor Japan had been involved in a major war
[03:53 - 03:58]
against China for almost four and a half years.
[03:58 - 04:03]
And this it had obviously caused a very considerable drain on the Japanese
[04:03 - 04:08]
economy. In addition as I pointed out in an earlier broadcast they
[04:08 - 04:12]
lined up the military lined up the diplomatic lined up in world
[04:12 - 04:17]
affairs. That is roughly the two and a half years of the Second
[04:17 - 04:22]
World War was such that there was this direct confrontation between the axis
[04:22 - 04:27]
Alliance which Japan was a principal power and the United States
[04:27 - 04:31]
and the European nations that the United States had allied itself with
[04:31 - 04:37]
the negotiations in Washington from April into late November of
[04:37 - 04:42]
1941 had demonstrated as I emphasized earlier the fact that
[04:42 - 04:47]
it was impossible for the United States to accept the Japanese position in a ship
[04:47 - 04:52]
and it was equally impossible for Japan to accept the American position.
[04:52 - 04:57]
Not only in Asia but again on the whole broad stage of
[04:57 - 05:02]
world affairs. Now on the other hand as I mentioned
[05:02 - 05:06]
at the beginning this was a strategic blunder of the first
[05:06 - 05:11]
order and for a very simple and obvious reason
[05:11 - 05:16]
namely it created the United States as an enemy
[05:16 - 05:21]
a fighting enemy against Japan an enemy that had a
[05:21 - 05:26]
military potential that Japan simply could not hope to match.
[05:26 - 05:31]
Now also the very success of the attack on Pearl Harbor
[05:31 - 05:36]
achieved something else that the Japanese obviously had not intended.
[05:36 - 05:41]
And that is that almost instantaneously it created
[05:41 - 05:46]
a broad national unity inside the United States.
[05:46 - 05:51]
Now in spite of the fact that the United States government had adopted a policy
[05:51 - 05:56]
that was directed very much against the Axis alliance and despite the
[05:56 - 06:01]
fact that this policy had broad popular support in the
[06:01 - 06:06]
United States there was still a very great deal of feeling within the
[06:06 - 06:10]
country that the United States should not get involved in any way
[06:10 - 06:16]
in the second world war. The familiar current of isolationism
[06:16 - 06:20]
which would characterize American policy since the early
[06:20 - 06:25]
1920s. But this attack on Pearl Harbor its
[06:25 - 06:29]
treachery on the day that will live in infamy. To use FDR a
[06:29 - 06:34]
phrase was of such a nature that immediately almost all Americans
[06:34 - 06:39]
felt that they had to stand together not only against the Japanese anime
[06:39 - 06:44]
but against the Axis alliance itself. So consequently
[06:44 - 06:48]
this. Well both psychological and political
[06:48 - 06:53]
unification of the United States gave added weight to the
[06:53 - 06:57]
military potential of the United States. Now as I
[06:57 - 07:02]
emphasized earlier one reason why Japan had been so well in
[07:02 - 07:07]
mentally successful in its resort to military force as an instrument of
[07:07 - 07:12]
national policy was the simple fact that from
[07:12 - 07:16]
1895 onward Japan had not been confronted with a
[07:16 - 07:21]
strong military enemy. But this attack on Pearl Harbor
[07:21 - 07:25]
transformed the broad strategic position of Japan
[07:25 - 07:31]
immediately and as things turned out disastrously for Japan.
[07:31 - 07:36]
Now initially that is to say in the period of roughly six months
[07:36 - 07:41]
after the attack on Pearl Harbor it seemed as if Japan
[07:41 - 07:45]
had long last reached the ultimate payoff in its
[07:45 - 07:50]
career of military aggression. By early June of
[07:50 - 07:54]
1942 Japan controlled an almost
[07:54 - 07:59]
unbelievable extent of land and sea. Some of
[07:59 - 08:04]
you may recall that the Japan Japanese forces in the spring of
[08:04 - 08:08]
1042 actually occupied what was by any
[08:08 - 08:13]
definition American territory. That is to say two of the islands in the
[08:13 - 08:17]
Aleutian chain stretching westward from Alaska.
