This file was prepared for electronic distribution by the inforM staff. Questions or comments should be directed to inform-editor@umail.umd.edu. STATEMENT ON THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT United States Commission on Civil Rights Clearinghouse Publication 56 December 1978 3. Effect of the Equal Rights Amendment The current status of women's rights underscores the continuing need for the ERA as a solid and permanent constitutional basis for achieving sex equality under the law. The fundamental legal principle to be established by the Equal Rights Amendment is that the law "must deal with the individual attributes of the particular person and not with stereotypes. . .based on sex." -1 The amendment will apply to any law, policy, or practice in which the government is directly or substantially involved. -2 Legislative history and a growing body of law defining "government action" with respect to other constitutional provisions make clear that the ERA will not affect private conduct that the government does not normally regulate. -3 Purely social relationships between men and women and the very private decisions of an individual to be a full-time homemaker, for example, will be outside the purview of the ERA. -4 The extensive legislative history indicating what congressional proponents intended the proposed amendment to accomplish is an important source for understanding its effect. Congressional reports and debates undoubtedly will be relied upon by the courts as a guide in interpreting the Equal Rights Amendment. -5 A second source for understanding and anticipating the effects of the ERA comes from the experience in the 14 States that since 1970 have enacted provisions in their own constitutions prohibiting discrimination based on sex. -6 Taking the Federal Government's lead, these States already have mandated equal rights under law for women and men within their borders. The experience of these "ERA States" in conforming their laws and policies to this mandate provides an important model for ERA implementation on a national level. Despite some dire predictions of the potential effect of the Equal Rights Amendment on the "fabric" of the Nation, the State experience has been one of substantial strides toward equality. The value of the State experience in predicting the Federal amendment's effect is enhanced by the fact that many States have drawn heavily on the Federal legislative history in interpreting and implementing their own provisions. -7 This source for understanding the Federal ERA's effect was not available when Congress adopted the Equal Rights Amendment in 1972. It confirms that the ERA is an appropriate measure to remedy the lengthy history and persistent reality of sex-based discrimination. ERA Implementation: Overview Statutory Reform through the Legislative Process The proposed Federal Equal Rights Amendment will "take effect two years after the date of ratification," allowing the States and the Federal Government ample time to bring their laws, policies, and practices into conformance with the ERA. At both the State and Federal levels, lawmakers already have undertaken comprehensive reviews of existing statutes to bring them into compliance with the principle of sex equality. This is particularly clear in several ERA States, where the most successful attempts have been facilitated by a statewide task force or commission appointed to oversee the legislative conformance process.-8 The orderly legislative review followed in State ERA jurisdictions indicates that the necessary changes do not produce the chaos predicted by ERA opponents. The first step in this review process is identifying laws that contain discriminatory sex-based language -9 or that, while neutral on their face, affect women and men differently.-10 A great majority of the statutes have needed merely cosmetic changes, as where, for example, the pronoun "he" or "his" was used generically and sex-neutral language was substituted. The remaining statutes--those requiring more fundamental, substantive reform-- have been addressed in an attempt to harmonize the underlying social policy of the statute with the principle of sex equality. A review of the Federal ERA's legislative history indicates that it is intended to require changes in all sex-based statutes, unless the gender lines are based on unique physical characteristics or are deemed necessary to protect other constitutional rights such as privacy. -11 Examples of explicit gender lines that must be sex-neutralized under the Equal Rights Amendment are found in laws that on their face: * Limit opportunities for one sex only, such as laws that prohibit women from working in particular jobs; -12 place quotas on the number of women in the military, with its concomitant benefits such as in-service training and GI loans and mortgages; -13 limit employment