SECTION X OFFICER ATTITUDES AND LEADERSHIP ISSUES A. Officer Attitudes A discussion of the attitudes of the officers in attendance is central to an understanding of the misconduct at Tailhook 91. Until this point, we have focused on "what" happened with little discussion or commentary as to "why" events at the convention degenerated to a point where indecent assaults, indecent exposure and excessive alcohol consumption became commonplace. Navy and Marine Corps aviation officers are well educated, physically fit, technically proficient and well trained. Many are Naval Academy graduates or alumni of other top colleges and universities and certainly have the education and background to recognize societal issues such as sexual harassment. Yet some of these individuals acted with disregard toward individual rights and failed by a wide margin to conduct themselves as officers and gentlemen in the Armed Forces of the United States. Although there were approximately 4,000 naval officers at Tailhook 91, and significant evidence of serious misconduct involving 117 officers has been developed, the number of individuals involved in all types of misconduct or other inappropriate behavior was more widespread than these figures would suggest. Furthermore, several hundred other officers were aware of the misconduct and chose to ignore it. We believe that many of these officers deliberately lied or sought to mislead our investigators in an effort to protect themselves or their fellow officers. On the other hand, there were hundreds of other officers who, when questioned, gave full and truthful accounts of their actions and observations while at Tailhook 91. Similarly, there were several hundred officers who spent their time at Tailhook 91 attending symposium events, visiting tourist sites and otherwise occupying themselves in places other than the third floor. Unfortunately, the reputations of those officers, who are guilty of no wrongdoing, have been tarnished by the actions of their fellow officers. Officers who engaged in misconduct gave a variety of reasons for their behavior at Tailhook 91. Perhaps the most common rationale was that such behavior was "expected" of junior officers and that Tailhook was comprised of "traditions" built on various lore. -60 Another reason given by many attendees was that their behavior was somehow justified or at least excusable, because they were "returning heroes," from Desert Storm. Many attendees, especially younger officers, viewed Tailhook as a means of celebrating the United States' victory over Iraqi forces. Numerous officers expressed their belief that Tailhook was a type of "free fire zone" where they could celebrate without regard to rank or ordinary decorum. As one Navy officer opined, "It was condoned early in some of the senior officers' careers. It was probably condoned back when Tailhook started...And I imagine one time when this first--the thing started, they were the elite, they thought they could [do] anything they wanted in Naval aviation and not have to answer the questions we're answering today about it.' Many officers told us they believed they could act free of normal constraints because Tailhook was a accepted part of a culture in some ways separate from the main stream of the Armed Forces. They stated that the career progression for naval aviators is such that most do not bear the leadership responsibilities of commanding a unit until they approach the 10-year point in their careers. (Aviation officers do not follow the career progression of command of increasingly larger units from the outset of their Military Service. Unlike Army ground units, where the newest second lieutenant is trained t he a unit leader, aviators for the most part are viewed as unit members for the initial portion of their careers.) -61 Some senior officers blamed the younger officers for rowdy behavior and cited a "Top Gun" mentality. They expressed their belief that many young officers had been influenced by the image of naval aviators portrayed in the movie "Top Gun". The officers told us that the movie fueled misconceptions on the part of junior officers as to what was expected of them and also served to increase the general awareness of naval aviation and glorify naval pilots in the eyes of many young women . One female Navy commander opined that the 1991 Tailhook convention was different in some ways from previous years, in part because of the recent Gulf War and the congressional inquiries regarding women in combat. The heightened emotions from the Gulf War were also enhanced with the forthcoming...downsizing of the military, so that you had people feeling very threatened for their job security and to more than just their jobs, their lifestyle. So you had people worried about what was coming down with the future. You had quite a bit of change. You had people that had been to the Gulf War. You had alcohol. You had a convention that had a lot of ingredients for any emotional whirlwind of controversy. She went on to say that these