[08:17 - 08:22]
Now from the far northern reaches of the Pacific Ocean
[08:22 - 08:27]
namely the Aleutian Islands Japanese control extended
[08:27 - 08:32]
Southwest word through the western half of the Pacific Ocean
[08:32 - 08:36]
through the Philippines Indonesia Southeastern Asia
[08:36 - 08:42]
large areas in China as I emphasized earlier. Clear to the borders
[08:42 - 08:46]
of India itself. Now even if the Japanese had
[08:46 - 08:51]
had to fight no battles at all in occupying this territory this
[08:51 - 08:56]
would still have been a very impressive achievement. Now the Japanese had
[08:56 - 09:01]
to liquidate allied strength in Southeastern Asia
[09:01 - 09:05]
particularly but again with the fall of the Philippines in the
[09:05 - 09:10]
spring of 1940 to this objective was achieved.
[09:10 - 09:15]
As a matter of fact to hear again was a manifestation of the
[09:15 - 09:20]
extremely favorable position that Japan had enjoyed strategically
[09:20 - 09:24]
namely again the overall weakness of the western of the
[09:24 - 09:29]
allied military presence in Asia in the beginning stages of the war.
[09:29 - 09:35]
Now on the other hand the tide of war begin to
[09:35 - 09:40]
shift gradually and almost imperceptibly against
[09:40 - 09:44]
Japan almost from the very moment of the Japanese achievement
[09:44 - 09:49]
of what seemed to be the ultimate in its career of military aggression.
[09:49 - 09:54]
Now also a nother military development of very great
[09:54 - 09:59]
significance although it was largely unheard of at that time because of the
[09:59 - 10:04]
blanket of secrecy that surrounded it was the beginning of a very
[10:04 - 10:09]
effective if American campaign of submarine warfare
[10:09 - 10:13]
against the Japanese shipping. Now this was meant to
[10:13 - 10:18]
achieve a very obvious goal namely to
[10:18 - 10:22]
deny Japan access to the raw materials that
[10:22 - 10:27]
Japan thought it had brought under its control in the initial stages of the
[10:27 - 10:32]
war. By the summer of. In
[10:32 - 10:37]
1944 it was perfectly clear that Japan had
[10:37 - 10:42]
lost whatever military initiative it had gained and that was very considerable in early
[10:42 - 10:47]
1042 and was already a force back
[10:47 - 10:51]
on the defensive. And it was perfectly clear that
[10:51 - 10:57]
Japan had no hope of winning the war and no hope of emerging from
[10:57 - 11:02]
the war in a favorable position. On the other hand it was
[11:02 - 11:07]
impossible to determine when that war would come to an end.
[11:07 - 11:12]
Now as far as Japan was concerned the decisive stage of the war
[11:12 - 11:17]
began early in 1945 when Japan was
[11:17 - 11:21]
for the first time brought under massive allied meaning American
[11:21 - 11:26]
really air attack by say June of
[11:26 - 11:31]
1945. Both Japan and the United States were confronted
[11:31 - 11:35]
with fundamental questions. The American problem was
[11:35 - 11:40]
simply how to end the war without an invasion of Japan.
[11:40 - 11:45]
The Japanese problem was also how to end the war but
[11:45 - 11:49]
on what the Japanese would regard as reasonable terms.
[11:49 - 11:55]
A very great deal has been said about the use of the atomic
[11:55 - 12:00]
bombs against Japan about the American decision to use those
[12:00 - 12:04]
bombs. And I am not going to go into a discussion of
[12:04 - 12:09]
this fascinating problem. It will be a problem bitterly
[12:09 - 12:11]
debated for many many years.
[12:11 - 12:16]
What I would like to do is simply to read what
[12:16 - 12:21]
two very wise men have had to say about this
[12:21 - 12:25]
decision. First I am going to read a
[12:25 - 12:30]
passage from the memoirs of Henry L.