benefits for working women and their dependents; -14 or limit the right of married women to control their own property. -15 * Confer supposed benefits (often illusory) on women only, such as alimony upon divorce only for wives -16 or minimum wages or rest periods only for female employees. -17 * Make age distinctions on the basis of sex, such as setting different ages for employment -18 or marriage -19 for males and females. With respect to statutes that draw gender lines on the basis of unique physical differences, the ERA's legislative history makes clear that they are exempt from the otherwise absolute prohibition against gender-based distinctions. Thus, laws that regulate sperm banks or provide programs for prenatal care will not be invalidated under the ERA. -20 However, since the physical characteristics involved must be unique, this category of laws is narrow. It does not include, for example, assumptions about women or men because of statistical groupings, such as those used by insurance companies in pension plans. -21 Further, to survive ERA scrutiny, laws dealing with unique physical characteristics must be narrowly drawn and serve compelling state interests. -22 In addition, laws providing for the separation of males and females-- for example, in public restrooms or dormitories--would not be invalidated under the Equal Rights Amendment, because privacy is a right protected by the Constitution. -23 Although ERA opponents like to characterize this as uncertain and suggest that the amendment will require sex-integrated restrooms, the legislative history of the ERA clearly refutes this argument, as does the experience of States with ERA provisions. -24 Finally, congressional debate and experience under State ERA provisions make clear that the ERA does not inhibit a State from prohibiting homosexual marriage. -25 Once it is determined that a particular law must be sex neutralized under the ERA, States and the Federal Government have considerable flexibility in deciding how to end the impermissible sex bias. They may either extend the law in question to cover women and men equally or nullify it entirely. As the Senate report on the ERA stated: it is expected that laws which are discriminatory and restrictive will be stricken entirely as the court did...[with] a law banning women from a certain occupation. On the other hand, it is expected that those laws which provide a meaningful protection would be expanded to include both men and women as for example minimum wage laws. -26 In some States, such as New Mexico, simple language changes and fundamental substantive reform were completed shortly after passage of the State ERA. Not surprisingly, ERA conformance, as with any comprehensive legal change, has not occurred overnight in every State with an equal rights amendment. This transition period is what Congress anticipated in providing for the 2-year grace period before the Equal Rights Amendment would take final effect. Judicial Application and Interpretation The experience under State equal rights amendments has not included extensive litigation, particularly in those States where comprehensive legislative reform answered most questions about the ERA's meaning. Where State courts have decided cases that raised ERA issues, however, they have tended to adhere closely to the legislative history of the Federal Equal Rights Amendment in interpreting their State amendments. The most significant development has been a standard of review in sex discrimination cases that clearly exceeds the standard applied by Federal courts in such cases under the 14th amendment. Most ERA States have used the same legal test that Federal courts now apply to race but not to sex classifications: distinctions between the sexes are automatically considered "suspect," and the State can justify such classifications only by showing that it has a compelling interest in the legislative purpose and that the sex distinction is essential to achieving that goal. - 27 In Pennsylvania, the State courts have moved beyond even the "suspect classification" test and adopted standards approaching the "absolute ban" against sex discrimination set out in the legislative history of the Federal ERA. -28 Since adoption of the State ERA in 1971, the high court of Pennsylvania has struck down all gender-based laws that have come before it or has fashioned sex-neutral alternatives through careful judicial construction. -29 Relying on Federal legislative history, State courts have also adopted limited exceptions to the mandate against statutory gender lines and discriminatory government actions. For example, basic privacy and morality issues have been carefully handled by the courts. The New Mexico Supreme Court dismissed an ERA challenge to a State university rule against coed visitation in the dormitories, recognizing that this rule derived from