SECTION IV WITNESS AND NAVY COOPERATION We found the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps were fully supportive of our efforts and went to all necessary lengths to ensure that our logistical and scheduling needs were met. The Navy also assisted in identifying Tailhook attendees and adjusting flight and training schedules where necessary to make officers available for interview. Perhaps most important was the Navy's designation of "points of contact" (POCs) to work with us in scheduling interviews and to act as facilitators in solving any and all logistical problems. The POCs, generally officers of the rank of commander or captain, accomplished all required tasks, including arranging the transportation of our agents onto various aircraft carriers, helping to identify and locate retired officers and, in general, helping to facilitate our interviews. In contrast to the organizational cooperation described above, we found a wide variance in the level of cooperation shown by aviation officers. Most of the officers interviewed responded in a serious and cooperative fashion. Other officers were far less cooperative and attempted to limit their responses so as to reveal only minimal information. Many officers refused to offer information pertinent to the investigation unless asked very specific questions. For example, a common tactic taken by many officers in response to general questioning was to answer that they simply had no knowledge of the subject. However, we experienced a number of situations in which facts disclosed later in the investigation suggested that many of the same individuals did indeed have pertinent knowledge or information. A typical response to questions posed in followup interviews was that the investigator had not asked the "right" question. It is our belief that several hundred of the 2,384 naval officers we interviewed responded in that fashion. The evidence revealed that other officers deliberately provided false information to us. Some squadron members appeared to maintain unified responses that were often contradicted by the testimony of witnesses not assigned to those squadrons. Similarly, individual officers specifically lied to us about their activities unless directly confronted with conflicting evidence. In one instance, a Navy lieutenant repeatedly denied that he indecently exposed himself. After he was shown a photograph clearly depicting him publicly exposing himself at Tailhook 91, the officer told us he had lied because he did not know that we had a picture and his career was worth the risk of being caught in a lie. A second officer, a Marine lieutenant colonel, lied to us about his own improper activities, as well as those of his squadron mates. The same officer had previously alleged to us that he had seen Lieutenant (LT) Paula Coughlin seeking souvenirs in the Rhino suite on the morning after her assault. The officer later retracted the allegation after he was found to have supplied other false information to our investigators. In many instances, we were able to overcome attempts to mislead our investigators. In many others, however, we were not. Collective "stonewalling" significantly increased the difficulty of the investigation and adversely affected our ability to identify many of those officers who had committed assaults. In the absence of specific conflicting testimony or physical evidence, an individual officer's statement that he or she neither saw nor heard of anything improper occurring at Tailhook 91 had to be accepted at face value. Our investigators encountered repeated and deliberate attempts to obstruct their efforts. For instance, some witnesses who had been identified as having taken photographs at Tailhook 91 told us that they had misplaced or destroyed all such photographs. However, when these individuals were presented with a DoD IG subpoena, in most cases these "lost" photographs were produced. One Marine Corps aviator's commanding officer (CO) informed us that, after the aviator was interviewed, he overhead the officer telephone other aviators and tell them what they should and should not say to investigators relating to improper activity engaged in at Tailhook 91. A few officers reported the existence of a "Lieutenants' Protective Association (LPA)" and a "Junior Officers' Protective Association (JOPA)." The LPA and JOPA were described as being an allegiance among officers. One officer told us that, according to LPA and JOPA "rules," a junior officer will not "give up" another junior officer just because he has done "something stupid." Naval aviators are typically known by their nicknames or "call signs." In one instance, aviators in a squadron denied they were known by call signs. However, we later learned that they did, in fact, use call signs. We strongly suspect that the initial denial by these officers was intended to conceal their involvement with a woman who was indecently assaulted in the gauntlet and that these aviators were aware that the woman knew them only by their respective call signs. In fact, they had earlier given her a poster autographed with their call signs. In situations in which the interviewee was considered to be a suspect or subject of criminal or other improper activity, we advised them of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ, and we respected their right to seek legal counsel and afforded them the opportunity to consult with an attorney. In every location where we conducted interviews, defense counsel was immediately available to interviewees through the Naval Legal Services Office (NLSO).