[12:30 - 12:35]
Stimson entitled on active service in peace and war.
[12:35 - 12:39]
It was Mr. Stimpson who was a secretary of war during the
[12:39 - 12:44]
Second World War and was the man who perhaps had played
[12:44 - 12:49]
a key role who did play a key role in the decision to use the bomb against
[12:49 - 12:54]
Japan. And ironically this was the same Henry L. Stimson who was
[12:54 - 12:59]
responsible for the Stimson doctrine back in 1932 that as
[12:59 - 13:03]
I emphasized in an earlier broadcast was the policy
[13:03 - 13:08]
position that the United States adhered to in its relations for almost 10 years
[13:08 - 13:10]
with Japan.
[13:10 - 13:15]
Writing about a year after Earth the decision had been made and Mr.
[13:15 - 13:20]
Stimson said this. Two great nations were approaching
[13:20 - 13:24]
contact in a fight to a finish which would begin on November
[13:24 - 13:29]
one thousand nine hundred forty five. Our enemy Japan commanded
[13:29 - 13:34]
forces of somewhat over five million armed men. None of those
[13:34 - 13:39]
armies had already inflicted upon us in our break through the outer perimeter of their
[13:39 - 13:43]
defenses. Over three hundred thousand battle casualties.
[13:43 - 13:48]
And the Army still unbeaten had the strength to cost us a million more. A
[13:48 - 13:53]
million casualties that is killed or wounded and captured. As long as
[13:53 - 13:58]
the Japanese government refused to surrender we should be forced to take and
[13:58 - 14:03]
hold the ground and smale the Japanese ground armies by close
[14:03 - 14:08]
in fighting of the same desperate and costly kind that we had faced in the Pacific
[14:08 - 14:13]
Islands for nearly four years and then later on Mr. Stimson wrote
[14:13 - 14:18]
my chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the
[14:18 - 14:23]
least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had
[14:23 - 14:28]
helped to raise in the light of the alternatives which on a fair estimate were
[14:28 - 14:32]
open to us. I believe that no man in our position and
[14:32 - 14:37]
subject to our responsibilities ording in his hands a weapon of such
[14:37 - 14:42]
possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives could have
[14:42 - 14:46]
failed to use it and afterwards look his countrymen in the face.
[14:46 - 14:52]
I would like to add here that Mr. Stimson was also aware of
[14:52 - 14:56]
what a costly invasion would mean to the Japanese.
[14:56 - 15:01]
And so in spite of the passage that I just read his concern was not simply with
[15:01 - 15:06]
the saving of American lives but with the saving of Japanese lives as
[15:06 - 15:11]
well. Now finally Mr. Stimson in looking
[15:11 - 15:15]
back at this decision had this to say.
[15:15 - 15:21]
As I read over what I have written I am aware that much of it in
[15:21 - 15:25]
this year of peace may have a harsh and unfeeling sound. It would
[15:25 - 15:30]
perhaps be possible to say the same things and to say them more gently
[15:30 - 15:36]
but I do not think it would be wise. As I look back over the five years of
[15:36 - 15:41]
my service as secretary of war I see too many stern and heart
[15:41 - 15:46]
rending decisions to be willing to pretend that war
[15:46 - 15:50]
is anything else than what it is. The face of war
[15:50 - 15:56]
is the face of death. Death isn't an inevitable part of every
[15:56 - 16:01]
order that a wartime leader gives the decision to use the atomic
[16:01 - 16:05]
bomb was a decision that brought death to over a hundred thousand
[16:05 - 16:10]
Japanese. No explanation can change that fact and I do not
[16:10 - 16:14]
wish to gloss it over but this deliberate premeditated
[16:14 - 16:19]
destruction was our least abhorrent
[16:19 - 16:24]
choice. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki put an
[16:24 - 16:28]
end to the Japanese war. It stopped the fire raids and the strangling
[16:28 - 16:33]
blockade. It ended the ghastly specter of a clash of great land
[16:33 - 16:38]
armies. In this last great action of the Second World
[16:38 - 16:43]
War we were given a final proof that war is death.
