SECTION Xl


CONCLUSIONS


There was a serious breakdown of leadership at Tailhook 91. 
Misconduct went far beyond the "treatment of women" issues for which 
the Navy had enacted new policies in the years preceding Tailhook 91. 
Tailhook "traditions" such as the gauntlet, ballwalking, leg shaving, 
mooning, streaking and lewd sexual conduct significantly deviated from 
the standards of behavior that the Nation expects of its military officers. 
The disparity between the espoused Navy policies regarding officer 
conduct and the actual conduct of significant numbers of officers at 
Tailhook 91 could not have been greater. Officers who assaulted women, 
as well as those who engaged in improper sexual behavior, knew that 
their actions would not be condoned under any objective standard. 
These officers needed no "policeman at the elbow" to warn them of the 
wrongful nature of their actions and they, therefore, must bear a major 
portion of the blame.


Leaders in naval aviation, ranging from the squadron commanders to 
flag officers who tolerated a culture that engendered the misconduct also 
bear a portion of the blame. The damage suffered by the Navy as a result 
of Tailhook cannot be fully repaired until the integrity of the Navy is 
restored, which, in turn, depends on the integrity of each of its members. 
The senior officers must lead the way in that endeavor. For the credibility 
of the Navy and Marine Corps as institutions, each senior officer who 
attended Tailhook 91, or previous Tailhook symposia, should consider 
the extent to which he bears some personal responsibility for what 
occurred there and how he can best serve the Navy and the Marine 
Corps in the future.


Navy Department leadership, military and civilian, will face many difficult 
decisions as it comes to grips with the issues raised in this report and the 
individual misconduct referrals that accompany the report. Personal 
friendship, knowledge of past service and sacrifice by the officers 
involved, and a general reluctance to end or adversely impact otherwise 
promising military careers will further complicate the matter.


The Acting Secretary of the Navy has appointed two convening 
authorities, a Marine Corps lieutenant general and a Navy vice admiral, 
who we expect will deal with the disciplinary and military judicial aspects 
of this matter with dispatch, equality and compassion. The next Secretary 
of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps are left with the more difficult problem of determining how 
to resolve and correct the long-term failure of leadership that 
characterized Tailhook 91.


We have every expectation that the Navy will address the causes and 
conduct that combined to produce the disgrace of Tailhook 91, and 
therefore, we offer no recommendations.