accepted standards of privacy and social mores and had neither the intent nor the effect of invidious discrimination between men and women. -30 The Washington courts have refused to hold that their State ERA requires validation of homosexual marriage otherwise unrecognized under State law. -31 Also, sex-based definitions of rape have been upheld against State ERA challenges under the "unique physical characteristics" doctrine. -32 Substantive Reform under State ERAs Domestic Relations One of the primary areas of substantive law reform under State ERAs has been in domestic relations. This is an area of law traditionally riddled with gender-based definitions of rights and responsibilities that embody deeply imbedded stereotypes about women and men. This also is an area that ERA opponents frequently point to for examples of how the Equal Rights Amendment would damage the "special status" of women under the law and within society at large. Foremost, ERA opponents have warned that ratification of the amendment would result in the repeal of laws obligating men to support their families. -33 In none of the ERA States, however, have laws requiring husbands to support dependent wives and children been repealed. -34 Nor have these laws been rewritten to require a "fifty-fifty" breakdown in the financial responsibilities of men and women during marriage or at the time of divorce. Instead, legal standards for support in these States now look to the actual needs and capabilities of each family member, not simply to the gender of the individual. -35 This result is consistent with the legislative history of the Federal ERA. -36 For example, the Texas Family Code now provides that "each spouse has the duty to support his or her minor children." -37 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals has ruled consistently that the ERA: does not require that the parents make mathematically equal contributions for the support of their children. It only provides that each parent has the equal obligation, in accordance with his or her ability, to contribute money or services which are necessary for the support and maintenance of his or her children. -38 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also has ruled that the "equal obligation" of men and women to support their families under the ERA does not mean mathematical equality in dollars and cents. In fact, courts in Pennsylvania must count in the balance not only the differing capabilities of each spouse to earn money outside the home, but the economic value of the services being provided by the homemaker spouse as well. -39 Recently, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ruled that the ERA did not require any direct financial contribution to child support by a mother who felt it necessary to be at home with her young children. -40 Her services at home were valued, as were the financial contributions of the supporting father. Of course, there are women who have been charged with the support of their husband or children under sex-neutral family support laws. When the public distortions of these cases are set aside, however, the equity of the court decisions becomes clear. For example, countless editorials and debates about the dangers of the ERA have referred to the Pennsylvania case of Buonocore v. Buonocore, -41 which charged the noncustodial mother with child support. But under the facts of the Buonocore case, this was quite fair. In 1973 Agnes Buonocore moved out of the marital home, leaving her husband and their two minor children. A year later, after she had shown no interest in taking custody of the children and had contributed nothing toward their support, her husband sued her for a contribution to child support. At that time she was earning a net weekly salary equivalent to her husband's, whose expenses included raising two young children. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania upheld an award of $30 a week support against Mrs. Buonocore, an award that certainly would not have been newsworthy if she had been a man. Another case--this one from Maryland--that underscores the fairness of the "mutual responsibility" doctrine of the Equal Rights Amendment is Tignor v. Tignor -42 At the time the marriage dissolved, Mr. Tignor sued Mrs. Tignor for support, since he is blind and had relied on his wife's financial support during the marriage. This extra information clarifies the court's willingness to require Mrs. Tignor to continue supporting her husband after the marriage ended. The growing recognition of "mutual family responsibility" in ERA States has brought with it needed confirmation of a married woman's economic rights in the marital partnership. In Maryland and Pennsylvania, for example, courts have relied on the ERA to abolish the common law presumption that all household goods belong to the husband. -43 One of these cases, DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, involved a woman who sought on divorce to recover a portion of the personal property, jewelry, household furniture, and other effects accumulated by the couple during their 10-year marriage. Since Pennsylvania had a legal presumption that all household goods belonged to the husband, Mr. DiFlorido challenged his wife's right to receive any portion of the marital effects. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared the one-sided presumption unconstitutional, ruling for the first time that both spouses should share equally in the distribution of marital assets. Pointing to the ERA, the court noted: "we cannot accept an approach that would base ownership of household items on proof of funding alone, since to do so. . .would fail to acknowledge the equally important and often substantial nonmonetary contributions made by either spouse." -44 Massachusetts also has changed its marriage dissolution laws under the State ERA to provide for consideration of the value of the contributions of the homemaker in making an equitable distribution of marital property at divorce. -45 Another important change in Massachusetts law is the sex neutralization of its "homestead protection." Previously, as "head of household," a man could protect his family homestead against debts of up to $30,000. After a woman, who was the sole support of a dependent husband and child, was turned down under this law, the obvious sex bias and inequity of this result prompted the legislature to extend homestead rights to women as part of their State ERA implementation process. -46 Adoption of the ERA also has equalized marital property laws in States with "community property" systems. In New Mexico, before adoption of the ERA in 1972, the husband's rights to control over the income and assets of the marriage were exclusive. A married woman could not even sign a stock-option agreement with her own employer or advertise the family washing machine for sale without her husband's consent. Now, husband and wife share equally in the management of the community property. -47 One direct benefit of shared management for a homemaker in New Mexico is that she can establish credit in her own name on the basis of her half-control of the community assets. Employment The steps taken by various ERA States to sex neutralize the allocation of worker's compensation benefits illustrate a State's flexibility in determining its route for achieving sex equality. Traditionally, many workers' compensation systems automatically awarded survivor's or dependent's benefits to the families of male workers, on the presumption that wives and children were dependent on the husband's income. The family of a female worker, on the other hand, usually had to present proof that they had depended on her income in order to collect survivor's or dependent's benefits. This stereotype not only penalized male survivors and minor dependents, but also directly discriminated against women workers by undercutting the value of their wage-earning years to their families. Faced with the need to sex neutralize these benefit plans, ERA States have taken different approaches. Washington now has automatic presumptions of dependency for the families of both male and female workers, while Maryland and Virginia require some proof of actual dependency by any spouse or children before benefits can be assigned. -48 Thus, two different social and fiscal policies can both lead to successful ERA conformance. In Pennsylvania, a number of official opinions of the attorney general, issued pursuant to the State ERA, have had a significant effect on employment opportunities for women. For example, girls can no longer be prevented from working as newspaper carriers,49 and women have the right to be barbers and cut men's hair.50 Height requirements for certain public jobs, such as the State police, have been reexamined under the State ERA. -51 In addition, the attorney general has ruled that the State will deny liquor licenses to public establishments that discriminate in the employment of, or refuse to serve, women. -52 Criminal Law In criminal law, there also have been positive results under State ERAs. The primary statutes called into question because of sex-based definitions have been prostitution and rape laws. No ERA State has legalized prostitution. Rather, all but Alaska are now operating under sex-neutral statutes, in compliance with the ERA. Connecticut's new statute is a particularly good example of conformance to both the legal and social policy implications of sex equality. -53 Both prostitutes and patrons are defined sex neutrally and risk the same criminal penalties, thereby equalizing the effect of these laws on individual women and men. Moreover, third parties who promote or profit from prostitution are subject to