[16:43 - 16:48]
War in the 20th century has grown steadily more barbarous more destructive
[16:48 - 16:53]
more debased in all its aspects. Now with the release of atomic
[16:53 - 16:58]
energy man's ability to destroy himself is very nearly complete.
[16:58 - 17:04]
The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended a war. They also made
[17:04 - 17:08]
it wholly clear that we must never have another war. This is the
[17:08 - 17:13]
lesson men and leaders everywhere must learn. And I believe that
[17:13 - 17:18]
when they learn it they will find a way to lasting peace. There is
[17:18 - 17:22]
no other choice. And Lester old Mr Henry L.
[17:22 - 17:27]
Stimson regarding what the historical decision
[17:27 - 17:32]
to use the atomic bombs against Japan. In my opinion
[17:32 - 17:37]
the best study of the decision to use the bomb
[17:37 - 17:42]
is by Herbert Feis and the book in its
[17:42 - 17:47]
second version is entitled The atomic bomb and the end of
[17:47 - 17:51]
World War 2. A Mr. face was not
[17:51 - 17:56]
involved in the decision to drop the bomb. But
[17:56 - 18:01]
like many serious men thoughtful men he
[18:01 - 18:06]
became very much interested in this problem and he wrote
[18:06 - 18:10]
which in my opinion is the most detailed study to date
[18:10 - 18:15]
of the manner in which the decision was made. What I would
[18:15 - 18:19]
like to do is simply to read Mr Feist says. The concluding
[18:19 - 18:24]
remarks about the use of the atomic bombs because I
[18:24 - 18:29]
think it is about the most thoughtful analysis of many
[18:29 - 18:34]
aspects of the action that has so far been set down.
[18:34 - 18:39]
Mr. Feist writes as follows. In summary it can be concluded
[18:39 - 18:44]
that the decision to drop the bombs upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki
[18:44 - 18:49]
ought not to be censored. The reasons were. Under the
[18:49 - 18:53]
circumstances of the time weighty and valid enough.
[18:53 - 18:59]
But a cluster of worrisome queries remain which the passage of time
[18:59 - 19:05]
has coated with greater political ethical and historical
[19:05 - 19:09]
interest. One of these whether or not the desired quick surrender could have been
[19:09 - 19:14]
induced if the American government had been more explicit in its explanation of how the
[19:14 - 19:19]
Japanese people and the Emperor would fare after surrender was
[19:19 - 19:24]
considered in the preceding chapter. Another which has often been asked
[19:24 - 19:29]
is why ten days were allowed to pass between the receipt of
[19:29 - 19:34]
information regarding the results of the test of the bomb and the issuance of
[19:34 - 19:39]
our final warning. I think the delay was due to an intent to be sure
[19:39 - 19:43]
that if the warning was at first unheated it could be driven quickly and deeply
[19:43 - 19:48]
honed by the bombs. Thus we waited until we knew all was in
[19:48 - 19:52]
readiness to drop them. These tactics worked but.
[19:52 - 19:58]
I wonder whether it might not have been wiser to issue the warning sooner
[19:58 - 20:03]
and thus to have allowed the Japanese authorities more time to ponder its
[20:03 - 20:08]
meaning and acceptability. I think it not out of the question
[20:08 - 20:13]
that if allowed say another fortnight the Emperor might have imposed his final
[20:13 - 20:18]
decision before the bomb was set for use. However because of the
[20:18 - 20:23]
blinding fury and pride of the fighting men meaning the Japanese fighting men it is
[20:23 - 20:27]
unlikely he hardly would have dared to do so until the explosion of the
[20:27 - 20:32]
atomic bomb destroyed the argument that Japan could secure a better peace
[20:32 - 20:37]
if it continued to refuse to surrender unconditionally. And
[20:37 - 20:42]
Mr. Feist continues but what if the American government had fully revealed the
[20:42 - 20:47]
results of the New Mexico test to the Japanese and the whole world. Could
[20:47 - 20:52]
that have induced the desired quick surrender. The most promising
[20:52 - 20:57]
time for situ revelations would have been in connection with the issuance of the Potsdam
[20:57 - 21:02]
declaration for by then the American air assaults and naval bombardments were
[21:02 - 21:06]
spreading happens everywhere and most Japanese were aware they had
[21:06 - 21:11]
no way of countering them. No good idea of how to survive them.
