SECTION II SCOPE AND INVESTIGATIVE METHODOLOGY A. Scope The scope of our investigation encompassed the following areas: 1. Indecent assaults -2 2. Indecent exposure 3. Conduct unbecoming an officer 4. Dereliction of duty, as well as failure to act in a proper leadership capacity -3 5. False statements and false swearing during the course of our investigation We found it necessary to conduct a comprehensive investigation because the earlier Naval Investigative Service (NIS) investigation focused almost exclusively on indecent assaults. That investigation found that a total of 26 women, 14 of them naval officers, had been assaulted at Tailhook 91. Although an NIS interim report dated February 1992 listed 18 naval officers who were considered to be suspects or subjects, the NIS final report of investigation, issued in mid-April 1992, identified only three indecent assault suspects: Ñone naval officer, one Marine Corps officer and one foreign military exchange officer.-4 In late April 1992, the Commander, NIS, referred 11 specific "case summaries" to cognizant Navy and Marine Corps flag officers "...for such disposition as [they] deem appropriate." However, in his memorandum to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the Commander, NIS, stated that the allegations regarding two Navy captains included in the 11 "referrals" were in one case "unsubstantiated" and, in the other, "uncorroborated." The Naval Inspector General (IG), after reviewing the NIS investigative report, but without conducting a comprehensive investigation of his own, forwarded for further review the names of 32 officers and one civilian for consideration of administrative sanctions. Six of these individuals were referred for questionable personal conduct, 6 were referred for standards of conduct issues involving contractor hospitality suites, 4 were referred for failure to act, and 17 were referred because they were commanding officers of squadrons which hosted or contributed to the funding of hospitality suites that featured lewd entertainment or behavior. We also received a memorandum from the Navy Judge Advocate General (JAG) dated July 2, 1992 in which he listed 80 individuals referred "...to the chain of command for appropriate disciplinary or administrative action." The list of 80 names included some of the 11 and 33 names specifically referred to the chain of command by the NIS and the Naval IG, respectively. The list of 80 also included 56 names which had not previously been mentioned as referrals. In total, the NIS and the Naval IG identified 95 names which were considered for referral. -5 The Naval IG also commented in his report with respect to the Navy's use of military aircraft to support attendance at Tailhook 91. Further, the Naval IG noted that various forms of impropriety such as instances of indecent exposure and excessive alcohol consumption were apparent. Neither the NIS nor the Naval IG, however, conducted comprehensive inquiries into those latter areas nor did they pursue the matter of leadership accountability. B. Methodology Due to the large number of witnesses and their geographic dispersion, we approached our review on a geographic rather than on a "lead-by-lead" basis as would normally be done in investigating crimes such as indecent assault. Our investigation into the events at Tailhook 91 began 10 months after the actual convention. Witnesses were scattered literally around the world at Navy and Marine Corps bases, as well as aboard naval ships. We assembled a task force of investigators which, after reviewing available information received from the Navy, developed a detailed plan for use in conducting interviews of attendees and other witnesses. The task force, consisting of over 40 investigators, conducted interviews at Naval air stations throughout the United States as well as on four aircraft carriers, including the USS Saratoga while it was deployed in the Mediterranean Sea, the USS Ranger while deployed in the Persian Gulf, the USS Nimitz deployed off the western coast of the United States and the USS Independence while deployed in Japan. Interviews were also conducted in Canada, Japan, Europe, the Middle East and various other locations at which witnesses were found to be stationed. A total of 26 investigative and 4 administrative support work years were expended in the effort as of January 31, 1993. Inasmuch as neither the Navy nor the Tailhook Association maintained comprehensive records that reflected the identity of all attendees, we sought to identify witnesses through various other means. That process included: 1. Analysis of Navy and Marine Corps flight records. 2. Review of Hilton Hotel guest registers pertaining to rooms reserved by the Tailhook Association. 3. List of approximately 1,680 named registrants furnished to us by the Tailhook Association. -6 4. Questionnaires completed by officers and civilian employees at the request of the Navy, Marine Corps and the Air Force. 5. Information garnered through interviews of other witnesses. 6. Information received through the Department of Defense Hotline or in anonymous letters sent directly to our Tailhook task force. 