potentially explosive ingredients combined at Tailhook 91, and resulted in "...an animosity in this Tailhook that existed that was telling the women that 'We don't have any respect for you now as humans'." The animosity, in this officer's opinion, was focused on women: "This was the woman that was making you, you know, change your ways. This was the woman that was threatening your livelihood. This was the woman that was threatening your lifestyle. This was the woman that wanted to take your spot in that combat aircraft." We found that all those factors were at play among the Tailhook 91 attendees. One rationale, that of the returning heroes, emphasizes that naval aviation is among the most dangerous and stressful occupations in the world. During Desert Storm, for example, the U.S. Navy suffered six fatalities, all of whom were aviation officers. We also found that the "live for today for tomorrow you may die" attitude expressed by many officers is a tact of life for many aviation officers. Over 30 officers died in the one- year period following Tailhook 91 as a result of military aviation related accidents. Others were found to have died in nonmilitary plane accidents, in vehicle crashes and, in at least one incident, by suicide. Although none of these factors justify the activities at Tailhook, they help illuminate the attitudes of many attendees. Many officers likened Tailhook to an overseas deployment, explaining that naval officers traditionally live a spartan existence while on hoard ship and then party while on liberty in foreign ports. Dozens of officers cited excessive drinking, indecent exposure and visits to prostitutes as common activities while on liberty. That was acknowledged by virtually all interviewees, from junior officers through flag officers. The most frequently heard comment in that regard was "what happens overseas, stays overseas." Officers said that activities such as adultery, drunkenness and indecent exposure which occur overseas are not to be discussed or otherwise revealed once the ship returns to home port. A similar attitude carried over to the annual Tailhook conventions. Countless officers told us it was common knowledge that "what happened at Tailhook stayed at Tailhook" and there were unwritten rules to enforce the policy. Frequently cited was the "no wives, no cameras" rule, which dated back to the earliest Tailhook reunions. Reportedly. few officers took their wives and only a small number of women attended. Witnesses told us that at earlier Tailhooks, many of the women in attendance were prostitutes. As years went by, however, women began to play a larger role as officers in naval aviation. Civilian women also began attending Tailhook conventions as a means of meeting naval pilots. The increase in the number of women attendees is supported by the tact that we were able to identify over 470 female attendees, many of whom were interviewed. Officers told us that the improper activity discussed in this report was nothing new but had merely come to light as a result of the influx of female attendees. The officers frequently opined that gauntlet participants could not or would not differentiate between the groupies and prostitutes who had been a part of Tailhook for many years, and other women who attended Tailhook 91. Despite the "no cameras" policy, our investigation collected more than 800 photographs, some of which depict indecent exposure. It is interesting to note that approximately two-thirds of the photographs were provided to us by female civilians and that nearly half of the remaining pictures were furnished by female naval officers. One disturbing aspect of the attitudes exhibited at Tailhook 91 was the blatant sexism displayed by some officers toward women. That attitude is best exemplified in a T-shirt worn by several male officers. The back of the shirt reads "WOMEN ARE PROPERTY," while the front reads "HE- MAN WOMEN HATER'S CLUB." The shirts, as well as demeaning posters and lapel pins, -62 expressed an attitude held by some male attendees that women were at Tailhook to ÒserveÓ -63 the male attendees and that women were not welcome within naval aviation. (See Figure 16) Figure 16. ÒWomen Are PropertyÓ T-shirt as worn in one squadron suite [unavailable due to graphics limitations} During the course of our investigation, an incident involving sexual harassment came to our attention. One of the squadron hospitality suites provided the forum for an informal job interview between a Navy captain and a civilian female. The woman had applied for a GM-I5 position within the captain's command. The captain was the hiring official for the position. Our investigation determined that the captain made numerous sexually oriented comments to the woman, questioned her sexual preferences and also directed her to stand up and turn around in front of him so as to enable him to view her buttocks. The incident was witnessed by other naval officers, as well as a civilian. Details of this matter have been referred under