even stricter penalties, depending on the level of coercion involved and the age of the prostitute. Similarly, most ERA States have neutralized their rape statutes so that both men and women are protected against sexual assaults of all varieties. In addition, many of these States have redefined their rules of evidence and standards of proof in rape cases to do away with sex-biased and unfair evidence rules. -54 In achieving these reforms, State courts have not overturned criminal convictions of any type as a result of an ERA challenge.55 Rather, courts have upheld valid convictions, while neutralizing any underlying sex-based provisions related to sentencing or age differences. -56 Since 1970, Illinois, Texas, and New Mexico -57 have amended their juvenile justice statutes to apply equally to male and female minors, and Pennsylvania has amended sex-based sentencing laws. -58 In addition, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania have begun steps to give women access to the greater range of programs available at male correctional facilities in ways that do not jeopardize the security or privacy rights of individual inmates. -59 Education State ERAs also have promoted positive reform of education. In a number of States, effective ERA challenges have been raised to State and local rules or regulations limiting the participation of girls in athletics programs of public schools. -60 These cases have involved contact sports such as football that are exempted by regulations under Title IX (the Federal law against sex discrimination in education). The result has been to open up competition for athletically inclined girls in sports formerly available to boys only. In Massachusetts, a special trust established to provide financial aid to young men attending law school has now been opened to women as well, as a result of the State ERA. -61 Here again, Title IX would not have reached such sex bias unless the trust was financed with Federal funds. In another case, involving different standards for access to housing at a State university, a Texas court struck down the school's rule prohibiting female students from choosing housing off campus. The court also extended to male students the right to have on-campus facilities made available to them. -62 NOTES 1. Senate Report, supra, at 12. 2. See sec. 1: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." 3. See, e.g., Senate Report, supra, at 12. The equal protection clauses of the 5th and 14th amendments similarly apply only to government action and a substantial body of case law has developed on this issue. See, e.g., Brown, Emerson, Falk, and Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment. A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J. 871, 905-06 (1971). 4. Senate Report, supra, at 11. 5. The Senate Judiciary Committee report represents the views of the proponents on both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. See Citizen's Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Interpretation of Equal Rights Amendment in Accordance with Legislative History (1974). 6. Alas. Const. art I, 3 (1972); Const. Colo. art. II, 29 (1973); Conn. Const. art I, 20 (1974); Hawaii Const. art. I, 4,21(1972); Ill. Const. art. 1, 18 (1970); Md. Decl. of Rts. art. 46 (1972); Mass. Const. art. I (1976); Mont. Const. art. 11, 4 (Supp. 1977); N.H. Const. Pt. 1, art. 2d (1974); Const. of New Mex. art. II. 18 (1973); Purdon's Pa. Const. Ann. art. I, 28 (1971); Tex. Const. art. 1, 3a (1972): Va. Const. art. I, 11 (1971); Wash. Const. art. 31, 1, 2 (1972). In addition, Utah and Wyoming adopted constitutional provisions regarding sex equality at the turn of the century, bringing the total number of States with equal rights provisions to 16. The Utah and Wyoming provisions, however, have resulted in little modern-day application and are unrelated in their legislative history to the proposed Federal ERA. 7. For a detailed discussion of the State ERA implementation process, see Brown et al., Women's Rights and the Law, supra. 8. See, e.g., State of Connecticut, General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research, The Potential Impact of the Proposed Equal Rights Amendment on Connecticut Statutes, No. 15 (March 1973); C.A. Gherardini Illinois Legislative Council, Methods of Implementing the Equal Rights Amendment (mimeographed, January 1973); Governor's Commission to Study Implementation of the Equal Rights Amendment. Annual Legislative Analysis ERA Commission Sponsored Bills (Annapolis, Md., May 1976) 9. In some cases, sex-based terminology may not be discriminatory (e.g., "All men and women who are citizens") or may be inconsequential to the constitutional mandate of the ERA (e.g., "the keeping of female cates"). 