[21:11 - 21:16]
Supposed to be more precise. The American government had published the reports on
[21:16 - 21:22]
the test which were sent by General Groves to Potsdam for Simpson and the president.
[21:22 - 21:26]
Such photographs of the explosion and of the mushroom cloud and the testimony of
[21:26 - 21:31]
scientists of the weapon that were available might not that broadcast
[21:31 - 21:36]
knowledge prefaced by an explanation that one of our purposes was to spare the
[21:36 - 21:41]
Japanese have had enough shock effect to cause the Emperor to
[21:41 - 21:45]
overrule the resistant Japanese military leaders. But Mr
[21:45 - 21:50]
Feis wonders he says but in order to make the disclosure
[21:50 - 21:55]
as impressive as possible it might have been necessary to postpone the
[21:55 - 22:00]
issuance of the final warning perhaps until the end of the Potsdam conference.
[22:00 - 22:05]
The test was July 16th. It would have taken time to assemble convincing
[22:05 - 22:09]
accounts and photographs and explanation. This
[22:09 - 22:15]
postponement might have prolonged slightly the period of combat.
[22:15 - 22:20]
However in retrospect I believe that the risk should have been
[22:20 - 22:24]
taken and the cost endured for by so doing this
[22:24 - 22:29]
we might have been spared the need to introduce atomic weapons into war
[22:29 - 22:35]
in the likely event that the Japanese would not have been swayed by this explicit warning of
[22:35 - 22:40]
what would happen to them if they rejected our ultimatum. We as a
[22:40 - 22:45]
people would be freer of any regret. I will not say remorse
[22:45 - 22:50]
at the necessity of enrolling Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the annals of
[22:50 - 22:55]
history. And then he concludes. But the mind circling
[22:55 - 23:00]
upon itself returns to the point of wondering whether if the
[23:00 - 23:04]
exterminating power of the bomb had not been actually displayed the
[23:04 - 23:09]
nations would have been impelled to make even as faltering an effort as they have
[23:09 - 23:14]
to agree on measures to save themselves from mutual extinction by this
[23:14 - 23:19]
ultimate weapon. In a novel published in 1914
[23:19 - 23:24]
H.G. Wells prophesied that nations would not recognize the
[23:24 - 23:28]
impossibility of war until the atomic bomb
[23:28 - 23:31]
burst in their fumbling hands.
[23:31 - 23:36]
No two great wars later it remains entirely uncertain
[23:36 - 23:41]
whether they will bow before its imperative and thus for old Mr.
[23:41 - 23:46]
Herbert Feis on the decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan.
[23:46 - 23:52]
Now the Japanese were confronted with a very difficult problem
[23:52 - 23:57]
namely how to bring to an end a war that was obviously
[23:57 - 24:02]
already lost. I would like to point out here only that it took the
[24:02 - 24:07]
two atomic bombs Plus the Soviet declaration of war on
[24:07 - 24:12]
Japan almost simultaneously with the second of the bombs to
[24:12 - 24:16]
force the Japanese to make the decision to surrender.