separate cover to Navy authorities. B. The Failure of Leadership One of the most difficult issues we sought to address was accountability, from a leadership standpoint for the events at Tailhook 91. The various types of misconduct that took place in the third floor corridor and in the suites, it not tacitly approved, were nevertheless allowed to continue by the leadership of the naval aviation community and the Tailhook Association . -64 The military is a hierarchical organization, which requires and is supposed to ensure accountability at every level. As one moves up through the chain of command, the focus on accountability narrows to fewer individuals. At the highest levels of the command structure, accountability becomes less dependent on actual knowledge of the specific actions of subordinates. At some point, "the buck stops here" applies. In the case of Tailhook 91, the buck stops with the senior leaders of naval aviation. Tailhook 91 is the culmination of a long-term failure of leadership in naval aviation. What happened at Tailhook 91 was destined to happen sooner or later in the "can you top this" atmosphere that appeared to increase with each succeeding convention. Senior aviation leadership seemed to ignore the deteriorating standards of behavior and failed to deal with the increasing disorderly, improper and promiscuous behavior. Throughout our investigation, officers told us that Tailhook 91 was not significantly different from earlier conventions with respect to outrageous behavior. Most of the officers we spoke to said that excesses seen at Tailhook 91 such as excessive consumption of alcohol, strippers, indecent exposure and other inappropriate behavior were accepted by senior officers simply because those things had gone on for years. Indeed, heavy drinking, the gauntlet and widespread promiscuity were part of the allure of Tailhook conventions to a significant number of the Navy and Marine Corps attendees. In seeking to identify the measure of responsibility properly borne by senior officers, it would be unfair to focus solely on the senior officers who attended Tailhook 91. Some measure of responsibility is also borne by other senior officers, some still on active duty and others now retired who attended previous Tailhook conventions and permitted the excesses of the annual conventions to continue unchecked. As we reported in Tailhook 91, Part 1, the nature of the misconduct at the annual conventions was well-known to senior aviation leaders. However, although aware of the activities and atmosphere, they were incapable of dealing with the increasingly indulgent behavior. The efforts taken to control their subordinates at Tailhook, through the years, were sometimes effective but only for limited periods. In our view, by September 1991, both individually and collectively, the senior leaders of naval aviation were unwilling to take the kinds of measures necessary to effectively end the types of misconduct that they had every reason to expect would occur at Tailhook 91. Moreover. the misconduct at Tailhook 91 went far beyond the "treatment of women" issues for which the Navy had enacted new policies in the years preceding Tailhook 91. The Tailhook traditions (the gauntlet, ballwalking, leg shaving, mooning, streaking and lewd sexual conduct) so deviated from the standards of behavior the nation expects of its military officers that the repetition of this behavior year after year raises serious questions about the senior leadership of the Navy. We found a great disparity between espoused Navy policies regarding consumption of alcohol and treatment of women and the actual conduct of' significant numbers of those officers at Tailhook 91. We were repeatedly told that such behavior was widely condoned by Navy civilian and military leadership. Some senior officers themselves had participated in third floor improprieties in previous years when they were junior officers to the extent that certain offensive activities had become a matter of tradition. For example, we found that officers, including some field grade officers, engaged in improper conduct such as indecent exposure and physical contact with strippers. In that regard, one Navy lieutenant told us, "...I don't think that anybody saw anything that they felt hadn't happened in the past. And so...it it had been allowed to happen in the past, they'd just let it go. They felt there was no reason to stop anything that they hadn't (sic) seen before." Relatedly, a lieutenant commander stated: "And I think you have to say that aviators emulate those who preceded them, and that Tailhooks that preceded them have legends of their own, and young aviators are going to try to mimic those people who are in a position to teach them and train them." Another junior officer, who admitted to participating in the gauntlet, told us "If I thought that going around and goosing a few girls on the breasts was going to create a national incident, do you think I would have done that? We only did it because the party