7. Information developed through the NIS and the Naval IG investigation. Although the Tailhook Association reserved approximately 1,000 rooms at the Hilton, that number did not come close to accommodating the estimated 4,000 officers that attended Tailhook 91. Thus, our attempts to identify all attendees were hampered by the fact that there were no records for hundreds of officers who slept on the floor of squadron hospitality suites or in rooms occupied by other officers. Further, our investigation disclosed that attendees stayed at hotels throughout the Las Vegas area, while others stayed at the homes of local friends or relatives. Still others stayed in motor homes or simply slept in vehicles driven by officers from such locations as San Diego and El Toro, California. Due to the proximity between Naval Air Stations in California and Las Vegas, hundreds of officers drove their personal vehicles to Tailhook 91. During the course of our investigation we interviewed -7 a total of 2,911 people. The graphs shown in Figures 1 and 2 depict the demographics of those interviewed. All Interviewees by Affiliation __________________ USN (Male) (2021) USN (Female) (84) Other (Male (8) CIV (Female) (305) CIV (Male) (123) USAF (Male) (63) USMC (Male) (298) USAF (Female) (9) Total Interviewees: 2911 Figure 1. All Interviewees by Affiliation [information in graph displayed as text due to graphic limitations] Navy and Marine Corps Officer Interviewees by Rank _____________________________________________________________________ RANK # OF INTERVIEWEES USN USMC O1 Ensign 2nd Lieutenant 71 O2 Lieutenant (Jr. Grade) 1st Lieutenant 318 O3 Lieutenant Captain 1232 O4 Lt. Commander Major 352 O5 Commander Lt. Colonel 239 O6 Captain Colonel 92 O7-10 Admiral General 37 07-10 (retired)...........................................43 Figure 2. Navy and Marine Corps Officer Interviewees by Rank [information in graph displayed as text due to graphic limitations] In addition to the above cited interviews, we conducted 314 reinterviews involving critical witnesses. We also note that, as of January 31, 1993, more than 1,500 additional individuals are either known or believed to have attended Tailhook 91. Those individuals were not interviewed either because (1) they refused to discuss details of Tailhook 91 with us -8, (2) we were unsuccessful in contacting them during the investigation, or (3) their names came up only on an incidental basis and no information was developed that indicated an interview was warranted. Throughout the interview process, we continued to identify new victims, witnesses and suspects. The need to fully address these emerging leads contributed to the time needed to complete the investigation. Finally, we note our belief that a substantial number of other, unidentified individuals attended Tailhook 91. Neither the Tailhook Association nor the Las Vegas Hilton Hotel attempted in any way to limit access to the third floor area. Thus, for example, several witnesses cited the presence of female attendees who could not be specifically identified or otherwise located. Similarly, many retired and Reserve officers are believed to have attended who were not identified during our investigation. In an effort to identify possible witnesses, we requested that local newspapers and other media publicize the task force presence in their area, noting our local and headquarters telephone numbers and the fact that we welcomed contact with any attendees or anyone else having information concerning Tailhook 91. The articles resulted in several telephone calls to the task force, thereby identifying additional witnesses. In addition to conducting witness, victim and suspect interviews, the task force used a full range of other investigative techniques, some of which are described below: 1. Photographs of Officer Interviewees. As part of our interview process, we photographed military officers and later used those photographs to develop groups of pictures needed to assist victims and witnesses in identifying specific individuals knowledgeable of the events at Tailhook 91. 2. Polygraphs. This technique was used on 34 occasions, in accordance with DoD Directives regulating the use of polygraphs.-9 Officers taking the polygraph examination executed signed waivers indicating they consented to the examination and had been fully apprised of their legal rights prior to the test. Findings disclosed that 14 of the tests indicated the officer was nondeceptive, 12 indicated deception, and 8 were inconclusive or no opinion was rendered by the polygraph examiner.-10 Twelve of the officers made admissions to the issues under investigation as a result of the polygraph examination. 3. Subpoenas. A total of 19 DoD IG subpoenas were issued in support of our investigation. Twelve of those subpoenas related to photographic evidence believed to be in the possession of the subpoenaed party. The remainder of the subpoenas related to business records and other documentary evidence relevant to the investigation. 4. Undercover Operations. This technique was used in an effort to further corroborate information concerning a specific indecent assault. The operation was successful in obtaining additional corroboration. 5. Consensual Monitoring. Four conversations were recorded with the consent of one of the parties, in accordance with DoD Directive.-11 The conversations related to knowledge of indecent assault activity in the gauntlet and other criminal activities. 