10. See Brown et al. Women's Rights and the Law supra, at 16-19. Examples of laws neutral on their face that may have a disparate effect on members of one sex include those pertaining to homemakers, discussed supra, ch. 2, "Family Law." 11. See Senate Report, supra, at 12 and 17; K. Davidson et al., Sex-Based Discrimination 111-12 (1974). 12. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. 187 (1970); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 4107.43 (1973). 13. 10 U.S.C. 8208 (1975). See generally, Binkin and Bach, Women in the Mililary (Brookings Institute, July 1977). 14. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. 114-413, 414; Idaho Code 72-410 (1973); Mo. Ann. Stat. 287.240 (Vernon 1972). 15. See La. Civ. Code Art. 2404, 2334 ("head and master law"). Revisions in this law were adopted in July 1978, but will not become effective until 1980. See La. House Bill No. 1569. 16. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 19 721 (1965); Nevada Rev. Stat. 125.150 (1975) (husband eligible to receive alimony only if disabled). 17. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23-333 (1964). Wyo. Stat. Ann. Tit. 27 27-218 (1967). 18. See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. 35. 19. See Brown et al. Women's Rights and the Law, supra, at 100. 20. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment. . ., supra, at 893-96. 21. In Manhart v. City of Los Angeles,--U.S.--, 46 U.S.L.W. 4347 (1978), Title VII's ban on sex discrimination in employment was relied on to invalidate the use of sex-based actuarial tables for setting rates in employer-operated pension plans. However, plans that are not employer operated are beyond the reach of Title Vll and, therefore, can continue to use sex-based rates. Where these plans or practices are regulated by the government, so that the "state action" requirement is satisfied, the ERA can he relied upon to challenge them. 22. See Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment. . ., supra, at 894. The strict scrutiny to be given classifications allegedly based on unique physical characteristics may produce different results when applied, for example, to laws establishing medical leave for childbearing and those concerning income protection plans for workers disabled by pregnancy. The former relate closely to the reproductive function and serve the public interest in malernal and infant health. In contrast, as far as employment is concerned, disabilities related to pregnancy are no different from other temporary disabilities, since both involve a temporary inabilily to work. It is arguable that the employer has no unique interest in maternal and child health distinct from its interest in the health and well-being of all employees. See brief amici curiae of Women's Law Project and American Civil Liberties Union, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. U.S. Supreme Court, Octoher Term, 1975. 23. See Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). While opponents of the ERA often link it with reproduclive freedom for women it is clear that the ERA is not necessary to establish the right of women to such freedom. The right to choose between abortion and childbirth already has been delineated by the Supreme Court as protected under the Constitution's right to privacy. See Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 24. Senate Report. supra, at 12. 25. See. e.g., comments of Sen. Birch Bayh, 118 Cong. Rec. 9331 (1972); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247. 522 P.2d 1187 (1974). 26. See, Senate Report, supra, at 15. 27. See, e.g.. People v. Ellis, 57 Ill. 2d 127, 130, 311 N.E. 2d 98, 10 (1974), in which the Illinois Supreme Court stated: In contrast to the Federal Constitution, which, thus far, does not contain the Equal Rights Amendment, the [Illinois] constitution of 1970 contains section 18 of article 1, and in view of its explicit language, and the debates, we find inescapable the conclusion that it was intended to supplement and expand the guaranties of the equal protection provision of the Bill of Rights and requires us to hold that a classification based on sex is a "suspect classification" which to be held valid must withstand "strict judicial scrutiny." Id at 101. 28. "The thrust of the Equal Rights Amendment is to insure equality of rights under the law and to eliminale sex as a basis for distinction. The sex of citizens of this Commonwealth is no longcr a permissible factor in the determination of their legal rights and legal responsibilities." Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1974). 29. See Brown et. al., Women's Rights and the Law, supra, at 2427, table 2.1. 30. Futrell v. Ahrens. 88 N.M. 284, 540 P.2d 214 (Sup. Ct. 1975). 31. Singer v. Hara. 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974); see also, Opinion of the Colorado Att. Gen., Apr. 24, 1975. 