[24:16 - 24:20]
And even so almost a week had to elapse before that
[24:20 - 24:25]
decision was finally made. To conclude what I would like
[24:25 - 24:30]
to do is to read the so-called imperial rescript on the end of the
[24:30 - 24:35]
war they rescript that the Emperor Emperor Hirohito
[24:35 - 24:40]
broadcast to his people at noon on August 14 1945
[24:40 - 24:46]
to our good and loyal subjects. After pondering deeply the
[24:46 - 24:50]
general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in our empire today
[24:50 - 24:56]
we have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to
[24:56 - 25:01]
an extraordinary measure. We have ordered our government to communicate to the governments of
[25:01 - 25:05]
the United States Great Britain China and the Soviet Union that our
[25:05 - 25:10]
empire accepts the provisions of their joint declaration. To
[25:10 - 25:15]
strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the
[25:15 - 25:19]
security and well-being of our subjects is the solemn obligation
[25:19 - 25:24]
which has been handed down by our imperial ancestors and which we lay
[25:24 - 25:29]
close to heart. Indeed we declared war on America and Britain out
[25:29 - 25:33]
of our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self preservation and the
[25:33 - 25:38]
stabilization of East Asia. It being far from our thought either
[25:38 - 25:43]
to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon
[25:43 - 25:47]
territorial aggrandizement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four
[25:47 - 25:52]
years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone the gallant
[25:52 - 25:57]
fighting of military and naval forces the diligence and it of our
[25:57 - 26:02]
servants of the state and the devoted service of our 100 million people the war
[26:02 - 26:07]
situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's
[26:07 - 26:12]
advantage. While the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.
[26:12 - 26:17]
Moreover the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb
[26:17 - 26:22]
the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable taking the
[26:22 - 26:27]
toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight. It
[26:27 - 26:32]
would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese
[26:32 - 26:37]
nation but also it would lead to the total extinction of human
[26:37 - 26:41]
civilization. Such being the case how are we to save
[26:41 - 26:46]
the millions of our subjects. Or to atone ourselves before the hallowed spirits of
[26:46 - 26:51]
our imperial ancestors. This is the reason why we have ordered
[26:51 - 26:56]
the acceptance of the provisions of the joint declaration of the powers.
[26:56 - 27:01]
And then finally the Emperor's rescript on the acceptance of the
[27:01 - 27:06]
surrender terms concludes having been able to safeguard and
[27:06 - 27:11]
maintain the structure of the imperial state. We are always with you our good and
[27:11 - 27:15]
loyal subjects relying upon your sincerity and integrity. Be
[27:15 - 27:20]
aware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may engender needless
[27:20 - 27:25]
complications or any fraternal contention and strife which may create
[27:25 - 27:30]
confusion astray and cause you to lose the confidence of the world.
[27:30 - 27:35]
Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation
[27:35 - 27:41]
ever firm in its face of the imperishable ness of its divine land and
[27:41 - 27:46]
mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities and the long road before it.
[27:46 - 27:51]
Unite your total strength to be devoted to the construction for the future.
[27:51 - 27:56]
Cultivate the ways of rectitude Foster nobility of spirit and work with
[27:56 - 28:00]
resolution. So is she may and hence the innate glory of the imperial state
[28:00 - 28:06]
and keep pace with the progress of the world. Thus spoke the Emperor to his
[28:06 - 28:10]
nation by radio at noon on August 14th the Japanese time of
[28:10 - 28:15]
1945. And what he was doing in effect was announcing
[28:15 - 28:20]
the end of one chapter and all too familiar and a ghastly
[28:20 - 28:25]
chapter of modern Japanese history and introducing a new and
[28:25 - 28:26]
unknown one.
[28:26 - 28:32]
You have just heard a broadcast on the topic. Japan and the atomic bomb on
[28:32 - 28:37]
the ninth of a series titled Japan 1868 through 968
[28:37 - 28:42]
with Johnny Markey professor of government and vice dean of the College of Arts and
[28:42 - 28:47]
Sciences at the University of Massachusetts. The title of the next
[28:47 - 28:51]
broadcast in this series is the occupation of Japan
[28:51 - 28:57]
Japan 1868 through 968 comes to you from WFC
[28:57 - 29:01]
are five College Radio in Amherst Massachusetts.
[29:01 - 29:06]
This program was distributed by the national educational radio network.