atmosphere seemed to promote that...Admiral Dunleavy and the rest of his cronies who go to Hook every year, man, they must be wearing some blinders, because it has been happening every single year that I know of." Senior officers, on the other hand, referred to their perception that the third floor was somehow the domain of the younger officers. Senior officers, including an admiral, told us there was a lack of respect exhibited toward older officers by some junior officers and noted their belief that they would have been powerless to act successfully in attempting to stop third floor improprieties. An example of the lack of respect is illustrated in an anecdote related by a Navy lieutenant. He told us that on Saturday night at about 10:00 p.m. he and two other lieutenants were waiting in line to use a suite rest room. An admiral tried to cut in front of them. The lieutenant challenged the admiral who reminded the officers that he was an admiral (0-8). The lieutenant (0-3) objected to the admiral's attempt to pull rank and told the admiral that the three 0-3s added up to an 0-9 and the admiral should go to the back of the line. Many factors contributed to a feeling of resentment by junior officers toward higher ranking officers. One aspect related to a perception that, despite their success in Desert Storm, junior officers would be adversely affected by the anticipated drawdown of troops. Yet another factor related to us was the squadron officers' use of their personal funds to pay for the suites, alcohol and entertainment. Flag officers and many of the Navy captains and Marine Corps colonels in attendance did not help fund the third floor activities. That tact, together with the lack of uniforms and absence of any official Navy participation with regard to squadron hospitality suites contributed to a perception held by many attendees that the party was a private one hosted by junior officers. Numerous officers attributed the perception that they could act with impunity to the uniqueness of the naval aviation community. -65 They explained that aviators are used to working in a rank-neutral environment frequently addressing more senior officers by their pilot "call signs" rather than by their rank. The witnesses also noted that aviation officers are less rank conscious and, therefore, less intimidated by the presence of more senior officers. The demarcation between junior and senior officers was further blurred by the abundance of alcohol and nearly everyone's dressing in T-shirts and shorts as opposed to Navy or Marine Corps uniforms. As told to us by one officer, "...the more you drink, the less noticeable any ranks would be, from looking upward and looking downward, you know." Field Grade Officers We interviewed 331 field grade officers who attended Tailhook 91. -66 As number of those officers were the commanders of squadrons that hosted suites at the convention. Others had responsibility over groups of squadrons represented at Tailhook 91 or had previously commanded or been members of those squadrons. The field grade officers typically had completed more than 12 years of service and many had more than 20 years of experience in naval aviation. A large portion of the field grade officers had attended prior Tailhook conventions. As indicated throughout the report, there were isolated instances in which field grade officers sought to remedy or prevent acts of misconduct; while in other instances, field grade officers themselves engaged in misconduct. With respect to the squadron commanders who attended Tailhook 91, we found similar patterns of behavior. Prior to Tailhook 91, the squadron commanders had received letters from the Tailhook Association president warning them about underage drinking and the "late night gang mentality" that had occurred at prior conventions. Some squadron commanders enforced proper conduct within their suites. Others chose to ignore events in their suites under the premise that Tailhook 91 was a private function rather than an official Navy activity. Several commanders told us they had difficulty in ensuring proper decorum despite prohibitions they issued. In one instance, a commander closed his unit's suite because of damage done to the suite.-67 The commanders who sought to forestall improper conduct at Tailhook 91 nevertheless were unwilling or unable to take actions to determine those responsible for the misconduct that actually took place at Tailhook 91. We found no evidence that any commander initiated any inquiry or took any disciplinary measures in the month between the Las Vegas convention and the initiation of the NIS investigation into the assault on LT Coughlin. Further, even those commanders who later told us that their subordinates had violated their orders regarding operation of the hospitality suites did nothing to address the misconduct that they acknowledged to us. -68 The Flag Officers We interviewed each of the 30 active duty admirals, 2 active duty Marine Corps generals and 3 N Reserve admirals who