32. People v. Green, 514 P.2d 769 (Colo. 1973); People v. Medrano, 321 N.W.2d 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); Brooks v. Maryland, 330 A2d 760 (Md. Ct. of Spec. App. 1975); Finley v. State of Texas, 527 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Ct. of Crim. App. 1975); and State v. Young, 523 P.2d 946 (Wash. App. Ct. 1974). 33. See Discussion, supra ch.2, "Family Law." 34. Although Pennsylvania does not require a husband to support a dependent wife after divorce, this is totally unrealted to the State ERA, since Pennsylvania has not provided for alimony for men or women for more than 100 years. In 1977 the Maryland Court of Appeals struck down a criminal desertion statute that only applied to the desertion of wives by their husbands. Coleman v. State, 37 Md. App. 322 (1977). The Maryland Legislature immediately reenacted this criminal remedy for nonsupport in sex-neutral form. See H.B. 1170 (1978). 35. Indeed, as of 1976, only six States still had laws charging fathers with sole responsibility for the support of children after divorce: Georgia, IDaho, Maine, Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming. See Brown et a., Women's Rights and the Law, supra, at 152-55. Only 15 States still have alimony statutes phrased in terms of the "husband's" responsibility. Id. at 130-34. 36. See Senate Report, supra, at 17. 37. Texas Family Code Ann. 4.02 (1975). 38. Friedman v. Friedman, 521 S.W.2d 111, 115 (Tex. Ct. of Civ. App. 1975); see also, Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Tex. Ct. of Civ. App. 1974). 39. See Conway v. Dana, 218 A.2d 324 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1974); Green v. Freiheit, Vic. No. 1015 (Fam. Div., 1st Jud. Dist., October Term 1973). 40. Wasiolek v. Wasiolek, 380 A.2d 400 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1977) 41. Com. ex. rel. Buonocore v. Buonocore, 340 A.2d 579 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1975) 42. Tignor v. Tignor, Div. No. 12601 (Md. Cir. Ct., Anne Arundel County, 1974). 43. Bender v. Bender, Civ. No. 152, September Term (Filing May 10, 1978, Md. Ct. of App.); DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 331 A.2d 174 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1975). 44. DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, supra, 331 A.2d at 179 (emphasis in original). 45. Mass. Code Ann. ch. 209, 32, as amended by ch. 609 of L. 1977. 46. Mass. Code Ann. ch. 188, as amended by ch. 791 of L. 1977. 47. New Mexico Stat. Ann. 57-4A-8 (1953), as added by L. 1973, ch. 320, 10, as amended by L. 1975, ch. 246, 6; See New Mexico Commission on the Status of Women, The New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment. 48. Compare Washington Rev. Code Ann. 51.32.050 (1962) with Md. Ann. Code, art. 101 36 (1964) 49. Pa. A.G. Op. No.71 (1971). 50. Pa. A.G. Op. No.69, No.75 (1971). 51. Pa. A.G. No. 57 (1973). 52. Pa. A.G. Op. No. 55 (1974). 53. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 53a-82 and 53a-83 (Rev. 1975). 54. See,eg., Mont.Rev.Code Ann., 94-5 502 to 504 (1969), as amended by L. 1973, ch. 513, 1 and L. 1975, ch 2, 1 and ch. 129, 1. See generally, Brown et al., Women's Rights and the Law, supra at 58-59. 55. See no. 32, ch. 3, supra. 56. Brown et al.. Women's Rights and the Law, supra at 33-34. 57. Ill. Ann Stat., ch. 37, 702-2 (1972); Tex. Fam. Code, 51.02 (1975); N.M. Stat. Ann., 42-7-5 (1975 Supp.). 58. See Commonwealth v. Butler, 328 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1974), for a history of Pennsylvania's sentencing laws. 59. See Note, The Sexual Segregation of Ameriean Prisons, 82 Yale L.J. 1229 (1973); Brown et al., Women's Rights and the Law, supra, at 90-91 n. 2. 60. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association, 334 A.2d 839 (Commonwealth Ct. 1975) (striking down bylaws prohibiting competition between boys and girls in interscholastic sports); Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (striking down regulation prohibiting girls from playing on high school football team); Mora v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist., Civ. No. 75-3182-1 (Boulder County, Colo., Dist. Ct., Dec. 3, 1975) (temporary restraining order issued against rule forbidding girls to practice or play with boys' basketball team). 61. Ebitz v. Pioneer National Bank, 361 N.E.2d 225 (Mass. 1977). 62. Texas Woman's Univ. v. Chayklintaste. 521 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). In another Texas case involving a public school regulation forbidding long hair for male students, the court of civil appeals in Houston interpreted the State ERA as a "suspect classification" analysis, but refrained from applying any judicial standard to the regulation on the ground that the court should not interfere in the daily rulemaking of the schools. Mercer v. Board of Trustees, North Forest Ind. Sch. Dist., 538 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).