6. Immunity. Throughout the investigation, we considered whether individuals suspected of involvement in criminal behavior at Tailhook 91 should be offered immunity in exchange for other information of specific concern to the task force. In each instance, a ''proffer'' -l2 was required. A total of 15 suspects or their attorneys engaged in immunity discussions with us and 3 submitted proffers. We requested and received two grants of immunity from naval authorities in regard to the matter. 7. Computer Analysis. Due to the enormous volume of information collected, the use of computer data bases played a significant role in recording and cataloging witness statements and other evidence. 8. "Candid" Photographs. We obtained more than 800 photographs during the investigative process. The photographs range from simple scenes depicting people conversing on the pool patio to pictures of indecent exposure and various other activities that could be characterized as conduct unbecoming an officer. In virtually every instance in which activity relevant to the investigation was shown, we were able to identify those individuals represented in the photographs. In every case of male indecent exposure, the individuals involved were found to be Navy or Marine Corps officers. In every case of indecent exposure depicting women, the individuals were found to be civilians. 9. Other. In addition to the above techniques, the task force used various other accepted law enforcement tools such as surveillance, confidential sources of information and consent searches. ___________________________ Notes 2 Indecent assault is a crime under Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The elements of the offense are: "(1) That the accused assaulted a certain person not the spouse of the accused in a certain manner; (2) That the acts were done with the intent to gratify the lust or sexual desires of the accused; and (3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the Armed Forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the Armed Forces." Lesser included offenses of indecent assault include assault and assault consummated by a battery (Article 128, UCMJ), indecent acts (Article 134), and attempts (Article 80). 3 Failure to act is punishable as a dereliction of duty under Article 92 of the UCMJ. The elements of that offense are: "(a) That the accused had certain duties; (b) That the accused knew or reasonably should have known of the duties; and (c) That the accused was (willfully) (through neglect or culpable inefficiency) derelict in the performance of those duties." A duty may be imposed by statute, regulation or custom of the Service, and actual knowledge need not be shown if the individual should have reasonably known of the duties. 4 The NIS report also contained information regarding a Marine Corps lieutenant colonel with respect to his possible obstruction of the NIS investigation. In pursuing this matter, we found insufficient evidence to warrant such a referral. 5 The Navy JAG informed us that the additional names contained in its list of 80 included names provided by NIS as potential suspects in various misconduct. The Commander, NIS, had prepared referral letters dated June 23, 1992 to 5 flag officers for all of the names on the list of 80. In his letter, the Commander, NIS, stated, ÒI havebeen directed to refer [these individuals] to the chain of command for appropriate action." The NIS advised that the reason the letters were never sent was because the Department of Defense (DoD) IG had requested that all criminal or administrative disciplinary actions be held in abeyance pending the completion of the DoD IG investigation. Our review of the NIS and the Naval IG referrals led us to conclude that many of the actions or inactions cited did not rise to the level of impropriety necessary to warrant a referral when viewed in the overall context of Tailhook. For example, the list of 80 included the names of many field grade officers who were referred simply because they had attested to the fact that they had witnessed the gauntlet and described what they had seen. They were referred presumably for their failure to take action. of the 117 referrals we are providing to the Navy for misconduct at Tailhook 91, only 30 are also included in the Navy and Naval IG referrals. 6 Tailhook Association records reflect the names of approximately 1,680 registrants. The Association contends that an additional 500 people registered while at Tailhook 91 but the Association failed to record the names of those individuals. Of the 1,680 named registrants, approximately 900 were active duty or Reserve officers. The remaining attendees consisted of contractor personnel, Government civilian employees, retired officers and members of the general public. 7 Of the 2,911 people interviewed, 108 were interviewed telephonically rather than in person. 8 The category includes certain nonmilitary attendees, as well as military attendees who invoked their rights against self-incrimination. 9 DoD Directive 5210.48 and DoD Regulation 5210.48R. 10 Òlnconclusive" indicates that a polygraph examination was conducted, however, the examiner could not reach a conclusive opinion. "ÒNo opinion indicates that the examination was terminated, either by the examiner or examinee, before completion. 11 DoD Directive 5200.24. 12 In the context of a grant of immunity, a proffer is a written offer from the suspect or the suspect's attorney, to the Government, of what the individual would say if that individual were to be granted immunity from prosecution. The proffer cannot be used as evidence in any subsequent prosecution.