attended Tailhook 91.69 We believe a discussion of the activities of the flag officers at Tailhook 91 is necessary and relevant, as was the discussion of the participation of Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett, 111, which was included in Tailhook 91, Part 1, in or to provide the backdrop against which the misconduct of junior officers occurred, as well as to asses their accountability. In interviewing the flag officers who attended Tailhook 91, we attempted to determine which of them had specific knowledge of any misconduct. For the most part, the flag officers participated in or attended the scheduled symposium activities such as seminars, sporting events and dinners. -70 Of the 35 flag officers we interviewed, 28 told us that they visited the third floor on Friday or Saturday night, or both nights, shortly after the conclusion of the evening dinner. Most of the officers stated that they arrived on the third floor between 9:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. Some flag officers told us they remained only briefly while others stayed for up to several hours. According to their testimony, with one notable exception discussed at length below, none of the flag officers, including those who spent several hours on the third floor and adjoining patio, witnessed any nudity or indecent exposure (including ballwalking, streaking or mooning), nor any activity occurring during the gauntlet. We interviewed VADM Richard M. Dunleavy, then the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) during the investigation. -71 In his initial interview, VADM Dunleavy denied having observed both leg shaving and the gauntlet, even when confronted with information we had obtained alleging that he observed leg shaving at Tailhook 90, had made favorable comments about leg shaving to the officers engaged in the activity, and had observed it again at Tailhook 9l. When we interviewed VADM Dunleavy the next day, he acknowledged that he had encouraged leg shaving at Tailhook 91 based on his favorable impression of the activity during the previous year's convention. Further, he acknowledged knowing that strippers performed during Tailhook 91 and prior conventions. Most significantly, he acknowledged to us that he was aware of the existence of the gauntlet and observed the activity that occurred during the gauntlet at Tailhook 91. VADM Dunleavy told us that after the 1990 convention, he learned that the term "gauntlet" was being used to identify a group of young aviators who gathered along the walls in the third floor hallway where they groped women who passed through the corridor. On Saturday night of the 1991 convention, he was on the third floor and became aware that the gauntlet was forming. He further told us that when he went into the third floor hallway, he saw that it was crowded and a commotion was occurring as the men "hooted and hollered." He stated he heard men yelling "Show us your tits!" but that he did not intervene because he believed he would not be heard above the commotion and because the activities "appeared to be in fun, rather than molestation." He stated that it was his impression at the time that no one was upset and he believed that "they [women] would not have gone down the hall if they did not like it." We believe that VADM Dunleavy's attitude toward leg shaving which was one of approval and encouragement and, more significantly, toward the gauntlet which was one of tolerance represents a serious, individual failure to recognize the impropriety of these activities and to take action to stop them. We find ourselves in a serious dilemma with respect to what the flag officers did not see. Although we obtained significant evidence that misconduct occurred at Tailhook 91 on a widespread basis, flag officers, according to their testimony, seemed to be relatively unaware of it. We are of the opinion that the majority of them are being truthful in stating their lack of knowledge with respect to specific acts of sexual misconduct. While we have reservations about the categorical denials of some of the flag officers that they were completely unaware of any specific misconduct, especially when viewed in light of their past experiences at prior Tailhook conventions, it would be unfair for us to question the credibility of any one of them in the absence of controverting evidence on this matter. In addition to whatever specific knowledge any of the flag officers may have had, it is our opinion that there was general knowledge among the Navy's senior aviation leadership of the inappropriate behavior that had become commonplace on the third floor during annual Tailhook conventions. In part, we base this opinion on the fact that 33 of the 35 flag officers who attended Tailhook 91 had attended prior Tailhook conventions; that 2 of the flag officers were past Tailhook Association Presidents; and that all of the aviation flag officers were former squadron commanders. Further, concern was expressed by flag officers over the excesses at prior Tailhook conventions as early as 1985. Many of the junior officers we interviewed told us that knowledge of the type of misconduct which occurred at Tailhook 91 was widespread throughout the aviation community. Finally, we obtained eyewitness testimony that one former high-ranking Navy civilian official engaged in inappropriate activity with a stripper in front of junior officers at a prior Tailhook convention, indicating that, at least in one instance, a senior official was aware of and participated in the type of activities for which junior officers are now being criticized. Notes 60 Throughout our investigation, witnesses told us of remarkable incidents at past Tailhook conventions. Incidents related by witnesses included a high ranking Navy civilian official dancing with strippers in hospitality suites, the throwing of flaming mannequins from rooftops, food fights, earlier gauntlets and strip shows, an admiral taxiing an aircraft to the hotel, another admiral entering a banquet on horseback and the use of a chainsaw to demolish a wall separating two suites. While some of these incidents were more prankish than improper, they combined to form the aura of "anything goes" which was the predominant attitude expressed by naval aviators regarding the annual Tailhook conventions. 61 Indeed, during our interviews of them, many senior officers repeatedly referred to the aviation lieutenants and lieutenant commanders as "the kids." To us, their use of this term, in context, symbolized an attitude where irresponsible behavior and conduct were accepted manifestations of high-spirited youth. The attitude is a major departure from the traditions of the ground forces, where newly commissioned second lieutenants control the lives of their platoon members and are expected by their superiors to demonstrate the personal qualities of a leader. 62 Some officers wore pins stating "NOT IN MY SQUADRON." This is an apparent parody of the Navy's "Not in My Navy" slogan which is intended to express the Navy prohibition of sexual harassment against women. Some officers told us that the pins signified contempt for women in naval aviation and, specifically, the desire to maintain the combat exclusion with respect to women. Other officers told us that the pins merely expressed the desire to keep the F-14 aircraft rather than the F-18 replacement planned by the Navy. 63 One squadron called a UNLV official and requested the telephone numbers of all UNLV sorority sisters. When she refused to furnish the information, the officer told her that she was "denying" the girls the "opportunity to serve their country." The UNLV official reported that the officer was rude, resulting in her abrupt termination of the call. She also reported that "fliers" soliciting girls to attend Tailhook 91 were later placed in all UNLV sorority mailboxes. The official identified the invitation shown in Section V of this report as a copy of one of the fliers. 64 See Tailhook 91, Part I, pp. 9 -11. 65 We found that aviation officers view themselves as unique. The perception is based not only on their occupation hut also on such matters as progression in rank and even their uniform. Aviation officers can frequently progress to the rank of lieutenant commander without ever having been in command of a unit. They are also distinguishable from other naval officers by their aviation wings insignia and brown, rather than black, uniform shoes. 66 This group consisted of 85 Navy captains, 7 Marine Corps colonels, 218 Navy commanders and 21 Marine Corps lieutenant colonels. 67 The details regarding activities in each of the 22 squadron hospitality suites are set forth at Appendix E. 68 This failure is consistent with the inaction of many officers who told us they witnessed assaults, indecent exposure and other improprieties at Tailhook 91 and elected at that time not to intervene. 69 By rank, this group consisted of 2 admirals, 6 vice admirals, I lieutenant general, 4 rear admirals (upper f half), 1 major general and 18 rear admirals (lower half). These numbers include officers selected for promotion Ñ prior to Tailhook 91 (see Appendix G). A significant number of retired flag officers also attended Tailhook 91. During our investigation, we spoke with 41 retired admirals and I retired Marine Corps general who attended. Together, there were nearly 80 flag officers, active, Reserve and retired at Tailhook 91. 70 A few of the flag officers did not attend the entire convention. For example, the major general arrived at 12:00 noon on Thursday and left at 5:00 p.m. that same day. 71 During the Navy's initial investigations of Tailhook 91, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) suspected that VADM Dunleavy may have had knowledge of the existence of the gauntlet. The interview of VADM Dunleavy by the Navy was discussed in Tailhook 91, Part 1, p. 17. VADM Dunleavy retired on July 1, 1992. A nomination for his retirement in the grade of Vice Admiral was not acted on by the Senate prior to its adjournment.